The opinion of the court was delivered by: DUFF
HONORABLE BRIAN BARNETT DUFF, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE:
Plaintiff William Rose has sued defendant Greg Franchetti for breach of contract and fraud arising out of the plaintiff's purchase of an airplane from the defendant. Diversity jurisdiction exists, but the defendant has moved to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b) (2) on the grounds that the court lacks personal jurisdiction over him, and in the alternative, requests transfer of venue pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). As set forth below, the motion will be denied.
The facts relevant to this motion are not in dispute. The plaintiff is a citizen of Illinois. The defendant is a citizen of Rhode Island who does business out of Massachusetts. In June, 1988, the plaintiff was reading a magazine of general circulation when he came across the defendant's advertisement for the sale of an airplane. He instructed his employee, Andrew Spak, to contact the defendant to inquire about the aircraft. Spak did so.
Over the next few weeks, Spak and the defendant exchanged phone calls on a number of occasions to discuss the plane.
During these conversations, the defendant represented that the plane was in good condition, that he had inspected it, that it needed only minor repairs, and that he had engaged Federal Aeronautics Administration ("FAA") certified mechanics to do the repairs in accordance with FAA practices.
The plaintiff thereafter sent agents to Massachusetts to see the plane. After inspecting the plane's records, the agents purchased the plane and flew it back to Illinois.
Spak, a certified FAA mechanic, then disassembled the plane for inspection. He discovered numerous repairs which had not been logged in the aircraft's records and which did not comply with FAA practices. The condition of the aircraft rendered it virtually valueless.
The plaintiff subsequently filed this lawsuit alleging breach of contract and intentional misrepresentation. The defendant has moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction, or in the alternative, to transfer this case to Massachusetts.
In order to enter a binding judgment, a court must have personal jurisdiction over the defendant. A court acquires such jurisdiction when the plaintiff properly serves the defendant with process pursuant to a statute or rule, and the service does not violate due process. Omni Capital International v. Rudolf Wolff & Co., Ltd., 484 U.S. 97, 108 S. Ct. 404, 409, 98 L. Ed. 2d 415 (1987).
In federal court, Fed.R.Civ.P. 4 governs service of process. Rules 4(c)-(e) prescribe the manner in which process may be served. Rule 4(f) describes where it may be served:
All process other than a subpoena may be served anywhere within the territorial limits of the state in which the district court is held, and, when authorized by a statute of the United States or by these rules, beyond the territorial limits of that state.
Where, as here, the plaintiff is suing a defendant located "beyond the territorial limits of the state," id., Rule 4(f) refers to Rule 4(e):
(e) Summons: Service Upon Party Not Inhabitant of or Found Within State.
Whenever a statute of the United States or an order of court thereunder provides for service of a summons, or of a notice, or of an order in lieu of summons upon a party not an inhabitant of or found within the state in which the district court is held, service may be made under the circumstances and in the manner prescribed by the statute or order, or if there is no provision therein prescribing the manner of service, in a manner stated in this rule. Whenever a statute or rule of court of the state in which the district court is held provides . . . for service of a summons, or of notice, or of an order in lieu of summons upon a party not an inhabitant of or found within the state . . . service may . . . be made under the circumstances and in the manner prescribed in the statute or rule.
Thus, the first sentence of this rule applies when a federal statute authorizes out-of-state service of process. The second sentence governs in the absence of such a federal statute. In this case, no such statute exists, so this court may obtain personal jurisdiction over the defendant only "under the circumstances and in the manner prescribed in [an Illinois] statute or rule." Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(e).
Neither party has informed the court as to the manner of service plaintiff employed in serving the defendant. Since the defendant has not objected to it, this court assumes that the manner of service was proper. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b) (4), (5).
The only question remaining then, is whether service was authorized "under the circumstances" -- that is, whether Illinois law permits service on this out-of-state defendant. The Illinois long-arm statute, Ill.Rev.Stat. 1987 Ch. 110, para. 2-209(a) ("para. 2-209(a)"), provides:
Any person, whether or not a citizen or a resident of this State, who in person or through an agent does any of the acts hereinafter enumerated, thereby submits such person, and if an individual, his or her personal representative, to the jurisdiction of the courts of this State as to any cause of action arising from the doing of any of such acts:
(1) The transaction of any business within the State;
(2) The commission of a tortious act within this ...