family of it on the night before he was sentenced. He has not
wavered in that decision at any time since.
The Court found him to be credible, lucid, and rational in his
testimony. He stated that he would not change his opinion even if
he were guaranteed an opportunity for pardon at age 70 or 75. He
understood the federal review options available to him, and was
aware of the efforts being made on his behalf by the petitioners.
He stated that it was not the lack of medical care, the
conditions of his confinement, or the counseling available that
were the determining factors in his decision. He drew a very
perceptive distinction between his situation and that of POW's.
He stated, "They [POW's] can have a hope and a dream of being
free. I can't. See, so it's two different sets of circumstances."
(Tr. p. 155). Walker said that there was "no possibility, hope or
dream" of being a free man, and that there was no sense in being
imprisoned for 10-25 years and then dying, when the end result
would be the same — death.
The Court finds that petitioners' original basis for their
petition, that the conditions of confinement have caused Walker's
will to be overborne, rendering his decision involuntary, is
without merit. Neither expert found any environmental factor that
affected Walker's capacity to make a voluntary waiver. Walker
himself did not have any serious complaints about the conditions
of confinement. The Court finds that Walker's decision is, in
part, based on the quality of his life due to the fact, not
conditions, of confinement and the sheer lack of the possibility
of freedom during his lifetime. He expressed a reasoned, logical
and acceptable desire not to lay in a "cage" and die an old man
in that "cage."
Having considered the opinions of the medical experts together
with Walker's testimony, the Court finds that the petitioners
have failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that
Charles T. Walker suffers from a flawed mental state due to an
overborne will. Walker's waiver of the right to further review
was made freely and rationally. Under the totality of the
circumstances, Walker's decision is the product of both rational
intellect and unconstrained will. Accord, Haynes v. Washington,
373 U.S. 503, 83 S.Ct. 1336, 10 L.Ed.2d 513 (1963); Townsend v.
Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 83 S.Ct. 745, 9 L.Ed.2d 770 (1963); Culombe
v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 81 S.Ct. 1860, 6 L.Ed.2d 1037
(1961). The Court further finds that Charles T. Walker has the
capacity to knowingly waive his right to further review of his
death sentence, and the same is done voluntarily. Rees v. Peyton,
384 U.S. at 314, 86 S.Ct. at 1506.
Accordingly, the petition for a writ of habeas corpus is DENIED
and this cause of action is, therefore, DISMISSED. The stay of
execution heretofore ordered by the Court is continued in full
force and effect pending appeal.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
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