United States District Court, Southern District of Illinois
August 16, 1988
JUAN RAMON MATTA-BALLESTEROS, ON THE RELATION OF MARTIN R. STOLAR, HIS ATTORNEY, PETITIONER,
GARY L. HENMAN, WARDEN, UNITED STATES PENITENTIARY AT MARION, ILLINOIS, RESPONDENT.
The opinion of the court was delivered by: Stiehl, District Judge:
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Before the Court is Juan Ramon Matta-Ballesteros' (Matta)
Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241
by a Person in Federal Custody.
This cause is before the Court in a posture somewhat different
from the majority of federal habeas actions which the Court is
regularly required to review. The petitioner is not challenging
the duration or nature of his confinement; rather, he challenges
the legality of his detention. Petitioner asserts that he was
illegally and unconstitutionally taken from his home in Honduras
and removed to the United States by federal agents. The relief
Matta seeks is to have this Court declare that the United States
is without jurisdiction over petitioner due to alleged violations
of his right to due process in the manner of his apprehension,
and order that Matta be returned to Honduras.
Matta is under indictment in the Northern District of Florida
for an alleged escape from the United States Prison Camp at Eglin
Air Force Base in 1971, and faces indictments on various
narcotics charges in the Central and Southern Districts of
California, and the District of Arizona. Matta originally sought
a temporary restraining order from this Court to prevent the
government from transferring him from the United States
Penitentiary at Marion, Illinois, where he is currently detained,
to face prosecution in any other district. The Court, upon
consent of the government, entered its temporary restraining
order on April 25, 1988. The Court directed the parties to brief
certain issues prior to the preliminary injunction hearing on May
16, 1988. On May 4, 1988, again upon consent of the government,
and for good cause shown, the TRO was extended until May 16,
1988. The Court heard extensive oral argument on the application
for preliminary injunction, including arguments on the likelihood
of success on the merits of the underlying habeas corpus action.
The government agreed to a further extension of the TRO until the
Court's ruling on the application for preliminary injunction.
On May 25, 1988, the Court denied Matta's application for a
preliminary injunction. The Court ruled that petitioner had
failed to establish that he lacked an adequate remedy at law;
that he failed to show irreparable harm; and that the balance of
harms did not weigh in petitioner's favor. The Court made no
ruling as to the likelihood of success on the merits. The merits
of Matta's habeas petition are now before the Court.
On June 2, 1988, the Court directed the government to show
cause why the writ should not issue, and on June 20, 1988,
ordered an expanded record from the parties, including affidavits
from the petitioner and any occurrence witnesses. The parties
have complied with the Order, and the Court has before it the
petition for a writ of habeas corpus, the affidavits of Matta,
certain occurrence and other witnesses, and certain reports.
A. Uncontroverted Facts
The following is a description of the events surrounding the
arrest which are uncontroverted:
Juan Ramon Matta-Ballesteros, a/k/a Juan Ramon Mata del Pozo,
a/k/a Juan Ramon Mata, (Matta) is a resident of Tegucigalpa,
Honduras. Very early on the morning of April 5, 1988, Matta,
accompanied by two security guards/drivers, went a short distance
from his home to the residence of his attorney, Carlos D.
Lorenzana. His guards remained outside while he went into the
house. Within minutes of arriving, Matta received a telephone
call from his
wife. Matta exited his attorney's house to return to his home.
Matta's security guards informed him that they had observed
members of the military, described by one as the Honduras Special
Troops known as "Cobra" watching the attorney's home while
standing at either end of the street. Matta, accompanied by his
security guards, drove the van back to his home.
Upon arriving at his home, Matta got out of the van and
identified himself to members of the Honduran military. The van
was surrounded by many military men with weapons. A beige Land
Cruiser Toyota pickup truck pulled up and two men arrested Matta.
Included among the group at Matta's house were some Americans in
civilian clothing. Matta was grabbed, a brief struggle ensued, a
black hood was placed over his head, and he was pushed onto the
floor in the back seat of the Land Cruiser. At some point during
the apprehension, Matta may have been shocked several times by a
Deputy United States Marshal, Juan J. Donato Morales, drove the
Land Cruiser to an air base, an hour to an hour and a half away.
