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01/18/89 the People of the State of v. Farley Shumpert

January 18, 1989

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, APPELLANT

v.

FARLEY SHUMPERT, APPELLEE



SUPREME COURT OF ILLINOIS

533 N.E.2d 1106, 126 Ill. 2d 344, 128 Ill. Dec. 18 1989.IL.45

Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County, the Hon. Philip J. Carey, Judge, presiding.

APPELLATE Judges:

CHIEF JUSTICE MORAN delivered the opinion of the court. JUSTICE CALVO took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.

DECISION OF THE COURT DELIVERED BY THE HONORABLE JUDGE MORAN

In the circuit court of Cook County, defendant, Farley Shumpert, was indicted for "murder" under the Criminal Code of 1961 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, pars. 9-1(a)(1), (a)(2) (the old homicide statute)). The murder allegedly took place on May 1, 1987. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the indictment alleging that Public Act 84-1450 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, pars. 9-1(a)(1), (a)(2)) (the new Act or the Act), amending the old homicide statute, became effective on January 5, 1987. The new Act replaces the offense of murder with first degree murder, and replaces the offense of voluntary manslaughter with second degree murder. Since the new Act does not include an offense of "murder," defendant alleged that the indictment failed to state an offense. In response, the State argued that the new Act did not become effective until July 1, 1987; hence, defendant was properly indicted under the old homicide statute. The circuit court held that the new Act became effective on January 5, 1987, and therefore granted defendant's motion to dismiss. The State appealed. We allowed a direct appeal to be taken to this court pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 302(b) (107 Ill. 2d R. 302(b)).

The sole issue presented for review is whether the Act became effective on July 1, 1987, as the State contends, or on January 5, 1987, as defendant contends.

The history relative to the passage of the Act is as follows. The General Assembly passed Senate Bill 522 on June 23, 1986. The bill was then sent to the Governor for his signature. Pursuant to his amendatory veto power, the Governor returned the bill to the General Assembly with specific recommendations for change. The General Assembly accepted the Governor's recommendations on December 3, 1986, and the Governor certified the bill on January 5, 1987.

The State argues that the Act does not contain an effective-date provision, and it therefore became effective on July 1, 1987, by operation of law. (See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 1, par. 1202.) Defendant alleges that the Act contains a provision calling for an effective date of January 1, 1987, and it therefore became effective on January 5, 1987, the date the Governor certified the bill. (See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 1, par. 1201(b).) In the alternative, defendant contends that even if the Act does not contain an effective-date provision, it became effective on January 5, 1987, by operation of law. (See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 1, par. 1201(a).) We agree with the State.

The underlying question is whether the Act contains an effective-date provision. Section 13 of the Act provides:

"This amendatory act of 1986 shall only apply to Acts occurring on or after January 1, 1987, which cause the death of another." (Pub. Act 84 -- 1450, § 13.)

The State argues that section 13 is not an effective-date provision because it does not provide expressly that it is one. An effective-date provision "must be expressly and clearly made." (2 A. Sutherland, Statutory Construction § 33.02 (4th ed. 1986).) The purpose of this rule is to provide notice as to the date the public act takes effect. Accordingly, in each effective-date provision the General Assembly uses straightforward and unambiguous language. For example, section 3 of Public Act 84 -- 1451 provides: "This Act shall take effect upon its becoming law" (emphasis added); and section 5 -- 1 of Public Act 84 -- 1452 provides: "This Act shall take effect on January 1, 1987" (emphasis added). (1986 Ill. Laws 4260-61.) An examination of the effective-date provisions of other public acts reveals that the General Assembly consistently uses such language.

In contrast, section 13 of the Act is not straightforward. The section, which provides that Public Act 84 -- 1450 "shall only apply to Acts occurring on or after January 1, 1987" (emphasis added), does not state that it shall take effect on January 1, 1987. Section 13 merely provides that whenever the Act does take effect, it shall apply to acts occurring on or after January 1, 1987; in other words, that the Act shall be applied retroactively from January 1, 1987. In fact, this court has stated previously, in dicta, that the Act shall be applied retroactively from January 1, 1987, but we declined to rule on the validity of this retroactivity. People v. Reddick (1988), 123 Ill. 2d 184, 197.

Several secondary sources also support the view that the Act does not contain an effective-date provision. Both Laws of Illinois, 84th General Assembly, 1986 Session, and West's Illinois Legislative Service, 1986 Laws, 84th General Assembly, No. 10, published in their respective volumes that the Act became effective on July 1, 1987. Moreover, at least two law review articles have taken the position that the Act became effective on July 1, 1987. (O'Neill, An Analysis of Illinois' New Offense of Second Degree Murder, 20 J. Marshall L. Rev. 209 (1986); Haddad, Second Degree Murder Replaces Voluntary Manslaughter in Illinois: Problems Solved, Problems Created, 19 Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 995 (1988).) The uncertain draftsmanship of section 13 has ...


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