APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS, FIRST DISTRICT, FIRST DIVISION
548 N.E.2d 760, 192 Ill. App. 3d 314, 139 Ill. Dec. 375 1989.IL.1969
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County; the Hon. Francis J. Mahon, Judge, presiding.
PRESIDING JUSTICE MANNING delivered the opinion of the court. BUCKLEY and O'CONNOR, JJ., concur.
DECISION OF THE COURT DELIVERED BY THE HONORABLE JUDGE MANNING
Tyrone Guider, the defendant, brings this appeal from a dismissal of his post-conviction petition without an evidentiary hearing in the circuit court of Cook County. On January 20, 1982, the defendant entered a guilty plea to indictment No. 81-C-6679, charging him with armed robbery (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 38, par. 18-2), deviate sexual assault (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 38, par. 11-3(a)), home invasion (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 38, pars. 12-11(a)(1), (a)(2)), aggravated battery (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 38, par. 12-4(b)(1)) and armed violence (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 38, par. 33A-2). He also pled guilty to indictment No. 80-C-8924, which charged him with home invasion (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 38, pars. 12-11(a)(1), (a)(2)), armed violence (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 38, par. 33A-2), attempted murder, attempted rape, and attempted burglary (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 38, par. 8-4). The trial court sentenced the defendant to 20 years' imprisonment to be served concurrently.
On February 17, 1982, the defendant filed a motion to withdraw his guilty pleas which was denied by the trial court. The defendant appealed that denial, and on November 1, 1982, we affirmed the defendant's conviction and sentence. (People v. Guider (1st Dist. 1982), No. 82 -- 0508 (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23) (hereinafter referred to as Guider I).) Thereafter, on November 8, 1985, the defendant filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief, and the circuit court appointed counsel. A supplemental petition for post-conviction relief was presented to the trial court on July 15, 1987, alleging that the defendant's guilty pleas were coerced. This assertion is based upon his attorney's advice to him that, predicated upon the pending charges, he could be sentenced to 120 years' imprisonment under the applicable statutes. Defendant further alleged in his petition that, relative to indictment No. 81 -- C -- 6679, he was denied the effective assistance of counsel due to his attorney's failure to investigate an alibi defense.
On July 15, 1987, the trial court granted the State's motion to dismiss the petition for post-conviction relief without an evidentiary hearing on the grounds that the defendant had received extensive admonitions from Judge Suria, yet he persisted in his plea of guilty which was determined by Judge Suria to be voluntary. The defendant now appeals that dismissal under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par. 122-1 et seq.). We affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County.
The defendant argues that he was entitled to an evidentiary hearing, and the trial court erred in dismissing his petition since he was denied his due process rights to a fair trial guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment. He further argues that he was denied his sixth amendment right to effective assistance of counsel by virtue of his attorney's failure to investigate an alibi defense, resulting in a coerced guilty plea. He attempts to support these arguments with an assertion that, as to the charges contained in indictment No. 81 -- C -- 6679, on September 18, 1980, the date the incident occurred, he was working at the Matushita Industrial Company, his usual place of employment, and the employee time records would have established an alibi.
The State argues that the trial court properly dismissed defendant's post-conviction petition without an evidentiary hearing where the defendant failed to substantiate his ineffective assistance of counsel claim. We agree. It is well established that a proceeding under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act is not an appeal, per se, but a collateral attack on the judgment. (People v. Caballero (1989), 126 Ill. 2d 248, 258, 533 N.E.2d 1089; People v. Owens (1989), 129 Ill. 2d 303, 307; People v. Albanese (1988), 125 Ill. 2d 100, 104, 531 N.E.2d 17; People v. James (1986), 111 Ill. 2d 283, 291, 489 N.E.2d 1350.) It is also well settled that a post-conviction petitioner is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing as a matter of right, but only when his petition sets forth allegations supported by the trial record or by affidavit which makes a substantial showing that the defendant's constitutional rights have been violated. Caballero, 126 Ill. 2d at 258-59; People v. Owens (1989), 129 Ill. 2d 303, 308; People v. Gaines (1984), 105 Ill. 2d 79, 91-92, 473 N.E.2d 868.
The purpose of the post-conviction proceeding is not to determine the defendant's guilt or innocence. (People v. Stewart (1988), 123 Ill. 2d 368, 372, 528 N.E.2d 631; Albanese, 125 Ill. 2d at 104.) Instead, it is a proceeding limited by the doctrines of res judicata and waiver, which permit inquiry into the constitutional issues involving the original conviction that have not been previously adjudicated or could have been. (People v. Stewart (1988), 121 Ill. 2d 93, 97; People v. Silagy (1987), 116 Ill. 2d 357, 365, 507 N.E.2d 830.) Therefore, a reviewing court's judgment on a prior appeal is res judicata as to all issues actually decided, and any issue that could have been raised in a direct appeal before a court of review is thereafter barred under the waiver doctrine if not presented. (Albanese, 125 Ill. 2d at 105; People v. Kubat (1986), 114 Ill. 2d 424, 436, 501 N.E.2d 111; Silagy, 116 Ill. 2d at 365.) Moreover, relief is not granted under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act by the petitioner's rephrasing of issues in constitutional terms that have been previously raised in his petition. Silagy, 116 Ill. 2d at 371; Gaines, 105 Ill. 2d at 90.
In the present case, the defendant's argument that his guilty plea was involuntary in light of the information received from his attorney that he could be sentenced to 120 years' imprisonment was raised and decided in Guider I. Therefore, the doctrine of res judicata applies. In Guider I we rejected the defendant's claim that his plea was involuntary by specifically noting that "the record shows that defendant was admonished very comprehensively by the trial court and that his plea was made voluntarily and intelligently." Consequently, the issue concerning the voluntariness of the plea is barred. See Stewart, 123 Ill. 2d at 372-73.
The second issue raised by the defendant, that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel due to his attorney's failure to investigate an alibi defense, may also be deemed as waived since he raised that issue on his direct appeal. (Kubat, 114 Ill. 2d at 436; Gaines, 105 Ill. 2d at 88.) Specifically, in Guider I we noted that the record did not support the defendant's contention that his attorney failed to competently represent him. However, our supreme court has frequently held that the doctrines of waiver and res judicata will not be applied in a post-conviction proceeding where such application would be fundamentally unfair. Albanese, 125 Ill. 2d at 106; People v. Cihlar (1986), 111 Ill. 2d 212, 218, 489 N.E.2d 859.
In light of our finding that waiver has occurred and res judicata applies, if we were to consider the defendant's claim under the doctrine of fundamental fairness, the result would be the same. The defendant contends that he was denied his sixth amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel by his attorney's failure to investigate an alibi defense regarding the charges contained in indictment No. 81 -- C -- 6679, and therefore, he is entitled to an evidentiary hearing. Defendant supports this contention with an assertion that on the date the incident occurred, he was working at the Matushita Industrial Company. In order for the defendant to establish his ineffective assistance of counsel claim, he must show that counsel's performance was so deficient that it fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and but for counsel's errors, the result of the proceedings would have been different. (Strickland v. Washington (1984), 466 U.S. 668, 694, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 698, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2068. People v. Albanese (1984), 104 Ill. 2d 504, 525, 473 N.E.2d 1246, cert denied (1985), 471 U.S. 1044, 85 L. Ed. 2d 335, 105 S. Ct. 2061.) In Strickland v. Washington the court further held: "court need not determine whether counsel's performance was deficient before examining the prejudice suffered by the defendant as a result of the ...