Sometime thereafter, Matta was placed on an airplane. He was
subsequently flown to the United States, and then transferred to
the United States Penitentiary at Marion, Illinois, in this
District, early on the morning of April 6, 1988. Approximately 24
hours elapsed from the time of his apprehension to the time of
his arrival at Marion Penitentiary.
Upon his arrival at Marion on April 6, 1988, Matta was given an
initial medical examination. The examination revealed, in part,
Clinical Evaluation Notes
18. Head, Face, Neck Linear abrasions at left and posterior
and Scalp basal aspect of the neck
34. G-U System Presence of depigment ed area with
some scaling at the left side of
proximal shaft of the penis
35. Upper Extremities Linear abrasions at the distal part of
both forearms mostly at the lateral
and posterior side. Palmar side of
both hands are smeared light red (per
pt's information it's from blood)
36. Feet Abrasion about 1 1/3 x 1/2 cm at
dorsum of left foot
39. Identifying Body Multiple erythematous spots of about
Marks, Scars, 3-5 mm at the back. Few of these spots
Tattoos have denuded skin compatible with
B. Controverted Facts
The expanded record reveals the following questions of fact
1. Petitioner asserts that a large group of United States
agents were present at Matta's home. The government asserts that
there were only four members of the United States Marshals
Service near Matta's residence.
2. Petitioner asserts that he was seized by American "agents"
in civilian clothing. The government asserts that the
apprehension was made by Honduran officers, and that no United
States agents were involved in the struggle with Matta.
3. Matta claims that the American agents, during the one and
one half hour drive to the air base, beat him on the head, back
and arms and burned him with a "double pronged electric." He
further claims that they mixed their shocks with "shouted
interrogation," in both English and Spanish (with non-Honduran
accents). The government, through the affidavit of Deputy Marshal
Donato Morales, asserts that Honduran officers placed Matta on
the floor of the Land Cruiser, that one Honduran rode in the back
seat with Matta, and the other with Donato Morales in the front.
Donato Morales observed the officer in the front to carry a stun
gun device which was placed on the floor. He did not see Matta
receive shocks from the stun gun during the trip.
4. Matta claims that upon arrival at the air base he was placed
aboard a jet and flown to the United States. The government
asserts that Matta remained at the air base in an air conditioned
vehicle for two to two and one half hours while awaiting an
5. Matta claims that during the two hour flight, the hood
remained on his head and he was repeatedly beaten and shocked
about the body, including his testicles and
feet. He claims that upon arrival in the United States he was
flown aboard a commercial jet to Puerto Rico and was forced to
sign an Entry Declaration, and was advised that he was under
arrest. The government denies that Matta was beaten or shocked
during the trip to the United States, denies that he was flown
from the United States to Puerto Rico, and denies that Matta was
forced to sign an entry declaration.
III. APPLICATION OF LAW
Petitioner has asked this Court to issue a writ of habeas
corpus and declare that no court in the United States has
jurisdiction over Matta, and to order his return to Honduras.
Petitioner asserts two grounds entitling him to the relief he
seeks: First, that the apprehension of Matta violated the
Honduran Constitution, which prohibits extradition of Honduran
citizens, the 1909 Extradition Treaty between the United States
and Honduras, and the Inter-American Extradition Treaty of 1933,
to which the United States and Honduras are signatories; Second,
that Matta's Fifth Amendment right to due process was violated
when he was tortured and abducted from Honduras. Both grounds
present questions of jurisdiction and standing.
A. Standard of Review
The government asks this Court to determine that, as a matter
of law, petitioner is not entitled to the relief he seeks. Under
Rule 8(a) of the Rules Governing Habeas Corpus cases under
Section 2254, 28 U.S.C. foll. § 2254, the Court may determine,
upon review of the expanded record, whether an evidentiary
hearing is required. "If it appears that an evidentiary hearing
is not required, the judge shall make such disposition of the
petition as justice shall require." The review, therefore, is in
the nature of the review the Court makes when considering a
motion for summary judgment.
In Jeter v. Keohane, 739 F.2d 257 (7th Cir. 1984), the court
stated, "an evidentiary hearing is not necessary when the facts
essential to consideration of the constitutional issues are
already before the court. Bergenthal v. Cady, 466 F.2d 635, 648
(7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1109, 93 S.Ct. 913, 34
L.Ed.2d 690 (1973); 28 U.S.C. § 2243." 739 F.2d 257, n. 1.
