APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS, THIRD DISTRICT
530 N.E.2d 1168, 176 Ill. App. 3d 274, 125 Ill. Dec. 759 1988.IL.1656
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Hancock County; the Hon. Richard C. Ripple, Judge, presiding.
JUSTICE HEIPLE delivered the opinion of the court. STOUDER, P.J., and WOMBACHER, J., concur.
DECISION OF THE COURT DELIVERED BY THE HONORABLE JUDGE HEIPLE
Initially, we note that the defendant, Richard A. Weakley, Jr., has filed no appellee's brief. However, we address the case under the authority of First Capitol Mortgage Corp. v. Talandis Construction Corp. (1976), 63 Ill. 2d 128, 345 N.E.2d 493.
This case presents the sole question of whether section 6 -- 303(a) of the Illinois Vehicle Code (the Code) is a basis to charge the Iowa resident-defendant for driving in Illinois when his Iowa driver's license was revoked by Iowa.
In relevant part, section 6 -- 303(a) currently provides as follows:
"(a) Any person who drives or is in actual physical control of a motor vehicle on any highway of this State at a time when such person's driver's license . . . is revoked or suspended as provided by this Code or any other law, except as may be specifically allowed . . . pursuant to this Code, shall be guilty of a Class A misdemeanor." (Emphasis added.) Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 95 1/2, par. 6-303(a).
The 1979 edition of the relevant part of section 6 -- 303(a) provided as follows:
"(a) Any person who drives a motor vehicle on any highway of this State at a time when his driver's license . . . is revoked or suspended as provided by this Act or any other Act, except as may be allowed . . . under this Act, shall be guilty of a Class A misdemeanor." (Emphasis added.) Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 95 1/2, par. 6-303(a).
In People v. Brown (1983), 118 Ill. App. 3d 609, 455 N.E.2d 287, we interpreted the 1979 statute under facts similar to those in the instant case. There, Iowa resident Brown was charged under section 6 -- 303(a) for driving in Illinois while his Iowa driver's license was revoked by Iowa. We affirmed dismissal of the charge.
In the instant case, the trial court dismissed the section 6 -- 303(a) charge, referring to our decision in Brown. The State argues on appeal that Brown is no longer valid in light of subsequent amendment of section 6 -- 303(a). We disagree and find that Brown is dispositive.
Brown interpreted section 6-303(a)'s phrase "this Act or any other Act" to refer only to acts adopted by the Illinois General Assembly, not to legislation of other States. It relied upon the fact that section 6-303(a) did not, as it easily could have, expressly regulate nonresident drivers whose licenses had been revoked or suspended by their home States. It found support for its interpretation in section 6-303(b) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 95 1/2, par. 6-303(b)). The Brown court noted that section 6-303(b) provided for extension of a defendant's period of suspension of revocation upon the Secretary of State's receipt of a report of a conviction under section ...