The opinion of the court was delivered by: ALESIA
James H. Alesia, United States District Judge.
The plaintiff, Tyrone Parker ("Parker"), has brought this action against his former employer, the Chicago Housing Authority ("CHA"), and his former co-workers, Zirl Smith ("Smith"), Wendell Johnson ("Johnson"), and Teresa E. Banaszak ("Banaszak"), in their individual and official capacities. Parker's complaint, as amended, consists of three counts. In the first count, Parker alleges that the defendants are liable to him under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for terminating him without due process, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. In the second count, Parker alleges that the defendants conspired to deprive him of his due process rights, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3). In the third count, Parker alleges a breach of contract claim under state law based on the provisions of the CHA employment manual.
The CHA has moved to dismiss all three counts of Parker's amended complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
For the reasons set forth in this opinion, the Court grants the CHA's motion to dismiss Count I, but gives Parker leave to amend that count; grants the CHA's motion to dismiss Count II and dismisses that count with prejudice; and reserves ruling on the CHA's motion to dismiss Count III pending Parker's determination as to whether he is able to amend Count I so as to state a cognizable civil rights claim.
From May 11, 1971 until his termination on February 14, 1986, Parker was employed by the CHA. At the time of his termination, Parker held the position of manager of the Robert Taylor-I Homes. The Robert Taylor-I Homes operate under the auspices of the CHA, which is a municipal corporation charged by statute with controlling low-income housing in the Chicago metropolitan area and governed by a seven-member Board of Directors. Prior to and at the time of Parker's termination, Smith served as Executive Director of the CHA, Johnson served as Deputy Executive Director of the CHA, and Banaszak served as Director of Human Resources of the CHA.
This action arises as a result of Parker's termination by the CHA and certain events preceding his termination. On November 8, 1986, while employed by the CHA, Parker requested permission from his supervisor, Johnson, to receive medical treatment for an alcohol problem. Johnson granted Parker permission to enter an alcohol treatment program at Presbyterian-St. Luke's Hospital ("St. Lukes") for a two-week period. According to Parker, he could not enter that particular treatment program because of his H.M.O. Insurance Plan. After February 6, 1986, however, Parker entered and successfully completed two successive alcohol treatment programs, each of which was offered by another local hospital.
On February 6, 1986, before Parker entered these programs, but after he received Johnson's permission to enter the St. Luke's program, Parker attended a manager's meeting in Johnson's office. At the conclusion of the meeting, Johnson interviewed Parker and alleged that Parker was under the influence of alcohol, an allegation which Parker denies. Based on this interview, Johnson informed Parker that his employment was suspended and that Johnson would recommend Parker's termination. On February 14, 1986, the CHA terminated Parker from his position as manager of Robert Taylor-I Homes.
After a post-termination hearing held on March 3, 1986, the hearing officer recommended that Parker's termination should stand as administered. On April 2, 1986, Parker wrote to Smith, requesting that Smith review the circumstances surrounding Parker's termination and charging that the CHA had violated its own written policies and procedures governing termination, as set forth in the CHA's Manual of Administrative Personnel Policies and Procedures ("the CHA manual"). Smith and Parker subsequently held two meetings regarding Parker's termination. After those meetings, Smith also recommended that Parker's termination stand. This lawsuit followed.
In ruling on the CHA's motion to dismiss, the Court accepts all well-pleaded allegations of Parker's amended complaint as true and views these allegations in the light most favorable to Parker. See Gomez v. Illinois State Bd. of Educ., 811 F.2d 1030, 1039 (7th Cir. 1987). Nevertheless, the fact that Parker's amended complaint is to be viewed liberally does not relieve him of the duty to allege sufficient facts to support his cause of action. See Ellsworth v. City of Racine, 774 F.2d 182, 184 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1047, 89 L. Ed. 2d 574, 106 S. Ct. 1265 (1986). Guided by these standards, we examine each count of Parker's amended complaint in turn.
A. Count I: Parker's Claim Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
In Count I of his amended complaint, Parker claims that the defendants violated Section 1983
in the following respects: