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WASHINGTON v. LAKE CTY.

July 5, 1989

EDDIE WASHINGTON, Plaintiff,
v.
LAKE COUNTY, ILLINOIS, LAKE COUNTY SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT and LT. HARRY FROSSARD, Individually and as an agent of LAKE COUNTY, ILLINOIS and of the LAKE COUNTY SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT, Defendants



The opinion of the court was delivered by: NORGLE

 CHARLES RONALD NORGLE, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

 Plaintiff's, Eddie Washington, amended complaint alleges violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 ("§ 1981"), 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ("§ 1983") and 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) ("Title VII") against Lake County, (the "County"), the Lake County Sheriff's Department (the "Sheriff's Department") and Lt. Harry Frossard, individually and in his official capacity on behalf of the County and the Sheriff's Department ("Frossard"). Defendants move to dismiss those allegations of the complaint asserting a cause of action under § 1983 against the County, and § 1983 and Title VII violations against Frossard, as well as to dismiss the Sheriff's Department entirely. For the following reasons, this motion is granted in part and denied in part.

 FACTS

 Washington, a black male, was employed as a jailer from September 12, 1986 to July 13, 1987 at the Lake County Jail. Washington alleges that, from about one month after he was hired until the date of his discharge, defendants "engaged in discriminatory practices against Washington regarding the terms and conditions of his employment on the basis of race." Specifically Washington alleges that Lt. Frossard of the Sheriff's Department, a white male and one of Washington's superior officers at the jail "engaged in a pattern and practice of harassment and humilation" of Washington, "unfairly and discriminatorily reprimanding and disciplining him and causing others to do the same, resulting in his discharge." Washington further alleges that he was denied a pretermination hearing in violation of his procedural due process rights.

 STANDARDS GOVERNING DISMISSAL

 On a motion to dismiss, the allegations of the complaint as well, as the reasonable inferences to be drawn from them, are taken as true. Doe v. St. Joseph's Hosp., 788 F.2d 411 (7th Cir. 1986). The plaintiff need not set out in detail the facts upon which a claim is based, but must allege sufficient facts to outline the cause of action. Id. The complaint must state either direct or inferential allegations concerning all of the material elements necessary for recovery under the relevant legal theory. Mescall v. Burrus, 603 F.2d 1266 (7th Cir. 1979). The court is not required to accept legal conclusions either alleged or inferred from pleaded facts. Carl Sandburg Village Condominium Ass'n No. 1 v. First Condominium Development Co., 758 F.2d 203, 207 (7th Cir. 1985). Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is improper unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief. Papapetropoulous v. Milwaukee Transport Services, Inc., 795 F.2d 591, 594 (7th Cir. 1986).

 DISCUSSION

 Plaintiff's amended complaint is pled by mixing allegations relevant to three distinct claims against three separate defendants. As the amended complaint is structured in a single count, § 1983 and Title VII violations are alleged against all defendants. Although the amended complaint appears to allege a § 1981 claim against Frossard alone, Complaint at para. 16, plaintiff in his response to this motion ("Response") indicates that it was his intention to allege a § 1981 claim against all defendants.

 The court will address defendants' challenges to the amended complaint in the following order: the propriety of a Title VII claim against Frossard; the propriety of asserting any claims against the Sheriff's Department; and finally, the § 1983 claims. But, first the court will sua sponte consider the § 1981 claims.

 § 1981 CLAIMS

 While none of the defendants have contested the § 1981 claims, the court addresses them in light of the Supreme Court's recent decision in Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 57 U.S.L.W. 4705, 105 L. Ed. 2d 132, 109 S. Ct. 2363 (1989). Plaintiff's claim that defendants deprived plaintiff of the equal benefit of the law and interfered with his employment contract in violation of § 1981 is based upon allegations of racial harassment relating to the conditions of plaintiff's employment. As Patterson held that such racial harassment occurring after the formation of an employment contract is not actionable under § 1981, 57 U.S.L.W. at 4708-10, plaintiff's § 1981 claims are dismissed as to all defendants.

 TITLE VII CLAIM AGAINST FROSSARD

 Defendants move for dismissal of the Title VII claim against Frossard on the grounds that Frossard is not an "employer" as that term is defined in Title VII. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b). Plaintiff does not contest dismissal of ...


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