APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS, FIFTH DISTRICT
542 N.E.2d 27, 185 Ill. App. 3d 547, 134 Ill. Dec. 27 1989.IL.939
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Williamson County; the Hon. William G. Schwartz, Judge, presiding.
JUSTICE HARRISON delivered the opinion of the court. CHAPMAN and RARICK, JJ., concur.
DECISION OF THE COURT DELIVERED BY THE HONORABLE JUDGE HARRISON
The defendant, John Martin, was charged on January 20, 1987, with driving under the influence of alcohol in violation of section 11-501 of the Illinois Vehicle Code (the Code) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 95 1/2, par. 11-501), and with driving while license revoked in violation of section 6-303 of the Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 95 1/2, par. 6-303). The circuit court of Williamson County subsequently dismissed the cause for violation of the defendant's right to a speedy trial. The State appeals. We reverse the circuit court and remand the cause for further proceedings.
On July 7, 1987, the defendant pled not guilty to the two charges. The trial court scheduled the cause for a September 8, 1987, jury trial. On September 8 the defendant failed to appear and a warrant was issued for his arrest. On September 16, 1987, the court quashed the defendant's arrest warrant and set the cause for a November 11, 1987, arraignment. On September 22, 1987, the defendant's attorney entered an appearance. On September 30, 1987, the court scheduled the cause for a December 16, 1987, jury trial. On December 16, the court reset the cause for the February docket. The cause was then delayed from February 9, 1988, to February 25, 1988, because two Judges recused themselves. On February 23, 1988, the defendant filed a motion to continue, which the court granted. On March 3, 1988, the circuit court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss, finding that the defendant's right to a speedy trial had been violated. The following was entered in the record sheet for March 3, 1988:
"Defendant present with attorney Patchett who moves for dismissal based upon unreasonable delay pursuant to statute. Defendant demanded jury trial on July 7, 1987 but failed to appear for pre-trial on September 8, 1987. Defendant then appears on September 16, 1987. 160 days from July 7, 1987 expired on 12/14/86. If 30 days are attributable as delay to defendant for failing to appear for pre-trial the operative date is 1/13/88. On December 23, 1987 defendant waives jury. Nothing was done by defendant during this period of time to delay trial. In fact from 12/23/87 until 2/23/88 nothing was done to delay the case by defendant. The Court finds that the provisions of SC Rules regarding prompt trials have been violated. Defendant is discharged."
The State filed this appeal, in which it contends that the trial court erred in discharging the defendant because 160 days of delay attributable to the State had not run at the time of the discharge on March 3, 1988.
This appeal essentially turns on three questions: (1) whether the defendant had made a valid jury demand on July 7, 1987; (2) whether the original Supreme Court Rule 505 (107 Ill. 2d R. 505), rather than the amended Supreme Court Rule 505 (113 Ill. 2d R. 505), applied to the defendant's cause; and (3) whether the record supports the defendant's assertion that the State should be charged with the delay occasioned between October 27, 1987, and December 16, 1987.
The entry in the record sheet for July 7, 1987, states that the defendant, in an appearance with the public defender, pled not guilty, and that the court scheduled a jury trial for the September docket. The trial court apparently found that this was the defendant's jury demand, and that the time thus began to run against the State on that date. We are unable to say that this finding was in error.
The next question is whether Supreme Court Rule 505 as it was in effect prior to August 1, 1987, or the rule as amended on August 1, 1987, is effective in this cause. Supreme Court Rule 505, as effective prior to August 1, 1987, provided, inter alia :
"Upon timely receipt of notice that the accused intends to plead 'not guilty,' the clerk shall set a new appearance date not less than 7 days nor more than 49 days after the original appearance date set by the arresting officer, and notify all parties of the new date and the time for appearance. If the accused demands a trial by jury, the trial shall be scheduled within the time prescribed by section ...