what Dardick and Zuckerman can and cannot do with their judgment, that issue too is not properly before the court on this motion. The court merely has granted judgment to Dardick and Zuckerman. They have not moved to enforce it. Until they do, this issue is not ripe for resolution.
3. The intervenors' third argument is frivolous. That this court has rendered judgments involving the Trust does not make this court the administrator of the Trust. If the intervenors wish to get money from the Trust, they should ask the Trustee. If the Trustee denies them their money wrongfully, they should sue the Trustee. The issues before this court for trial and for post-trial resolution were narrow and specific. See Leigh, 669 F. Supp. at 1393 (discussing issues for trial); id. at 1414-17 (setting forth proper issues for post-trial motions). If the intervenors believed that the court omitted to try certain critical issues or had ignored certain matters for post-trial resolution, they should have included that contention when they appealed this court's decision in Leigh, 669 F. Supp. 1390.
It is too late to present the issue of future administration of the Trust in this case.
In this court's prior opinion, the court ruled that the intervenors' attorney, Richard C. Moenning, had spent a reasonable 807 hours in prosecuting the intervenors' claims. Mr. Moenning had asked the court to multiply this figure times $ 150.00, his current hourly rate, to obtain the "lodestar" amount of attorneys fees for the intervenors. Mr. Moenning spent more time justifying this figure as a risk multiplier, rather than arguing that it was a proper adjustment for inflation. The court rejected Moenning's request for a risk multiplier, and with it went Moenning's prayer for fees at his current hourly rate. See Leigh, 714 F. Supp. at 1473-76.
Four days after this court rendered its decision, the Supreme Court issued its ruling in Missouri v. Jenkins by Agyei, 491 U.S. 274, 109 S. Ct. 2463, 105 L. Ed. 2d 229 (1989). There the Court held that in awarding attorneys fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982), it was appropriate to adjust for a delay in payment by awarding interest on attorneys fees incurred several years prior to an award of attorneys fees. See id. at 2468-69. The care which the Court took in discussing this issue suggests that it would be an abuse of discretion not to adjust for inflation in cases where a significant period of time has passed between the incurring of legal costs and the awarding of fees.
The court thus holds that the intervenors are entitled to an adjustment for inflation, since more than three years has passed between the time their attorney worked for them (March 1984) and the time they petitioned for fees (December 1987).
That an adjustment is appropriate does not mean that the prevailing party is entitled to whatever adjustment he or she puts forth, however. As usual, the intervenors put forth a figure ($ 150.00, their counsel's current hourly rate) and assume that this accurately compensates them for the inflation that prevailed in 1980-87. While the court's calculations confirm that it does,
this appears to be an entirely fortuitous result. The court encourages parties to justify their rates better than the intervenors have, for the court is not inclined to do work which is clearly the responsibility of the party which petitions for fees.
The court will award the intervenors $ 121,050.00 in attorneys fees.
The court grants the intervenors' motion in part and denies it in part. The court enters final judgment (1) in favor of National Boulevard Bank and against the Reliable Trust in the amount of $ 5,755.00; (2) in favor of the Trust and against Libco Corporation and Clyde Engle in the amount of $ 44,763.45; (3) in favor of the Trust and against Nathan Dardick and Ronald Zuckerman in the amount of $ 44,763.45; (4) in favor of Dardick and Zuckerman and against the Trust in the amount of $ 116,984.74; and (5) in favor of the intervening plaintiffs and against Dardick, Zuckerman, Libco, and Engle in the amount of $ 126,850.54. The court directs the clerk to file the documents submitted in camera to the court under seal.