The opinion of the court was delivered by: ROVNER
ILANA DIAMOND ROVNER, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
This is an action brought by the federal government to reduce tax assessments to judgment. The case is currently before the Court on defendants' motions to dismiss.
Defendants originally delivered their motions to the Court on August 12, 1988. On September 16, 1988, the Court noted that defendants had not set a date for presentment of their motions before the Court. The Court also noted that each motion was accompanied by a notice of filing which stated:
Said Motion is not filed for hearing before any judge under the jurisdiction or influence of the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, but is rather submitted for the sole purpose of providing a responsive pleading in the nature of a special appearance to the complaint in this case.
Because the motions were not presented for hearing, the Court stated that it would take no action on them. On September 29, 1988, the court ordered defendants to answer or otherwise plead by October 7, 1988. Defendants then noticed their previously filed motions for presentment, and the Court set a briefing schedule on October 13, 1988.
On December 15, 1988, after the conclusion of the briefing period, defendants delivered to the Court a motion for an evidentiary hearing and offer of proof. That motion was not noticed for hearing. General Rule 12(i) of the Rules of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, which became effective on October 3, 1988, provides:
Where the moving party, or if the party is represented by counsel, counsel for the moving party, delivers a motion for which no date of presentment is set and fails to serve notice of a date of presentment within ten days of delivering the copy of the motion to the Court as provided by section (e) of this Rule, the Court may on its own initiative deny the motion.
Because defendants have not served notice of a date of presentment, the Court denies their motion for an evidentiary hearing.
Defendant's first motion is styled "motion to dismiss for lack of exclusive legislative jurisdiction." This motion is premised on Article I, Section 8, Clause 17 of the United States Constitution, which provides:
[The Congress shall have the power] to exercise exclusive legislation in all cases whatsoever, over such district (not exceeding ten miles square) as may, by cession of particular States, and the acceptance of Congress, become the seat of the government of the United States, and to exercise like authority over all places purchased by the consent of the Legislature of the State in which the same shall be, for the erection of forts, magazines, arsenals, dockyards, and other needful buildings.
Defendants argue that Clause 17 limits the legislative power of Congress such that the only geographical areas over which Congress may legislate, or may exercise its power of taxation, are those areas described in Clause 17. This position is contrary to both the natural reading of the Constitution and the case law. Clause 17 limits not the power of Congress, but the power of the states. "The word 'exclusive' was employed to eliminate any possibility that the legislative power of Congress over the District [of Columbia] was to be concurrent with that of the ceding states." District of Columbia v. John R. Thompson Co., 346 U.S. 100, 109, 73 S. Ct. 1007, 1012, 97 L. Ed. 1480 (1953). See also Paul v. United States 371 U.S. 245, 263, 83 S. Ct. 426, 437, 9 L. Ed. 2d 292 (1963); Black Hills Power and Light Co. v. Weinberger, 808 F.2d 665, 668 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 818, 108 S. Ct. 73, 98 L. Ed. 2d 36 (1987). Similarly, it is clear that the power of the Congress to collect taxes, created by Article I, Section 8, Clause 1 of the Constitution,
is an independent power which is not limited by the other specific powers ...