Searching over 5,500,000 cases.

Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.

Gilpin v. American Federation of State

decided: May 24, 1989.


Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of Illinois, Springfield Division. No. 85 C 3479 -- Richard Mills, Judge.

Wood, Jr., Posner, and Flaum, Circuit Judges.

Author: Posner

POSNER, Circuit Judge

A union that has been certified as the exclusive bargaining representative for a group of employees must represent every employee in the bargaining unit, even those who don't belong to the union. Correlatively, the union is entitled to charge the nonmembers their pro rata share of the expenses that it incurs in negotiating for and administering the collective bargaining agreement, and to ask the employer to deduct this pro rata share from the nonmembers' wages. But if the union goes further and makes the nonmembers pay either the full union dues or an agency fee that exceeds the collective bargaining costs fairly chargeable to nonmembers, union -- and the employer -- can get into legal trouble. If the collective bargaining agreement is with a public employer (state or local,) that deducts the union's agency fee from its employees' wages, and part of the fee is used to advance the union's political or ideological goals as distinct from defraying the union's expenses of negotiating and administering the collective bargaining agreement, both the public employer and the union can be held liable in a suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violating the nonmembers' right of free speech under the First Amendment (made applicable to the states by interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment). See Abood v. Detroit Board of Education, 431 U.S. 209, 52 L. Ed. 2d 261, 97 S. Ct. 1782 (1977). What is more, the First Amendment has been held to require the public employer and the union to establish efficacious procedures, including notice and right to a hearing, for determining how much of the union's proposed agency fee is proper. See Chicago Teachers Union v. Hudson, 475 U.S. 292, 89 L. Ed. 2d 232, 106 S. Ct. 1066 (1986); Ping v. National Education Ass'n, 870 F.2d 1369 (7th Cir. 1989).

In September 1985 nine nonunion employees of Illinois state and local agencies brought this suit against the local of the American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees that represents those employees in collective bargaining, and against the employers themselves. Several weeks earlier, the union had decided that for the new school year the agency fee (called "fair share fee") would be 90 percent of the union dues, and the union had so notified the employees in the bargaining unit. Shortly after filing the suit the plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction to prevent the deduction of the agency fee for the 1985 school year. The motion was denied and the employers proceeded to deduct the fee from the wages of the nonunion employees in the bargaining unit and to pay over the amount deducted to the union, which however placed the entire amount in an interest-bearing escrow account. Although 10,000 of the 20,000 to 30,000 employees in the bargaining unit do not belong to the union, the district judge refused to certify the suit as a class action.

After the Supreme Court decided Hudson in 1986, the district judge held that both the first notice sent by the union to employees regarding the "fair share fee" for the 1985 school year and the procedure that had been used to determine the fee were defective. For the 1986 school year the union sent a new notice after fixing the fee at 96 percent of the union's dues. It also asked the American Arbitration Association to appoint an arbitrator to determine the proper agency fee for both 1985 and 1986, as well as for future years. The arbitrator ruled that in 1985 the proper agency fee would have been 95 percent of union dues, so the nonmembers had gotten a bargain at 90 percent. He ruled that 95 percent was also the proper percentage for 1986, so the union had overcharged non-members by 1 percent that year. He directed the union to remit the 1 percent overcharge to the nonmembers from the escrow account together with the interest that had accrued in the account, and the union has agreed to do this. The nonmembers were not required to remit their 5 percent 1985 windfall. The plaintiffs in this suit were not parties to the arbitration proceeding and have not challenged the arbitrator's determinations regarding the proper agency fees for 1985 and 1986.

The district judge was dissatisfied with the 1986 notice but concluded that no harm had been done since the union had agreed to refund the overcharge to all nonmembers, whether or not they had challenged the 1986 agency fee. For the 1987 school year the union prepared a fuller notice, which the judge found adequately informative. The arbitrator has not yet ruled on the propriety of the fee that the union set for 1987 (at 91 percent of union dues), but the union has agreed to abide by whatever ruling the arbitrator makes and to refund any overcharge that he finds to all nonmembers whether or not they challenge the ruling. On the basis of the union's undertakings and the revision of the notice, the judge decided there was no need to order any relief, and he entered judgment for the defendants.

