facts under both approaches. Id. at 898. Smith's failure to apply each rule of law to the facts of his case does not constitute adequate grounds for this Court's reconsideration of its opinion.
Smith also contends that we erred in granting summary judgment as to damages and entering judgment against defendants, thereby precluding consideration of pre-judgment interest. "Pre-judgment interest is a form of compensation and the decision to award pre-judgment interest rests in the sound discretion of the district court." Michaels v. Michaels, 767 F.2d 1185, 1204 (7th Cir. 1985). When sitting in diversity, the district court must look to the state law to determine if pre-judgment interest is appropriate. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Transport Ins. Co., 846 F.2d 1048, 1051 (7th Cir. 1988) (citing Simmons, Inc. v. Pinkerton's Inc., 762 F.2d 591, 607 (7th Cir. 1985)). Generally, Illinois law requires pre-judgment interest only when provided by statute or by agreement of the parties. U.C. Castings Co. v. Knight and LBK, 754 F.2d 1363, 1376 (7th Cir. 1985). "Moreover, even if authorized by statute, interest can only be awarded if the damages amount is fixed or easily computable." Castings at 1376 (citing First Nat. Bank of Clinton, Illinois v. Insurance Co. of North America, 606 F.2d 760, 769 (7th Cir. 1979). Smith sought compensation for the difference in the value of the truck as warranted and as delivered, as well as incidental and consequential damages. Initially, such a damage recovery was not fixed nor easily computable so as to require pre-judgment interest. However, in this case, damages did not become fixed until Navistar moved to have judgment entered against it for the total amount which a jury could award. However, at this point, judgment was entered and Smith was no longer entitled to pre-judgment interest. Accordingly, we find that the claim for pre-judgment interest is an inadequate ground on which to reconsider our order.
Finally, Smith claims that his expert testimony, previously unavailable, introduces new facts which require this Court's reconsideration of its January 27, 1989 opinion. However, he has not established that this testimony was unavailable prior to the briefings for summary judgment. He has completely failed to rebut Navistar's argument that Smith had access to his expert as of April 13, 1988, prior to Navistar's motion for summary judgment and almost five months before Smith's initial response brief was due. This fact has not been contested in any of the supporting documents presented by Smith. However, even if this report was unavailable, Smith simply could have moved for an extension of time in order to obtain this report. Motions to reconsider cannot "be employed as a vehicle to introduce new evidence that could have been adduced during the pendency of the summary judgment motion. Keene at 665. Nevertheless, even if we were to accept the proposition that the expert's report constitutes new evidence, Smith has failed to demonstrate its relevance. Smith merely states that the report "may be a necessary element to prove unconscionability under UCC § 2-719(3)." (Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration of Interlocutory Order of January 27, 1989, Para. 13) (emphasis added). Standing alone, this allusion to potential relevance does not warrant reconsideration of our prior decision.
Finally, both parties seek an award of costs. However, an award of costs is within the sound discretion of the court. See, e.g., Landau & Cleary, Ltd. v. Hribar Trucking, Inc., 807 F.2d 91 (7th Cir. 1986). We find that costs are inappropriate in this case. Although Smith is technically the prevailing party, its contumacious conduct led to the entry of judgment. We decline to award costs to Navistar because its conduct necessitated litigation in the first instance. Therefore, we deny the request of each party for an award of costs.
Because Smith has presented nothing but vague legal arguments and speculative new evidence, there are no grounds warranting reconsideration of our order. Smith's failure to consider all of the relevant case law does not constitute grounds for reconsideration. Moreover, the expert report proffered by Smith as new evidence does not bring to light any factual issues which would support a reconsideration of this case. Therefore, we deny Smith's motion to reconsider the order of January 27, 1989, and the judgment of February 28, 1989. It is so ordered.
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