The opinion of the court was delivered by: SHADUR
MILTON I. SHADUR, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Maceo Willis ("Willis") has sued several City of Chicago ("City") police officers (collectively "Officers"),
Chicago Police Superintendent LeRoy Martin ("Martin")
and City itself under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ("Section 1983"), claiming numerous violations of Willis' constitutional rights incident to his arrest and detention by Officers from February 11 to 13, 1985.
In May 1988 all defendants moved for summary judgment under Rule 56. This Court's May 27, 1988 memorandum opinion and order (the "Opinion," 687 F. Supp. 380
) dismissed several of Willis' claims on grounds stated there.
Only two of Willis' claims -- those challenging the length and conditions of his detention before he received a hearing -- survived that first round of attack.
1. Kukulka's and O'Connor's motion is denied.
2. City's and Martin's motion is denied and Willis' corresponding cross-motion is granted.
Opinion at 383 set out a brief factual background -- all that was needed in the context of the then-pending motion. Because the current Rule 56 motions concern a considerably narrower set of issues and stand on a different footing, it is necessary to recapitulate the now-relevant facts.
At about 9 a.m. February 11, 1985
Officers met Willis at his place of employment and urged him to accompany them to police headquarters to aid the police in an investigation. Willis agreed and went with Officers to Area 3 Violent Crimes Police Headquarters at 39th and California. Shortly after Willis' arrival at Area 3 (about 1:30 p.m.) Jones prepared an arrest report on Willis. There was no warrant for the arrest.
Willis remained at Area 3 in the custody of Kukulka and O'Connor
until approximately 11 p.m. During that time Willis was placed in a series of lineups resulting in his identification by eight witnesses regarding seven separate sexual assaults. By 7 p.m. the lineups had concluded. At 9 p.m. an Assistant State's Attorney approved filing charges against Willis, and Kukulka immediately drafted the criminal complaints and felony minute sheets.
At 11:45 p.m. Willis was transported to the 9th District Police Station lockup and the police began to process him. At 4:15 a.m. February 12 the 9th District watch commander, or another police officer authorized by the watch commander, approved the charges against Willis. That concluded the processing.
Instead of Willis being taken to court at that point (a subject dealt with a bit later in this factual summary), Willis remained in police hands for different purposes. Early in the afternoon of February 12 he was moved from the 9th District lockup to Area 2 Violent Crimes Police Headquarters to allow the Area 2 officers to place Willis in another series of lineups -- this time relating to the investigation of other sexual assaults -- that the police scheduled for 8 p.m. that evening. No arrest warrant had been issued against Willis for those crimes either.
On February 13 Willis had a bond hearing. Bond was set at $ 300,000. Willis could not post bond and remained in custody. Later that day a grand jury indicted Willis for four sexual assaults.
Chicago Police Department ("Department") General Order ("GO") 78-1 establishes a general policy requiring that each arrestee be brought to court on the first available court date after the completion of processing. GO 78-1 para. VI.C.2 ("Paragraph C-2") recognizes an exception to that policy:
a. In the event Criminal Investigation Division personnel ascertain that there is a necessity for the detention of an arrestee for a period of time longer than that which might routinely be expected, in order that they may continue the investigation, a request for such detention will be made by the unit commanding officer or the area coordinator to the watch commander of the facility where the arrestee is detained.
b. The watch commander will ordinarily honor such requests. . . .
There was in fact a 9:30 a.m. holiday court call on February 12.
Although the booking procedure on the Area 3 charges had been completed in plenty of time for Willis to appear at that February 12 court call, Willis was held past that call pursuant to Paragraph C-2. Indeed, he was not arraigned until February 13.
Complaint Count I charges Kukulka and O'Connor with having violated Willis' Fourteenth Amendment due process rights by (1) not feeding him and (2) not allowing him to use the washroom during the 12-hour period that he was in their custody on February 11. This opinion will consider the first of those claims in detail, then turn briefly to the second.
Though Kukulka and O'Connor dispute Willis' claim that he was not offered nor did he eat any food during the entire time he was at Area 3, they recognize Willis' version must be accepted for current purposes. They contend they are nevertheless entitled to judgment as a matter of law because, they say:
1. There is no constitutionally protected right to food during a 12-hour detention period.
2. Even if such a right exists, Willis cannot show a deprivation of that right in ...