The plaintiffs appeal, raising four issues that merit discussion: whether the judge should have certified the suit as a class action, given the large number of non-union employees; whether he should have issued a preliminary injunction against the collection of the 1985 agency fee; whether the plaintiffs are entitled to restitution of the money deducted from their wages in 1985 and 1986, the years for which, the judge found, the union's notices were inadequate; and whether the 1987 notice was inadequate.

The district judge was right not to certify the suit as a class action on behalf of the 10,000 nonunion members. A potentially serious conflict of interest within the class precluded the named plaintiffs from representing the entire class adequately. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(a)(4); United Independent Flight Officers, Inc. v. United Air Lines, Inc., 756 F.2d 1262, 1284 (7th Cir. 1985). Two distinct types of employee will decline to join the union representing their bargaining unit. The first is the employee who is hostile to unions on political or ideological grounds. The second is the employee who is happy to be represented by a union but won't pay any more for that representation than he is forced to. The two types have potentially divergent aims. The first wants to weaken and if possible destroy the union; the second, a free rider, wants merely to shift as much of the cost of representation as possible to other workers, i.e., union members. The "restitution" remedy sought by the National Right to Work Legal Defense Foundation, which represents the nine named plaintiffs, is consistent with -- and only with -- the aims of the first type of employee. The Foundation is seeking repayment to all the bargaining unit's nonunion employees of the entire agency fees collected by the union in the 1985 and 1986 school years (with interest), even though the Foundation has not challenged the arbitrator's determination that the union was entitled to more than the amount it actually collected in 1985 and to 99 percent of the amount it collected in 1986. Not only would the "restitution" that the Foundation seeks confer a windfall on the nonunion employees but it might embarrass the union financially. Yet those nonunion employees who, while not wanting to pay more (and perhaps even wanting to pay less) than their "fair share" fees, have no desire to ruin the union or impair its ability to represent them effectively might not want so punitive a remedy. The National Right to Work Foundation is not an adequate litigation representative of those employees. Nor did it or anyone else propose that the judge certify two classes. Finally, there is little -- perhaps no legitimate -- need for a class action here. The union's policy is to refund any overcharges determined by the arbitrator to all nonunion members, whether or not they are parties to a judicial or arbitral proceeding; and the nonunion members are not entitled to any additional monetary remedy, as we shall see.

We can be briefer about the second issue. The correctness of the order denying the preliminary injunction is thoroughly moot. The plaintiffs were trying to enjoin the deduction of agency fees for 1985. The judge refused and the fees were deducted. Even the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit cannot make time run backwards.

We come to the third issue, restitution. At argument we pressed the plaintiffs' counsel for an explanation of how his clients could have been hurt by the inadequate notices sent in 1985 and 1986. The arbitrator -- whose decision the plaintiffs have not challenged -- found that the union had undercharged the plaintiffs for 1985, and the union has agreed to refund with interest the slight overcharge that it had exacted in 1986 though never enjoyed, having placed the entire agency fee in escrow. The plaintiffs actually benefited from the inadequate notice. The function of the notice is to give employees who don't belong to the union enough information about the agency fee for the forthcoming year to enable them to decide whether to challenge it. Had the plaintiffs received a fuller notice they might have mounted such a challenge. But a challenge could only have cost them; it could not have benefited them. A challenge to the 1985 fee would have been worse than futile, given the arbitrator's finding that the fee was too low, while a challenge to the 1986 agency fee would have been futile because the arbitrator ordered the tiny overcharge in that fee refunded to all nonunion employees -- even those who, like the plaintiffs, did not challenge the fee, whether because the notice was inadequate or for other reasons. The plaintiffs got something for nothing, thanks in part to the defective notices of which they complain.

