Before addressing the merits of the county's appeal, we note that the law under which plaintiffs sought relief, the Juvenile Court Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 37, par. 701-1 et seq.), was repealed effective January 1, 1988, and replaced with the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 37, par. 801-1 et seq.). Although the order appealed here was entered after the effective date of the new act, the underlying orders which provided for placement of minors with the plaintiffs and which required the county to pay for the care and support of such minors were entered while the former act was still in effect. Under section 7-1 of the new act, court orders made under the authority of the former act and in force on the effective date of the new act remain in force until modified or terminated by further court order. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 37, par. 807-1(3).) While the outcome of this appeal would not be different under the new act, since the relevant provisions of the former act have been carried forward to the new act without substantive change, we decide the appeal under the former act. Therefore, any further references to the Juvenile Court Act pertain to the former act unless specifically noted.
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS, SECOND DISTRICT
532 N.E.2d 1000, 177 Ill. App. 3d 991, 127 Ill. Dec. 171 1988.IL.1912
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Du Page County; the Hon. S. Bruce Scidmore, Judge, presiding.
JUSTICE DUNN delivered the opinion of the court. LINDBERG, P.J., and WOODWARD, J., concur.
DECISION OF THE COURT DELIVERED BY THE HONORABLE JUDGE DUNN
Plaintiffs, Robert and Carol Greve and Park Ridge Youth Campus, filed suit in the circuit court of Du Page County against defendants, the County of Du Page, the Du Page County Board, and the chairman and individual members of the county board (collectively referred to hereinafter as the county), seeking a writ of mandamus ordering the county to pay outstanding vouchers submitted to the county by the Du Page County Probation Department. The vouchers represented the amounts allegedly owed to plaintiffs for providing the care and support of minors placed with them pursuant to section 5-7 of the Juvenile Court Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 37, par. 705-7). The circuit court denied the county's motion for summary judgment and granted plaintiffs' motion for judgment on the pleadings. The county appeals, contending that the circuit court erred in ordering the county to provide funding for youth care and support in excess of the amount requested by the judiciary for inclusion in the county's appropriation ordinance. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.
In their complaint filed November 25, 1987, plaintiffs alleged that from time to time the circuit court for the Eighteenth Judicial Circuit had entered orders under sections 5-7 and 7-3(2) of the Juvenile Court Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 37, pars. 705-7, 707-3(2)), placing minors in the temporary care and custody of the plaintiffs and other providers of foster care and requiring the county to pay said providers specified sums of money per diem, and to pay for the medical care of the minors. It was also alleged that on October 9, 1987, and November 13, 1987, the Du Page County Probation Department submitted to the county for payment vouchers totaling $178, 564.40, representing amounts owed to the plaintiffs and other foster care providers for the care and support of minors placed under the Act, but that the county refused to provide the funds to make the court-ordered payments. It was alleged that the failure of the county to pay the outstanding invoices would result in the release of approximately 60 minor children by the providers of foster care to the court and the return of said minor children to the environments from which they were removed. The plaintiffs sought the court to declare that the providers of foster care had a clear legal right to the issuance of the court-ordered payments by the county and to require the county to pay all outstanding invoices submitted by said providers.
The county filed an answer in which it admitted that the vouchers in question had not been paid but denied that plaintiffs were entitled to relief. The county then filed a motion for summary judgment. Submitted with the motion was an affidavit of Jack T. Knuepfer, the chairman of the county board. In his affidavit, Knuepfer stated that during budgetary hearings which occurred in October and November 1986, pursuant to section 7-1 of the Juvenile Court Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 37, par. 707-1), the court requested that the county board appropriate $705,000 for the care and support of minors in fiscal year 1987. Knuepfer stated that the board passed the county's annual appropriation ordinance for that fiscal year on November 25, 1986, and that the ordinance designated a separate fund in the amount of $605,000 for youth care and support. According to the affidavit, a contingency fund in the amount of $300,000 was established in case the appropriated amount was exhausted. Knuepfer stated that throughout 1987 the county paid $1,116,504 for the care and support of minors placed under the Juvenile Court Act. After the initial appropriation and the contingency fund were exhausted, the county transferred $65,000 from the general county fund and then approximately $145,000 in unspent sums from the Probation Department appropriation to pay for youth care and support. Knuepfer's affidavit also stated that the county had reached its maximum tax levy for the year 1988, and that payment by the county of the outstanding invoices of the foster care providers would cause reductions in the amounts allocated for other programs and services that made demands on the county budget. In the motion for summary judgment, the county argued that Illinois law did not require it to continue to pay for the care and support of minors placed under the Juvenile Court Act after the amounts requested by the court for inclusion in the annual appropriation ordinance had been exhausted.
After hearing oral argument, the circuit court denied the county's motion for summary judgment. The parties then stipulated that the matters raised in the motion constituted the county's only defense to plaintiffs' complaint for mandamus, and plaintiffs moved for judgment on the pleadings. The circuit court granted plaintiffs' motion and ordered the county to pay the outstanding vouchers submitted to the county for care and support of minors placed pursuant to section 5 -- 7 of the Juvenile Court Act.
The case before us revolves around several sections of the former Juvenile Court Act. Section 5-7 of the former act authorized the circuit court under specified circumstances to remove minors adJudged wards of the court from their parents, guardians, or legal custodians, and to place them with foster care providers. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 37, par. 705-7.) The Act also authorized the circuit court to order the county to pay such foster care providers. Section 7-3(2) provided:
"Whenever a ward of the court is placed under Section 5-7, the court may order the county to pay monthly such amounts as are necessary for his care and support to the guardian of the person or legal custodian appointed under this Act, or to the agency which such guardian or custodian represents." (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 37, par. 707-3(2).)
Finally, section 7 -- 1 of the former act provided in pertinent part:
"(1) Each county board shall provide in its annual appropriation ordinance or annual budget, as the case may be, for payments for the care and support of minors, and for payments for court appointed counsel in accordance with orders entered under this Act in an amount which in the judgment of the court may be needed for that purpose. Such appropriation or budget item constitutes a separate fund into which shall be paid not only the ...