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09/27/89 the People of the State of v. Peter Redisi

September 27, 1989

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE

v.

PETER REDISI, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT



APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS, SECOND DISTRICT

544 N.E.2d 1136, 188 Ill. App. 3d 797, 136 Ill. Dec. 361 1989.IL.1524

Appeal from the Circuit Court of Lake County; the Hon. Harry D. Hartel, Jr., Judge, presiding.

APPELLATE Judges:

PRESIDING JUSTICE UNVERZAGT delivered the opinion of the court. NASH and DUNN, JJ., concur.

DECISION OF THE COURT DELIVERED BY THE HONORABLE JUDGE UNVERZAGT

Following a jury trial, defendant, Peter Redisi, was convicted of home invasion (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par. 12-11). The trial court sentenced defendant to a 45-year extended term of imprisonment. Defendant appealed, and this court affirmed the conviction but vacated the sentence and remanded the cause for imposition of a nonextended term of imprisonment. (People v. Redisi (1988), 172 Ill. App. 3d 1003.) Defendant was subsequently resentenced to a 30-year term of imprisonment after the trial court denied his motion for a substitution of Judge (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par. 114-5(a)). Defendant appeals, contending that it was error for the trial court to deny his motion for a substitution of Judge at the resentencing stage of the proceedings. We agree. We therefore vacate the amended judgment and sentence entered on January 6, 1989, and remand the cause for resentencing proceedings consistent with this opinion.

After this court first remanded the cause for resentencing, the cause was placed on the calendar of Judge Harry D. Hartel, Jr., for resentencing. Judge Hartel did not preside at defendant's jury trial. It is undisputed that defendant's motion for a substitution of Judge was placed on Judge Hartel's calendar, and it appears from the record that no substantive rulings were made by Judge Hartel prior to denying defendant's motion. In denying defendant's motion, the trial court reasoned that the trial was over and that defendant was not entitled to an automatic substitution of Judge pursuant to section 114-5(a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par. 114-5(a)). That section reads:

"Within 10 days after a cause involving only one defendant has been placed on the trial call of a Judge the defendant may move the court in writing for a substitution of that Judge on the ground that such Judge is so prejudiced against him that he cannot receive a fair trial. Upon the filing of such a motion the court shall proceed no further in the cause but shall transfer it to another Judge not named in the motion. The defendant may name only one Judge as prejudiced, pursuant to this subsection; provided, however, that in a case in which the offense charged is a Class X felony or may be punished by death or life imprisonment, the defendant may name two Judges as prejudiced." Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par. 114-5(a).

Based on its particular facts, this appeal presents a matter of first impression in this court. Defendant argues that sentencing is a part of a trial, and thus when the cause was placed on Judge Hartel's calendar for resentencing according to this court's order remanding the cause, it was "on the trial call" of that Judge within the meaning of the statute, and he was entitled to invoke the automatic substitution of Judge provision to obtain a fair sentencing hearing. Defendant buttresses this argument by pointing out that the "imposition of a sentence in a criminal case is a 'critical' stage of the trial" to which certain due process rights attach, such as the right to counsel. People v. Vesley (1967), 86 Ill. App. 2d 283, 288.

The State does not dispute that sentencing may be deemed a part of the trial but argues that a motion for the automatic substitution of a Judge must be brought before the trial itself. The State attempts to garner support for its position from our supreme court's decision in People v. Emerson (1987), 122 Ill. 2d 411. In Emerson, the defendant's conviction was reversed on appeal, and the cause was remanded to the trial court for a new trial. Upon remand, the cause was assigned to the same Judge who had presided at defendant's first trial. The Emerson court noted that a request for an automatic substitution must be made before the trial Judge rules on a substantive matter in the case and went on to conclude that the remand constituted a continuation of the original proceedings for purposes of ...


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