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09/13/89 Champa Soumpholphakdy Et v. Prudential Property &

September 13, 1989

CHAMPA SOUMPHOLPHAKDY ET AL., PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS

v.

PRUDENTIAL PROPERTY & CASUALTY INSURANCE, DEFENDANT-APPELLEE (STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY ET AL., DEFENDANTS)



APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS, FIRST DISTRICT, THIRD DIVISION

544 N.E.2d 1107, 188 Ill. App. 3d 602, 136 Ill. Dec. 332 1989.IL.1416

Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County; the Hon. Richard L. Curry, Judge, presiding.

APPELLATE Judges:

PRESIDING JUSTICE FREEMAN delivered the opinion of the court. WHITE and CERDA, JJ., concur.

DECISION OF THE COURT DELIVERED BY THE HONORABLE JUDGE FREEMAN

Plaintiffs, Champa Soumpholphakdy, Kesone Soumpholphakdy, and Khaikeo Soumpholphakdy, appeal from an order of the trial court which granted a motion for summary judgment in favor of defendant, Prudential Property and Casualty Insurance (Prudential), and denied plaintiffs' cross-motion for summary judgment in a declaratory judgment action regarding an automobile liability insurance policy. For the reasons stated below, we affirm the judgment of the Circuit Court.

Plaintiffs' complaint for declaratory judgment sought a determination of the rights and liabilities of the parties under a policy issued by Prudential to co-defendant Bennie Marsala (Marsala). Specifically, plaintiffs sought a declaration that Prudential is obligated to provide coverage for or otherwise indemnify Marsala for any judgments entered against him in an underlying personal injury suit. Plaintiffs allege in the underlying action that they were injured when riding as passengers in an automobile which collided with a truck being operated by Marsala. The truck was owned by Marsala's employer, defendant Donald Christensen, d/b/a Donald Christensen & Associates (Christensen).

Prudential filed a counterclaim for declaratory judgment, citing exclusionary language in the policy, that there is no coverage for nonowned cars regularly used by the insured. Prudential alleges that Marsala was operating a non-owned vehicle which he regularly used and therefore the exclusion applied. Subsequently, Prudential filed a motion for summary judgment, attaching the depositions of Marsala and Christensen. Plaintiffs filed a cross-motion for summary judgment. After a hearing on the cross-motions, the trial court found that the truck was regularly used by Marsala and therefore its use was excluded from coverage under the Prudential policy. The trial court accordingly granted defendant Prudential's motion for summary judgment and denied plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment.

On appeal plaintiffs contend that the trial court improperly failed to apply the distinction between business and personal use of vehicles, as set forth in Illinois case law and mandated by public policy. Defendant Prudential responds that the courts properly look to the frequency of the prior use of the non-owned vehicle in determining whether a "regular use" provision excludes coverage.

The parties cite a number of Illinois cases, in addition to several cases from foreign jurisdictions, which involve a "regular use" provision in an automobile liability policy. We will review the Illinois case law briefly. We decline to follow the case law from foreign jurisdictions, since it does not have binding authority on this court. In Schoenknecht v. Prairie State Farmers Insurance Association (1960), 27 Ill. App. 2d 83, 169 N.E.2d 148, the plaintiff was involved in an accident while operating an automobile provided to him by his employer for use during working hours of 8 a.m. to 4:30 p.m. The plaintiff was directed to return the car to the shop of his employer at the close of the work day. On the date of the accident, at the close of the work day, instead of returning the car to the shop, the plaintiff went to visit friends and was involved in the accident at 11 p.m. The appellate court affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff. (Schoenknecht, 27 Ill. App. 2d at 98.) The court stated that the car was furnished to the plaintiff solely during working hours and upon the business of his employer. (Schoenknecht, 27 Ill. App. 2d at 97.) The court noted that the only times the plaintiff had used the car previously was during working hours and to further the business of his employer. The plaintiff never had used the car to go anywhere else. (Schoenknecht, 27 Ill. App. 2d at 97.) Accordingly, the court concluded that the trial court properly found that the "regular use" exclusion did not apply to deny coverage. Schoenknecht, 27 Ill. App. 2d at 98.

In State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Differding (1977), 69 Ill. 2d 103, 370 N.E.2d 543, the defendant was a student at Northern Illinois University whose permanent residence was with her parents in Park Forest. During the summer she sublet an apartment from a professor, who asked her to maintain his automobile for the summer and limited her use of the automobile to the DeKalb area. The defendant was involved in an accident while driving the car to her home in Park Forest. The supreme court stated that whether the automobile was "furnished or available . . . for [the] frequent or regular use" of the defendant under the policy was a question of fact. (Differding, 69 Ill. 2d at 107.) The court held that the trial court's finding of noncoverage was supported by the evidence. (Differding, 69 Ill. 2d at 107.) The supreme court noted the trial court's findings that the date of the accident was the fourth time the defendant had driven the car to Park Forest. (Differding, 69 Ill. 2d at 106.) Further, the supreme court agreed with the trial court that the automobile was furnished or available for the defendant's regular use, and in fact was used regularly and frequently by the defendant. Differding, 69 Ill. 2d at 106.

In Economy Fire & Casualty Co. v. Gorman (1980), 84 Ill. App. 3d 1127, 406 N.E.2d 169, the defendant was involved in a collision while operating an automobile owned by his employer and furnished to him for making deliveries. The defendant was instructed to return the car to the store when finished making deliveries, and if no one was at the store, to put the keys in the ashtray and lock the car. The car never was given to him for his personal use and he never was given personal permission to drive the car after working hours, 5 to 8 p.m. The defendant stated, however, that many times he left at 8 p.m. to make deliveries and did not return until 8:30 or 8:45 p.m. On the date of the accident, the defendant left the store at 8:30 p.m. with seven or eight deliveries to make. He was uncertain of the location of the street for his last delivery, so he stopped at a friend's house, at 9 to 9:30 p.m. One friend rode with him in the car to show him where the street was. They returned to the home and remained with some other people until around 10:45 p.m. The defendant drove one person home and had another friend in the car when the accident occurred around 11 p.m.

In determining whether the car was furnished for the defendant's "regular use," the court looked to prior case law. The court concluded that State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Differding (1977), 69 Ill. 2d 103, 370 N.E.2d 543, effectively overruled the earlier case of Schoenknecht v. Prairie State Farmers Insurance Association (1960), 27 Ill. App. 2d 83, 169 N.E.2d 148. The court stated that Differding, unlike Schoenknecht, determined whether a vehicle is furnished for regular use irrespective of whether it is actually being used at the time of an accident in a way for which it was not provided. Based on the analysis in Differding, the court found in the case before it that the defendant's use of the automobile was "regular" as a matter of law. Gorman, 84 Ill. App. 3d at 1131.

In State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Bundy (1988), 165 Ill. App. 3d 260, 519 N.E.2d 109, the court affirmed the trial court's granting of a motion for summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff insurer, on the basis that a pickup truck owned by a codefendant company and driven by the defendant Bundy was excluded from coverage since it was provided for Bundy's regular or frequent use. Bundy had obtained the truck from the residence of a co-worker in order to transport something for one of his family members. Prior to the accident he had used the truck daily during the course of his employment. In addition, he had used the truck for personal reasons up to two or three times a month. He always had asked for the requisite permission for personal use. On the day of the accident, he was unable to reach a ...


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