The Court must determine if petitioner has presented sufficient
allegations to entitle him to the habeas relief he seeks as a
matter of law. The Court will, therefore, consider the pleadings
and the affidavits in the light most favorable to the petitioner.
Petitioner must raise a question of material fact to entitle him
to habeas review; that is, his allegations must be
outcome-determinative under the applicable law.
B. Violation of Extradition Treaties
Matta asserts that his capture violated the Honduran
Constitution, and at least two extradition treaties to which the
United States and Honduras are signatories.
The well-recognized rule of international law is that "only
sovereign nations have the authority to complain about violations
of extradition treaties." United States v. Yunis, 681 F. Supp. 909,
916 (D.D.C. 1988). Similarly, "[E]xtradition treaties are
made for the benefit of the governments concerned. . . . And,
under international law, it is the contracting foreign
government, not the defendant, that would have the right to
complain about a violation." United States v. Cordero,
668 F.2d 32, 37-38 (1st Cir. 1981), quoted in Yunis, 681 F.2d at 916. See
also, United States v. Valot, 625 F.2d 308 (9th Cir. 1980);
United States ex rel. Lujan v. Gengler, 510 F.2d 62, 67-68 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1001, 95 S.Ct. 2400, 44 L.Ed.2d 668
Indeed, even where a treaty provides certain benefits
for nationals of a particular state . . . it is
traditionally held that "any rights arising out of
such provisions are, under international law, those
of the states and . . . individual rights are only
derivative through the states."
Lujan, 510 F.2d at 67, quoting ALI, Restatement (Second) of the
Foreign Relations Law of the United States, § 115, comment (e)
(1965). Therefore, absent an objection by Honduras as to Matta's
capture, he is precluded from personally asserting
that a violation of any extradition treaty has occurred, whether
it be that between the United States and Honduras, or the
Inter-American Extradition Treaty.
It only remains to be emphasized that by no means
every irregularity in the recovery of a fugitive from
criminal justice is a "recourse to measures in
violation of international law or international
convention." If the State in which the fugitive is
found acquiesces or agrees, through its officers or
agents, to a surrender accomplished even in the most
informal and expeditious way, there is no element of
Comment to Article 16, Harvard Research in International Law
Draft Extradition Treaty, 29 Am.Jur.Int'l Law Supp. 631 (1935);
quoted in Lujan, 510 F.2d at 67.
As the Second Circuit in Lujan noted, in reference to United
States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267 (2d Cir.) pet. for reh'g en
banc denied, 504 F.2d 1380 (2d Cir. 1974), "[T]o support this
claim [of a violation of an extradition treaty], Toscanino would
have to prove that the Uruguayan government registered an
official protest with the United States Department of State." 510
F.2d at 67, n. 8.
In support of his claim, Matta has included in the expanded
record an affidavit of Felix Cerna Salgado, a member of the
National Congress of the Republic of Honduras for the Department
of Olancho. His affidavit states that the apprehension of Matta
"has been repudiated by the majority of the Honduran people and
especially by public officers of the legislative, judiciary, and
executive powers of the Republic. . . ." He further states that
Matta's apprehension provoked public demonstrations and an attack
on the American Embassy, and that five Honduran citizens were
killed, six million dollars in property was damaged and a state
of national emergency was declared. The affidavit includes an
extensive list of public officials and professional organizations
that protested the apprehension. However, notably absent is any
reference to an official protest having been made by the Honduran
government, Foreign Ministry, or President.
Similarly, the "Declaration" submitted by the petitioner, is a
declaration, or bill, merely submitted to the National Congress
by seven congressmen. It is of no official weight, the record
does not reflect that it has even been voted on, or approved by
the congress, and there is no indication that its sentiments have
been adopted by the executive branch of the government.
Absent the fact of an official protest, petitioner is without
standing to assert the violation of any extradition treaty as
grounds for the relief he seeks.
To the extent that Matta's claim is based on the Honduran
Constitution, this Court is clearly without jurisdiction to
interpret or apply it to proceedings before the Court.
Furthermore, the failure of the Honduran government to object to
Matta's apprehension similarly prevents him from asserting an
infringement of the Honduran Constitution as grounds for the
relief he seeks.
