The opinion of the court was delivered by: DUFF
HONORABLE BRIAN BARNETT DUFF, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
Peat Marwick contends that plaintiff has not offered any direct evidence that she was denied partnership because of her sex, and that under the indirect method she cannot prevail. Although plaintiff insists that she has direct evidence of discrimination against her, she focuses on the indirect -- or prima facie case -- method, and this court will confine itself to that approach.
Both sides agree that, in order to raise an inference of discrimination, plaintiff must prove (1) that she is a member of a protected group, a woman; (2) that she was qualified to be a partner; (3) that she was rejected for partnership; and (4) that a position as partner was left open or filled by a man. Kirk v. Board of Education, 811 F.2d 347, 354 (n.10) (7th Cir. 1987). If she does so, the burden shifts to Peat Marwick to "articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions." Klein v. Trustees of Indiana University, 766 F.2d 275, 282 (7th Cir. 1985). Once Peat Marwick does this, plaintiff must prove "that the proffered reason is a pretext, an excuse for discrimination." Dugan v. Ball State University, 815 F.2d 1132, 1136 (7th Cir. 1987). Plaintiff can satisfy this latter burden either by "show[ing] that, in addition to [the] proffered reasons, a discriminatory motive was a determining factor [or by] show[ing] that [the] proffered reason is unworthy of credence." Klein v. Trustees of Indiana University, 766 F.2d at 282 (citations omitted).
Of course, plaintiff need prove neither a prima facie case nor pretext at the summary judgment stage. All she must do is demonstrate, with regard to each issue on which she bears the burden of proof, that there "is a genuine issue of material fact which requires trial." Beard v. Whitley County REMC, 840 F.2d 405 (7th Cir. 1988).
Peat Marwick first attempts to show that plaintiff cannot establish a prima facie case. Although some of its arguments are only slightly more meritorious, Peat Marwick does not dispute factors (1) and (3) -- i.e., that plaintiff is a woman and that she was not made a partner. It does, however, insist that plaintiff cannot demonstrate a genuine factual issue on factors (2) and (4) -- i.e., that she was qualified to be a partner and that an available partnership existed at the time her partnership nomination was denied.
Peat Marwick's argument that plaintiff was not qualified to be a partner in the firm is truly remarkable. This is not a case of a disgruntled employee who, having repeatedly failed to meet her employer's expectations, now adds insult to injury by bringing a Title VII action. Plaintiff time and again, for a period of nearly ten years, received glowing written evaluations from her superiors at the firm.
In the fall of 1984, these superiors -- all partners in the Chicago office's audit department -- unanimously nominated her for partnership the following year, ranking her second of the four nominees from audit. When the Operating Committee in New York reviewed her nomination throughout the winter of 1985, it determined that she was an "outstanding" candidate for partner.
Now, it might be the case that, at trial, plaintiff will be unable to establish that she was qualified for partnership. Many of the audit partners have testified that, despite the praise they gave her in their written evaluations, plaintiff had serious deficiencies in her accounting and leadership skills, and that these deficiencies formed the basis for their removal of her name from partnership consideration in March, 1985. If this court believes their testimony, then it might well determine that their written evaluations of her work (and her chance for partnership) were overstated, and that in fact she was not qualified for partnership in this big eight accounting firm. But for Peat Marwick to argue that this court could so find at the summary judgment stage is not merely wrong, it is frivolous.
Peat Marwick next contends that plaintiff cannot establish a prima facie case because she cannot establish that an available partnership position was either left open or filled by a man.
Peat Marwick concedes that three men from the audit department were made partners in the year plaintiff was denied, and that numerous men from this department have become partners since. It contends, however, that the relevant position is partnership in the bank industry group -- the audit department is subdivided into four industry groups -- and notes that the only other person to have attained partnership from that group since plaintiff's rejection was Beth Pagnotta, a woman. Yet, Peat Marwick's argument on this score contains two fatal flaws.
First, Peat Marwick has not even come close to establishing the absence of a factual dispute regarding the position for which plaintiff was nominated. Although there is some evidence that partnership decisions were made on an industry group basis -- e.g., one candidate was chosen from each group for partnership consideration in the plaintiff's year -- there is considerable evidence that partnership decisions were made on a department-wide basis. For example, the audit partners ranked plaintiff against the other audit nominees in the fall of 1984, and all of the audit partners met in March of 1985 to discuss together whether plaintiff's name should be removed from their nominee list. Compare Dugan v. Ball State University, 815 F.2d 1132 (7th Cir. 1987) (plaintiff's comparisons confined to other candidates in her department because decisions being attacked were intra-departmental). Only at trial could this court determine whether a position as partner, other than the one (subsequently) filled by Beth Pagnotta, was available to plaintiff in 1985.
Moreover, even were this court to find at this stage that the bank industry group was the relevant group for determining whether a position existed for plaintiff, Peat Marwick would still not be entitled to summary judgment. In para. 22 of its statement of undisputed facts, Peat Marwick states that, when questioned by other partners in the firm about the dilemma of having two qualified partnership candidates ready for partnership in 1985 -- i.e. Ms. Pagnotta and plaintiff -- two of the bank industry group partners "responded by outlining the bank partners' decision, which called for the nomination of [Ms.] Pagnotta the following year  and by stating that they would review plaintiff's candidacy again [in the fall of 1985] after the completion of the busy audit season." This statement constitutes an admission by Peat Marwick that the bank industry could have handled two new partners in the 1985-86 period. Thus, it not only renders the motion for summary judgment on this score superficial, but might well prevent Peat Marwick from contesting the availability of a partnership position in the bank industry group when the case comes to trial.
Having determined that plaintiff has (more than) established a prima facie case at the summary judgment stage, the court now turns to Peat Marwick's contention that it had a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for not making her a partner. According to Peat Marwick, the Chicago office partners removed her name from the list of nominees it had presented to the Operating Committee because some of the partners in the audit department and bank industry group had concerns about her skills.