SUPREME COURT OF ILLINOIS
539 N.E.2d 1247, 128 Ill. 2d 500, 132 Ill. Dec. 441 1989.IL.785
Appeal from the Appellate Court for the First District; heard in that court on appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County, the Hon. Carl J. Cipolla, Judge, presiding.
JUSTICE CLARK delivered the opinion of the court.
DECISION OF THE COURT DELIVERED BY THE HONORABLE JUDGE CLARK
Appellant, Clarence McClain, was arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol. A breathalyzer test disclosed a 0.14 concentration of alcohol in his blood, and McClain's driver's license was summarily suspended by the Secretary of State pursuant to section 11-501.1 of the Illinois Vehicle Code (the Code) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 95 1/2, par. 11-501.1). The circuit court of Cook County rescinded the summary suspension due to perceived defects in the documentation filed by the arresting officer. The appellate court reversed the judgment of the circuit court and reinstated the suspension. (165 Ill. App. 3d 157.) We subsequently granted McClain's petition for leave to appeal (107 Ill. 2d R. 315(a)).
We begin consideration of this appeal with an examination of the summary suspension process. Under the summary suspension statute, any person who drives or is in actual physical control of a motor vehicle upon a public highway of this State is deemed to have given consent to a chemical test or tests of blood, breath or urine for purposes of determining the alcohol, other drug, or combination thereof content of such person's blood. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 95 1/2, par. 11-501.1(a).) Under the implied-consent doctrine, a person requested to submit to this test must be warned by the arresting officer that a refusal to submit to the test or a finding of an alcohol concentration of 0.10 or greater will result in summary suspension of the person's driver's license. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 95 1/2, par. 11-501.1(c).) The officer is then required to submit a sworn report to the Secretary of State and the circuit court of venue certifying that the test was requested and that the person either refused to submit to the test or submitted to testing which disclosed an alcohol concentration of 0.10 or more. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 95 1/2, par. 11-501.1(d).) Upon receipt of the officer's sworn report, the Secretary of State summarily suspends the person's license. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 95 1/2, par. 11-501.1(e).
A person whose driving privileges are suspended under section 11-501.1 may request a hearing in the circuit court to seek rescission of the suspension pursuant to section 2-118.1 of the Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 95 1/2, par. 2-118.1). Section 2-118.1 provides in part:
"The scope of the hearing shall be limited to the issues of:
1. Whether the person was placed under arrest for an offense as defined in Section 11 -- 501, or a similar provision of a local ordinance, as evidenced by the issuance of a Uniform Traffic Ticket; and
2. Whether the arresting officer had reasonable grounds to believe that such person was driving or in actual physical control of a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, other drug, or combination thereof; and
3. Whether such person, after being advised by the arresting officer that the privilege to operate a motor vehicle would be suspended if the person refused to submit to and complete the test or tests, did refuse to submit to or complete such test or tests to determine the person's alcohol or drug concentration; or
4. Whether the person, after being advised by the arresting officer that the privilege to operate a motor vehicle would be suspended if the person submits to a chemical test, or tests, and such test discloses an alcohol concentration of 0.10 or more, and such person did submit to and complete such test or tests which determined an alcohol concentration of 0.10 or more." Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 95 1/2, par. 2-118.1(b).
In the present case, McClain requested a hearing pursuant to section 2-118.1 of the Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 95 1/2, par. 2-118.1). In his "Petition to Rescind Statutory Suspension" he alleged that: (1) he was not properly placed under arrest for an offense defined in section 11-501.1 of the Code; (2) the arresting officer did not have reasonable grounds to believe that he was driving while under the influence of alcohol; (3) he had not been adequately warned by the arresting officer; and (4) he did not refuse to submit to the breathalyzer test pursuant to the statute. However, at the hearing, McClain argued two other grounds for rescission. He claimed that the arresting officer's failure to swear under oath as to the truth of his reports, along with the officer's failure to list the time ...