APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS, SECOND DISTRICT
535 N.E.2d 45, 179 Ill. App. 3d 788, 128 Ill. Dec. 831 1989.IL.220
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Kane County; the Hon. John L. Nickels, Judge, presiding.
PRESIDING JUSTICE UNVERZAGT delivered the opinion of the court. INGLIS and REINHARD, JJ., concur.
DECISION OF THE COURT DELIVERED BY THE HONORABLE JUDGE UNVERZAGT
Defendant, John Brothers, appeals from an order of the trial court which dismissed his petition for relief pursuant to the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (Act) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par. 122-1 et seq.). On appeal, defendant contends that (1) the trial court's dismissal of his petition without first appointing counsel violated his due process rights and the doctrine of separation of powers, and (2) the trial court improperly entertained the State's motion to dismiss his petition prior to determining whether the petition was frivolous or patently without merit.
After a jury trial, defendant was found guilty of burglary and was sentenced to a 10-year term of imprisonment under the extended-term provisions of the Unified Code of Corrections (see Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 1005-8-2). Defendant appealed his conviction to this court, and, in an order entered pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 23 (107 Ill. 2d R. 23), we affirmed defendant's conviction of and sentence for burglary. See People v. Brothers (1986), 148 Ill. App. 3d 1156 (unpublished Rule 23 order).
On March 30, 1987, defendant filed a petition for post-conviction relief which alleged that his State and Federal constitutional rights were violated because he was tried by an all-white jury. Defendant's petition further requested that counsel be appointed to represent him during his post-conviction proceedings. On April 2, 1987, the State filed a motion to dismiss defendant's petition. Defendant's cause was then transferred to a different Judge who conducted a hearing on defendant's petition.
During the hearing on defendant's petition, the trial court initially asked the State to address the issue whether defendant was entitled to be represented by counsel during the initial stage of the proceedings. The State responded that if the court was determining whether defendant's petition was facially defective, then defendant had no right to counsel. The State was then allowed to argue that the alleged constitutional violation raised in defendant's petition was meritless and the petition should be dismissed. Defendant did not respond to the State's argument.
The trial court decided to continue the matter and appoint the public defender's office to represent defendant. The public defender stated that the appointment of her office was tantamount to determining that defendant's petition was not frivolous. In response to the public defender's statement, the trial court gave the following soliloquy:
"I think in light of that, Mr. Brothers, rather than taking the position that I have and continue the matter until Wednesday, for the reasons that the State's Attorney has indicated, the petition on its face does not set forth substantive reasons to justify the granting of the post-conviction relief, and by appointing the Public Defender, in essence what I am doing, then, is finding that it does have substance, when, in fact, I don't believe that it does have substance.
So, to avoid that sort of a -- what I think would be an inappropriate -- or, I am finding -- I am going to make a finding that your petition does not set forth substantive matters to justify your post-conviction relief.
Accordingly, then, I am going to go ahead and grant the State's motion to dismiss your petition for post-conviction relief.", Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal from the dismissal of his post-conviction petition.
Defendant first contends that the trial court's failure to appoint counsel to assist him in the preparation of his petition for post-conviction relief prior to dismissing his petition violated his due process rights and the doctrine of separation of powers. The State maintains, and defendant's reply brief readily concedes, that this issue has been decided against defendant in People v. Porter (1988), 122 Ill. 2d 64. In Porter, our supreme court determined that the failure to appoint counsel prior to the dismissal of a post-conviction petition pursuant to section 122-2.1 of the Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par. 122-2.1) does not violate either the doctrine of separation of powers, a defendant's due process rights, or a defendant's equal protection ...