APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS, FIRST DISTRICT, THIRD DIVISION
533 N.E.2d 919, 178 Ill. App. 3d 752, 127 Ill. Dec. 837 1988.IL.1838
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County; the Hon. Raymond Terrell, Judge, presiding.
JUSTICE RIZZI delivered the opinion of the court. WHITE, P.J., and McNAMARA, J., concur.
DECISION OF THE COURT DELIVERED BY THE HONORABLE JUDGE RIZZI
Defendants, Isiah Anderson, Wilhelmina Anderson, Timothy Anderson and Belinda Anderson (Anderson), appeal from a judgment of the circuit court of Cook County granting plaintiff, United States Department of Housing and Urban Development , possession of its real estate. On appeal, Anderson argues that (1) the jury's verdict was against the weight of the evidence; (2) the trial court abused its discretion when it permitted plaintiff to reopen its case to introduce evidence of the relationship between the company that managed the property, Permit Real Estate, Inc., and HUD; and (3) the trial court erred in allowing HUD to substitute itself as a party plaintiff in place of Permit Real Estate, Inc., after plaintiff had rested its case. We affirm.
HUD owns property in Chicago located at 20 North Waller Street (Waller). The Waller property was managed by Kienlan Real Estate from April 1984 to January 1987. On May 1, 1984, Anderson signed a lease for the Waller property. The lease provided for a rental of $600 per month and for a late charge of 4%. By oral agreement, this was a month-to-month lease.
On July 11, 1986, Wilhelmina Anderson signed a bid to purchase the Waller property for $25,333. According to Wilhelmina, when she informed Henry Doolin of Kienlan Real Estate that it would be difficult to pay rent and manage the mortgage at the same time, Doolin informed her not to worry about the rent and to just concentrate on the amount necessary to close on the mortgage. Wilhelmina also stated that repairs were made in reliance upon Doolin's representation that she would have no problems securing the real estate. Doolin, however, testified that he never waived the payment of any rent and that he did not authorize the Andersons to make any repairs on the property.
Anderson did not pay rent for the months of July 1986 through May 11, 1987. By January 1, 1987, Anderson owed HUD $8,124 in back rent. On January 30, 1987, HUD awarded the management contract on the Waller property to Permit Real Estate, Inc. (Permit). HUD then directed Permit to serve Anderson with a five-day notice and to retain an attorney to commence eviction proceedings. On March 3, 1987, Anderson was served with a five-day notice demanding payment of $8,124 in rent. This notice was signed to Permit as agent for HUD. Following the close of evidence at trial, the jury found in favor of HUD and the court entered a judgment for possession of the premises to HUD. This appeal followed.
First, Anderson argues that the jury's verdict is against the weight of the evidence. Anderson asserts that Doolin, as agent for HUD, waived the payment of rent and thus the jury erred in returning a verdict to the contrary. We disagree.
A verdict is deemed to be against the manifest weight of the evidence when "an opposite Conclusion is clearly apparent or when the finding of the jury appears arbitrary and unsubstantiated by the evidence." (Hargrove v. Neuner (1985), 138 Ill. App. 3d 811, 813, 485 N.E.2d 1355, 1357.) Thus, a court of review will not disturb a jury's finding unless, considering all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the party who prevailed at trial, the jury's Conclusion is palpably erroneous and wholly unwarranted. 138 Ill. App. 3d at 813, 485 N.E.2d at 1357.
In the instant case, we do not believe that the jury's Conclusion is palpably erroneous or wholly unwarranted. In short, the evidence adduced at trial indicates that a five-day notice demanding payment of past-due rent was served upon Anderson by Permit as agent for HUD. Anderson did not pay the money demanded in the notice. Anderson testified that HUD's agent, Doolin, waived payment of the rent when Anderson was attempting to purchase the property. However, Doolin testified that he did not waive any payment of the rent for Anderson. Although there is a conflict in the testimony, we will not substitute our judgment for that of the jury in determining the credibility of the witnesses. Thus, we conclude that the jury's verdict was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.
Next, Anderson argues that the trial court erred in allowing plaintiff to reopen its case and introduce evidence of the relationship between Permit and HUD. We disagree. In general, the decision to reopen a case to allow the introduction of additional evidence rests within the sound discretion of the trial court. (Bank of Illmo v. Simmons (1986), 142 Ill. App. 3d 741, 746, 492 N.E.2d 207, 212.) Factors to be taken into consideration in allowing a party to reopen a case include whether (1) the failure to introduce the evidence occurred because of inadvertence or calculated risk; (2) the adverse party will be surprised or unfairly prejudiced by the new evidence; (3) the new evidence is of the utmost importance to the movant's case; and (4) any cogent reasons exist to justify denying the request. Hollembaek v. Diminick's Finer Foods, Inc. (1985), 137 Ill. App. 3d 773, 778, 484 N.E.2d 1237, 1241.
Based upon our review of the record, we do not find that the trial court abused its discretion in allowing plaintiff to reopen its case for the limited purpose of introducing evidence of Permit's relationship with HUD. Both parties had already stipulated that Anderson had entered into a lease for the Waller property, that Anderson had not paid rent to HUD and that Anderson was served with a five-day notice demanding payment of rent signed by Permit. Moreover, Anderson has not alleged or given any basis for this court to conclude that any surprise or prejudice occurred by allowing the introduction of such evidence. Anderson was well aware of the fact that the property was owned by HUD and that Permit's only role was that of agent and management company. We believe that in ...