extraordinary remedy, and the movant must make a "clear showing" that she is entitled to such relief. 11 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2948, at 428-29 (1973).
After considering the factors set forth in Curtis, supra, the court finds that Haussmann is not entitled to a preliminary injunction. Haussmann has not clearly shown that an irreparable injury will occur before a trial on the merits is conducted. She has already been reinstated and provided with a teaching schedule. Aside from Haussmann's unsubstantiated assertion that she may be unlawfully terminated at some unidentified time in the future, there is no evidence that the school board intends to take such action. A movant cannot demonstrate an irreparable injury through mere speculation or an unfounded fear. Public Serv. Co. of N.H. v. Town of W. Newbury, 835 F.2d 380, 383 (1st Cir. 1987); Goldie's Bookstore, Inc. v. Superior Court, 739 F.2d 466, 472 (9th Cir. 1984); Wright & Miller, supra, at 436-37. "[A] preliminary injunction will not be issued simply to prevent the possibility of some remote future injury. A presently existing actual threat must be shown." Wright & Miller, supra, at 437. Having resumed her teaching duties, Haussmann has failed to demonstrate a presently existing actual threat. For this reason, Haussmann's motion for a preliminary injunction is denied.
Haussmann has also filed a motion for summary judgment, wherein she claims that she is entitled to compensatory and punitive damages, and permanent injunctive relief. For purposes of resolving those claims, the parties are hereby ordered to appear in chambers for a pretrial settlement conference on May 31, 1990, at 8:30 a.m.
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