APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS, THIRD DISTRICT
540 N.E.2d 832, 184 Ill. App. 3d 1094, 132 Ill. Dec. 910 1989.IL.860
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Will County; the Hon. Angelo F. Pistilli, Judge, presiding.
JUSTICE SCOTT delivered the opinion of the court. WOMBACHER and BARRY, JJ., concur.
DECISION OF THE COURT DELIVERED BY THE HONORABLE JUDGE SCOTT
The record shows that the defendant was originally charged with residential burglary. While he was on pretrial release in that case, he committed the instant offenses of armed violence and aggravated battery. On December 30, 1987, the defendant was tried and convicted of the offenses he committed while on pretrial release, but was not sentenced. On January 5, 1988, he entered a plea of guilty to residential burglary and was sentenced to a four-year term of imprisonment. On April 15, 1988, the defendant was sentenced to a consecutive term of 10 years' imprisonment on the armed violence conviction.
On appeal, the defendant argues that he was not eligible for a consecutive sentence under the statute in effect at the time the offense was committed and therefore the 10-year armed violence sentence should be vacated. At the time the offenses were committed, section 5-8-4(h) of the Unified Code of Corrections (Code) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 1005-8-4(h)) provided:
"If a person charged with a felony commits a separate felony while on pre-trial release, any sentence imposed upon conviction of that separate felony shall be consecutive to any sentence imposed upon conviction of the original felony."
The defendant contends that the statute contemplates that a defendant will be first convicted and sentenced for the original felony, and then convicted and sentenced for the felony committed while on pretrial release. Therefore, because he was first tried for the pretrial offenses rather than the original felony, he argues that a consecutive sentence was improper.
In support of his position, the defendant refers to the amendment of section 5 -- 8 -- 4(h) of the Code, which now provides:
"If a person charged with a felony commits a separate felony while on pre-trial release, the sentences imposed upon conviction of these felonies shall be served consecutively regardless of the order in which the judgments of conviction are entered." (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par. 1005-8-4(h).)
The defendant argues that the statute was amended because the legislature realized the quirk in the law applicable to a case such as his and therefore changed the statute to provide that a consecutive sentence can be imposed regardless of the order of the convictions.
The State argues that the statute in existence at the time the defendant committed the offenses required only that the defendant be sentenced for the original felony before he was sentenced for the felony committed while on pretrial release. It contends that the amendment merely clarified the legislature's original intent.
The fundamental objective of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to the legislature's intent. (People v. Scott (1974), 57 Ill. 2d 353, 312 N.E.2d 596.) The language used in a statute is the primary source for determining this intent, and where that language is certain and unambiguous, the proper function of the court is to enforce the ...