criminal code and agreeing to assist in the investigation and trial of the employee, stated a cause of action for retaliatory discharge in Illinois. 421 N.E.2d at 880.
In Wheeler v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 108 Ill. 2d 502, 485 N.E.2d 372, 92 Ill. Dec. 561 (1985), the Illinois Supreme Court relied on federal law in holding that protection of citizens from the hazards of radioactive material is as important as the public policy recognized in Palmateer of protecting citizens of Illinois from crime. The court found that the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2011 et seq. (1989), enunciated a public policy of national scope effectively declaring a clearly mandated public policy favoring protection of citizens from the hazards of radioactive material. 485 N.E.2d at 377. Based upon its finding that protection of the State's citizens from hazardous radioactive materials was as important as protecting the State's citizens from crime, the court found that the plaintiff who alleged he was fired in retaliation for refusing to transport radioactive material in violation of the regulations promulgated under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, stated a cause of action in Illinois for the tort of retaliatory discharge.
In Barr v. Kelso-Burnett Co., 106 Ill. 2d 520, 478 N.E.2d 1354, 88 Ill. Dec. 628 (1985), the Supreme Court of Illinois refused to find a clearly mandated public policy in the federal and state constitutional rights of free speech and due process. The court held that the fact that a constitutional or statutory provision is cited in the complaint does not give rise to a claim for retaliatory discharge. 106 Ill. 2d 520, 478 N.E.2d 1354, 88 Ill. Dec. 628. The public policy underlying a statutory or constitutional provision is to be found by examining the history, purpose, and effect of the provision. 106 Ill. 2d 520, 478 N.E.2d 1354, 88 Ill. Dec. 628. The court found that the constitutional provisions relied upon by the plaintiff established a clearly mandated public policy limiting the power of government, but nothing in the provisions established a public policy concerning the relationship between private individuals, including the employer-employee relationship. 478 N.E.2d at 1354. The court reiterated that by its decisions in Kelsay and Palmateer, it did not "'reject a narrow interpretation of the tort of retaliatory discharge' nor 'strongly support' the expansion of the tort". 478 N.E.2d at 1356.
In Price v. Carmack Datsun, Inc., 109 Ill. 2d 65, 485 N.E.2d 359, 92 Ill. Dec. 548 (1985), decided the same day as Wheeler, the Supreme Court of Illinois held that the Illinois Insurance Code did not establish a clearly mandated public policy such that an employee allegedly fired for filing a health insurance claim stated a cause of action for retaliatory discharge. The court noted that the entire insurance industry is regulated and that the Insurance Code regulates all types of insurance and policies issued in the State. 485 N.E.2d at 361. The court after reiterating its statement in Palmateer that a clearly mandated public policy must strike at the heart of a citizen's social rights, duties, and responsibilities, found the matter involved in the plaintiff's complaint to be "a private and individual grievance rather than one affecting our society". 485 N.E.2d at 361.
This court's attempts to find a common thread or trend as to what the Illinois Supreme Court will recognize as a clearly mandated public policy of the State of Illinois is made difficult by the fact that the tort of retaliatory discharge is relatively new in Illinois and there are a limited number of cases in which the Illinois Supreme Court has addressed the issue. However, this fact does not prevent the court from arriving at the conclusion that the policy enunciated in the CRA would not be found by the Illinois Supreme Court to be a clearly mandated public policy of the State in contravention of which an employer who discharges an employee commits the tort of retaliatory discharge.
In the instant case, plaintiff alleges that he was fired for reporting his employer's noncompliance with the CRA, and for his attempts to bring his employer into compliance with the CRA. See 12 U.S.C.A. § 2901, et seq. (1989). Section 2901 enunciates the Congressional findings and statement of purpose of the CRA and provides:
(a) The Congress finds that --
(1) regulated financial institutions are required by law to demonstrate that their deposit facilities serve the convenience and needs of the communities in which they are chartered to do business.