APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS, THIRD DISTRICT
542 N.E.2d 1152, 186 Ill. App. 3d 472, 134 Ill. Dec. 645 1989.IL.1151
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Will County; the Hon. Thomas Ewert, Judge, presiding.
JUSTICE BARRY delivered the opinion of the court. HEIPLE and SCOTT, JJ., concur.
DECISION OF THE COURT DELIVERED BY THE HONORABLE JUDGE BARRY
The plaintiff, Jeffrey F. Kure, sued the defendant, Kimberly L. Sluski, in negligence for injuries he received in an auto accident. The jury found in favor of the defendant. The plaintiff appeals.
The defendant testified that on the evening of March 16, 1986, she gave the plaintiff a ride northbound on Illinois Route 171. The defendant stated that it was dark and her lights were on. As they proceeded in a 55-miles-per-hour zone, they came upon a car heading north at about 40 miles per hour. They followed the car for about a quarter of a mile, until the road changed from a no passing zone to a passing zone. She was aware of the change because she saw a sign that said "passing zone" and the center line changed from solid to broken. The defendant pulled into the southbound lane to pass. As she pulled out, she did not see any oncoming vehicles. When she pulled ahead of the other car, however, she saw an oncoming pickup truck with its lights off about four car lengths from her vehicle. The truck's driver then turned on his lights. The defendant attempted to pull back into the right lane, but the plaintiff grabbed the wheel and tried to turn it to the left. The car went into the northbound lane, then went out of control and slid across the highway before colliding with a tree on the left side of the road.
Darvin Schultz testified that he was driving north on Route 171 at a speed of 40 to 45 miles per hour when the defendant attempted to pass him. When the defendant pulled out to pass, the cars were in a no passing zone. However, as the defendant pulled even with Schultz, the road changed to a passing zone. Schultz estimated that the defendant's speed was at least 60 miles per hour. According to Schultz, while the defendant was in the southbound lane and slightly behind Schultz's car, an oncoming pickup truck about 200 feet away turned on its lights. Schultz braked his car to allow the defendant's car back into the northbound lane. The defendant's car went into the northbound lane and then went out of control. It spun around as it crossed the highway and then collided with a tree on the left side of the road.
The plaintiff testified that the defendant began to pass in a no passing zone as they were proceeding up a hill. The defendant was driving about 73 to 75 miles per hour as she passed the car. When the pickup truck came over the hill, it was at least four car lengths away. The defendant turned back into the northbound lane but lost control of the car. The plaintiff stated that he did not attempt to turn the wheel to the left. He did not recall anything after the car went out of control.
Illinois State trooper Dale Pesavento testified that there was not a "passing zone" sign in the area where the accident occurred. He also stated that there were several "no passing zone" signs in that area.
The jury returned a verdict in favor of the defendant. The plaintiff moved for a new trial, which the trial court denied.
The plaintiff first argues on appeal that the jury's verdict should be overturned because it was arbitrary and not based on the evidence. He contends that the jury ignored evidence that the defendant had negligently attempted to pass in a no passing zone. He also argues that the evidence of his comparative negligence was incredible and unworthy of belief.
A jury verdict should be set aside and a new trial ordered when the verdict is against the manifest weight of the evidence. (Mizowek v. De Franco (1976), 64 Ill. 2d 303, 356 N.E.2d 32.) A verdict is against the manifest weight when the opposite Conclusion is clearly evident or when the findings are unreasonable, arbitrary, and not based on the evidence. (Monier v. Winkler (1987), 158 Ill. App. 3d 724, 511 N.E.2d 246.) In making this determination, a reviewing court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the appellee. Kemper v. McDougal-Hartmann Co. (1984), 127 Ill. App. 3d 512, 468 N.E.2d 998.
In the instant case, there was conflicting testimony as to whether the defendant was negligent in passing the vehicle. Consequently, the jury's decision largely rested on the witnesses' credibility. The weighing of credibility is normally within the province of the trier of fact. (Mizowek, 64 Ill. 2d at 309-10, 356 N.E.2d at 35.) Our review of the record leads us to conclude that ...