APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS, SECOND DISTRICT
537 N.E.2d 8, 181 Ill. App. 3d 324, 130 Ill. Dec. 187 1989.IL.462
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Du Page County; the Hon. Robert A. Cox, Judge, presiding.
PRESIDING JUSTICE UNVERZAGT delivered the opinion of the court. McLAREN and DUNN, JJ., concur.
DECISION OF THE COURT DELIVERED BY THE HONORABLE JUDGE UNVERZAGT
Plaintiff appeals an order of the circuit court of Du Page County granting a judicial driving permit to defendant, Paul Duff. The Attorney General raises one issue on appeal: whether the trial court abused its discretion by granting a JDP to defendant, who was not a first offender within the meaning of section 6-206.1of the Illinois Vehicle Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 95 1/2, par. 6-206.1).
On April 17, 1988, defendant was arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 95 1/2, par. 11-501). Defendant's driver's license was summarily suspended, and the notice of suspension indicated that defendant was not a first offender under the definition set forth in section 11-500 of the Vehicle Code. See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 95 1/2, pars. 11-500, 11-501.1.
On May 25, 1988, defendant petitioned for a JDP to relieve undue hardship. Attached to the petition was an abstract of defendant's driving record from the Secretary of State's office. The abstract showed that two Dispositions had taken place on January 11, 1984, regarding an arrest on December 12, 1983. The court granted the JDP to defendant for the purpose of driving within the scope of defendant's employment. The Secretary of State requested that the court review its decision to issue the JDP because defendant was a second offender for DUI. On July 12, 1988, after a hearing on the matter, the court issued a final order directing the Secretary of State to issue a JDP to defendant. The plaintiff then filed this appeal.
On appeal, plaintiff contends that the court should not have granted the JDP to defendant because he is not a first offender. When construing statutes, courts must ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature. (People v. O'Donnell (1987), 116 Ill. 2d 517, 522.) The purpose of the summary suspension framework is protection of highway travelers. (Koss v. Slater (1987), 116 Ill. 2d 389, 395.) To interpret the statute, we must look to the language of the statute itself. (Niven v. Siqueira (1985), 109 Ill. 2d 357, 365.) Here, the statutory language is clear and unambiguous.
Section 6-206.1of the Vehicle Code provides that a driver who is impaired by alcohol is a threat to public safety and that, to provide a deterrent to driving while intoxicated and to remove impaired drivers from the roads, the State may summarily suspend a driver's license. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 95 1/2, par. 6-206.1.) The section further provides:
"[Whenever] a first offender is arrested for any offense as defined in Section 11 -- 501 . . .:
(a) Subsequent to a notification of a statutory summary suspension of driving privileges as provided in Section 11-501.1, the first offender as defined in Section 11-500 may petition the circuit court of venue for a Judicial Driving Permit . . .." (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 95 1/2, par. 6-206.1(a).)
A first offender is defined as:
"[Any] person who has not had a previous conviction or court assigned supervision for violating Section 11-501 . . . within the last 5 years . . .." (Emphasis added.) ...