APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS, SECOND DISTRICT
LOWELL KOUSINS et al., on behalf of themselves and all
545 N.E.2d 779, 189 Ill. App. 3d 771, 137 Ill. Dec. 126 1989.IL.1608
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Lake County; the Hon. Stephen E. Walter, Judge, presiding.
JUSTICE REINHARD delivered the opinion of the court. UNVERZAGT, P.J., and WOODWARD, J., concur.
DECISION OF THE COURT DELIVERED BY THE HONORABLE JUDGE REINHARD
Plaintiffs, Lowell and Carol Kousins, appeal from the order of the circuit court of Lake County dismissing their amended complaint seeking relief from the alleged illegal assessment of a real estate tax penalty.
The issue presented on appeal is whether the trial court lacked jurisdiction to consider the claim raised in plaintiffs' complaint.
Plaintiffs were assessed real estate taxes for 1984 in the amount of $3,856.98 to be paid in two equal installments of $1,928.49. The first installment was due on June 2, 1985, and the second installment was due on September 3, 1985. Plaintiffs paid the first installment on July 12, 1985.
On or about July 21, 1985, plaintiffs received notice that they were being charged a penalty of $57.85 because their payment was late. The penalty was calculated at a 1 1/2%-per-month rate on the $1,928.49 first installment for the entire months of June and July. Plaintiffs paid the $57.85 penalty on July 21, 1985.
Plaintiffs filed an amended class action complaint contending, inter alia, that any penalty imposed after the July 12, 1985, date of payment of the first installment is unauthorized by law and seeking injunctive and declaratory relief. The circuit court, on June 22, 1988, granted defendants' motion to dismiss with prejudice, finding that it lacked jurisdiction to consider plaintiffs' claim because plaintiffs had an adequate remedy at law and because plaintiffs' claim did not establish that the complained-of penalty was unauthorized by law.
On June 29, 1988, defendants filed a motion for attorney fees and costs pursuant to section 2-611 of the Civil Practice Law (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 110, par. 2-611). On July 11, 1988, plaintiffs moved to dismiss defendants' section 2-611 motion and filed a cross-motion for attorney fees and costs pursuant to section 2-611. Plaintiffs appealed only from the order dismissing their amended complaint, and this court dismissed the appeal because there was no finding pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 304(a) (107 Ill. 2d R. 304(a)) making the dismissal order final and appealable. (Kousins v. Anderson (1989), 180 Ill. App. 3d 827, 536 N.E.2d 487.) On remand, the circuit court entered an agreed order dismissing the parties' section 2-611 cross-petitions, and this appeal ensued.
The usual vehicle for challenging tax assessments is the legal remedy provided by statute for paying taxes under protest and filing objections to the application for judgment. (Clarendon Associates v. Korzen (1973), 56 Ill. 2d 101, 104, 306 N.E.2d 299.) Independent grounds for equitable jurisdiction in real estate tax cases exist only when no adequate legal remedy is available, when exempt property is taxed, or when an unauthorized tax is levied. (First National Bank & Trust Co. v. Rosewell (1982), 93 Ill. 2d 388, 392, 444 N.E.2d 126; see also Schlenz v. Castle (1986), 115 Ill. 2d 135, 141, 503 N.E.2d 241.) The two latter situations constitute independent grounds for equitable relief, and, in such cases, it is not necessary that the remedy at law be inadequate. (Clarendon Association, 56 Ill. 2d at 105, 306 N.E.2d at 301.) As to the unauthorized-by-law exception, the question is not whether the tax is valid but, rather, whether the assessor has the power to function. (North Pier Terminal Co. v. Tully (1976), 62 Ill. 2d 540, 548, 343 N.E.2d 507.) The challenge must be to the assessor's authority to act in order to sustain equitable jurisdiction. North Pier Terminal Co., 62 Ill. 2d at 548, 343 N.E.2d at 511.
In this case, plaintiffs contend that the county collector improperly imposed a penalty on their late first installment by assessing a 1 1/2% penalty for the entire month of July rather than applying that rate on a pro rata basis through July 12 only. In other words, plaintiffs argue that because the first installment was paid on July 12, it was no longer unpaid and late and therefore the ...