Searching over 5,500,000 cases.

Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.

01/17/89 Robert Lamborn, v. Jim Edgar

January 17, 1989





533 N.E.2d 1008, 178 Ill. App. 3d 814, 127 Ill. Dec. 926 1989.IL.33

Date Filed: January 17, 1989; December 6, 1988, nunc pro tunc

Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County; the Hon. Thomas R. Rakowski, Judge, presiding.


JUSTICE SCARIANO delivered the opinion of the court. HARTMAN and BILANDIC, JJ., concur.


The Illinois Secretary of State appeals from an order of the circuit court of Cook County reversing an administrative decision denying reinstatement of plaintiff's driving privileges.

Plaintiff, Robert Lamborn, was first arrested for driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor on October 5, 1982. Plaintiff refused to submit to a breathalyzer test, and his driving privileges were suspended for six months. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 95 1/2, par. 6-206(a)(17).) On April 21, 1983, plaintiff was convicted of failure to drive on the proper side of the roadway (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 95 1/2, par. 11-701(a)), and he was placed under court supervision and referred to a remedial/rehabilitation program. Plaintiff was again arrested for DUI on October 28, 1983, after having consumed six or more beers and peppermint schnapps. Plaintiff took and failed a breathalyzer test but did not recall being told the results. Upon conviction of this DUI charge, plaintiff's driving privileges were revoked on October 6, 1984. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 95 1/2, par. 6-205(a)(2).) On September 5, 1985, plaintiff was convicted of driving while his license had been revoked. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 95 1/2, par. 6-303(a).

Plaintiff initially underwent an alcohol- and drug-dependency evaluation on September 5, 1984, which revealed that plaintiff was consuming one pint to one quart of schnapps or brandy and some beer almost daily. Plaintiff's Michigan Alcoholism Screening Test score was high enough to indicate alcoholism, and he had experienced memory loss, problems with his wife, and a fight with an acquaintance while drinking. Plaintiff previously had attended Alcoholics Anonymous and had undergone treatment for alcoholism. Based upon this information, plaintiff was classified at Level III, indicating alcoholism/chemical dependency. The countermeasures recommended for plaintiff included (1) court supervision or probation with the condition of total abstinence from alcohol and (2) regular attendance at AA meetings and verification of his attendance.

During an alcohol- and drug-dependency reevaluation conducted on August 11, 1986, plaintiff stated that he had not used alcohol or any drugs since March 26, 1984. Plaintiff also denied that he was an alcoholic and indicated that he did not plan to resume drinking alcohol once his legal difficulties were resolved. The chemical-dependency assessor found that plaintiff did not accept his alcoholism and classified him at Level III. The assessor did not recommend any countermeasures beyond those described in the 1984 evaluation.

A final alcohol- and drug-dependency evaluation was conducted on February 9, 1987. The evaluation report indicated that there was no change in plaintiff's attitude or in the criteria for admission into a treatment program. The report also stated that any return of plaintiff's driving privileges depended upon his completion of some additional treatment program or, at a minimum, regular attendance at AA meetings, procurement of a sponsor, and work at and acceptance of a program of recovery. It was recommended that plaintiff choose an intensive out-patient treatment program and complete all phases of "after-care," or that he resume active participation in AA. Plaintiff was again classified as Level III, indicating an alcohol/chemical dependency. The suggested countermeasures consisted of (1) completion of an intensive out-patient treatment program and all recommended "after-care," or (2) resumption of regular attendance of at least one AA meeting weekly, plus the procurement of a sponsor and work at a realistic program of recovery. The evaluation report included the statement that "the rationale for these recommendations is the understanding of this office re: [Secretary] [Of] [State] standards."

Plaintiff thereafter brought a petition seeking reinstatement of his full driving privileges or, in the alternative, a restricted driving permit . An administrative hearing was held upon plaintiff's petition. At the hearing, plaintiff testified that he had not used alcohol since March 1984. Plaintiff admitted that he was an alcoholic but stated that he did not attend AA because he did not have time. He indicated that his friends and his work provided an effective support system for him. Plaintiff testified further that he had attended an in-patient program for the treatment of alcoholism at Grant Hospital in 1979. Following this treatment, plaintiff maintained abstinence for one year before he resume drinking alcohol. It was during this period of relapse that plaintiff was arrested for two DUI offenses.

Plaintiff was 51 years old at the time of the hearing and was employed as a conductor for Amtrak. He lived 10 miles from his job but was able to travel to and from work by public transportation and taxi cabs.

The hearing officer found that plaintiff was an alcoholic and that he did not understand the seriousness of his alcoholism. She also found that plaintiff had no recovery program to support his abstinence. She observed that his demeanor was defensive and somewhat resistant. She indicated that his testimony admitting that he was an alcoholic was not credible in light of his prior denials of alcoholism. Based upon the foregoing, the hearing officer concluded that (1) plaintiff was an alcoholic who must provide evidence of a support system to help maintain abstinence; (2) plaintiff did not demonstrate undue hardship because he was able to use public or private transportation to and from work, and he was not required to drive on the job; and (3) plaintiff failed to carry his burden of proving that he would be a safe and responsible driver and that he would not endanger the public safety ...

Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.