The plaintiffs remind us that this is a First Amendment case, so that the principle that underlies the previous paragraph -- the principle that denials of due process that do no measurable harm give rise to no damages, see, e.g., Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 55 L. Ed. 2d 252, 98 S. Ct. 1042 (1978) -- may not apply. But the principle of Carey is not limited to due process cases. As the Supreme Court later explained in Memphis Community School District v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 91 L. Ed. 2d 249, 106 S. Ct. 2537 (1986), whatever the constitutional provision that is violated, there can be no award of compensatory damages if there is no harm (i.e., no loss to compensate for). See also Cygnar v. City of Chicago, 865 F.2d 827, 848 n. 21 (1989); Auster Oil & Gas, Inc. v. Stream, 835 F.2d 597, 602 (5th Cir. 1988). What is true is that in areas where harm occurs but is not readily monetizable, an award of general damages may be permitted, and taking away a person's right of free speech may be such a case. See, e.g., Memphis Community School District v. Stachura, supra, 477 U.S. at 310-11; City of Watseka v. Illinois Public Action Council, 796 F.2d 1547, 1558-59 (7th Cir. 1986); Ustrak v. Fairman, 781 F.2d 573, 578-79 (7th Cir. 1986); Parrish v. Johnson, 800 F.2d 600, 606-07 (6th Cir. 1986). But it is still necessary to show some harm.

We can imagine an argument that these plaintiffs suffered harm. In 1986 their employers deducted a larger agency fee than was proper, and although the excess was placed in escrow and not used to fund the union's political activities, the plaintiffs lost the use of the money, which they might have devoted to the support of political activities of their own choosing. Whether this is a sound argument, cf. Lowary v. Lexington Local Board of Education, 854 F.2d 131 (6th Cir. 1988), and what bearing the undercharge in 1985 -- which freed up funds for the plaintiffs to use on political activities if they chose, and which greatly exceeded the 1986 overcharge -- should have on it, we need not consider. The plaintiffs allude to this argument in asking us to reverse the denial of their motion for a preliminary injunction but do not mention it in connection with their claim for monetary relief. Indeed, they do not seek damages. Instead they seek a remedy -- restitution -- that is ordinarily (although not invariably) a substitute for rather than a form of damages. See, e.g., Patton v. Mid-Continent Systems, Inc., 841 F.2d 742, 748 (7th Cir. 1988); Dobbs, Handbook on the Law of Remedies 224 (1973) ("The damages recovery is to compensate the plaintiff, and it pays him, theoretically, for his losses. The restitution claim, on the other hand, is not aimed at compensating the plaintiff, but at forcing the defendant to disgorge benefits that it would be unjust for him to keep"). For example, a copyright holder who has suffered no damages can seek restitution of the infringer's profits in lieu of damages. See 17 U.S.C. § 504; see also 15 U.S.C. § 1117 (trademark infringement). But this avenue (restitution as the remedy for unjust enrichment) is closed to these plaintiffs, not only because the defendants derived no benefit from agency fees deposited in an escrow account but also because those fees did not exceed the union's bona fide expenses on behalf of the plaintiffs and the other nonunion employees. There was no enrichment, and it was not unjust.

The plaintiffs want the entire escrow account paid over to them and the other union nonmembers even though all of the money in it (with the exception of the 1 percent of the 1986 fee that the union has agreed to refund) is necessary -- and inadequate -- to defray costs properly incurred by the union in representing nonmembers in collective bargaining, and even though the union derives no benefit from agency fees held in escrow. It is a severely punitive remedy the plaintiffs seek, not one properly described as restitution at all. It would be suitable if at all only if the defendants had been guilty of willful or malicious violations of the Constitution. Yet the 1985 notice which the district judge found to be defective had been issued before the Supreme Court decided the Hudson case, and the 1986 notice was ten pages long and contained voluminous information concerning the agency fee. The only defect the district judge found in the 1986 notice lay in the brevity of the union's description of the procedure for challenging the agency fee. The notice stated: "AFSCME Local 2000 has established an Arbitration Procedure for resolving challenges to the amount of the Fair Share Fee. This procedure will result in expeditious decision on the challenge by an impartial decision maker. Challengers will receive further information regarding this procedure upon the union's receipt of their challenge." The notice gave an address and deadline for mailing a written challenge that "must include the challenge fair share fee payer's ('Challenger's') name, address, social security number, job title, employer and employing agency and location." The district judge thought the notice should contain more details about the ...

Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.