C. Violations of Petitioner's Fifth Amendment Rights
1. Application of the United States Constitution to Aliens.
Petitioner claims that his forcible abduction and
transportation from Honduras to the United States violated his
right to due process. The Supreme Court has not resolved the
question of whether the Constitution of the United States affords
its protection to aliens. The Court has, however, held that the
Constitution is in force "wherever and whenever the sovereign
power of [the United States] is exerted." Balzac v. Porto Rico,
258 U.S. 298, 312, 42 S.Ct. 343, 348, 66 L.Ed. 627 (1922). Most
circuits have applied the Constitution to situations where the
government acts extraterritorially, requiring those acts "to
conform to constitutional proscriptions when acting overseas."
Yunis, 681 F. Supp. 917 (citations omitted). This Court is
similarly persuaded, and finds that Matta is entitled to the
guarantees and protections of the Constitution as it applies to
the activities of government officials in Matta's capture and
transportation from Honduras to the United States.
2. Whether the circumstances and nature of Matta's capture
violated his Fifth Amendment Rights.
The long-standing rule of law is that a forcible abduction does
not offend due process nor does it require that courts dismiss an
indictment for loss of jurisdiction on those grounds. The Seventh
Circuit, in United States v. Marzano, 537 F.2d 257 (7th Cir.
1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1038, 97 S.Ct. 734, 50 L.Ed.2d 749
It has long been held that due process has been
satisfied when a person is apprised of the charges
against him and is given a fair trial. The power of a
court to try a person is not affected by the
impropriety of the method used to bring the defendant
under the jurisdiction of the court.
Id. at 271, citing Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519
, 72 S.Ct.
509, 96 L.Ed. 541 (1952); Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436, 7 S.Ct.
225, 30 L.Ed. 421 (1886).
The Ker-Frisbie doctrine, as it has come to be known, stands
for the premise that the "forcible abduction of a criminal
defendant into the court's jurisdiction does not impair the
court's power to try him." United States v. Cordero, 668 F.2d 32,
36 (1st Cir. 1981). This doctrine has been reaffirmed by the
Supreme Court in United States v. Crews, 445 U.S. 463, 474, 100
S.Ct. 1244, 1251, 63 L.Ed.2d 537 (1980); Stone v. Powell,
428 U.S. 465, 96 S.Ct. 3037, 49 L.Ed.2d 1067 (1976); Gerstein v.
Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 95 S.Ct. 854, 43 L.Ed. 2d 54 (1975). (In
which the Supreme Court stated "Nor do we retreat from the
established rule that illegal arrest or detention does not void
a subsequent conviction." Id. at 119, 95 S.Ct. 865.)
The petitioner is not under indictment in this district. This
fact places petitioner's claim in a unique position before the
Court. Petitioner seeks relief from this Court which, if granted,
would result in his return to Honduras, and, therefore, affect
the personal jurisdiction of those courts in which he faces
indictment. Under the Ker-Frisbie doctrine, courts are not
required to dismiss an indictment for lack of jurisdiction based
on the defendant's forcible abduction. To the extent that this is
a case of first impression, the Court holds that the Ker-Frisbie
doctrine applies to alleged escapees who seek habeas relief based
on the "impropriety of the method" used to bring the petitioner
within the jurisdiction of the Court. 537 F.2d at 271. To that
extent, the Court finds that no Fifth Amendment violation
occurred that would warrant the relief Matta seeks.
3. The Toscanino Exception.
The petitioner would have this Court apply an exception to the
Ker Frisbie doctrine pursuant to the Second Circuit ruling in
United States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267 (2d Cir. 1974). The
Court first notes that the Seventh Circuit has yet to apply the
Toscanino exception to any case before it, nor has the Seventh
Circuit indicated any intent to limit the Ker-Frisbie doctrine.
This Court does not believe that Toscanino should be applied to
Matta's habeas petition to afford him the extraordinary relief,
return to Honduras, which he seeks. To date, the Toscanino
argument, or one similar, has been rejected by the Fifth, Ninth,
Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits. See: United States v. Postal,
589 F.2d 862 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 832, 100 S.Ct. 61, 62
L.Ed.2d 40 (1979); United States v. Winter, 509 F.2d 975 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 825, 96 S.Ct. 39, 46 L.Ed.2d 41
(1975); United States v. Herrera, 504 F.2d 859 (5th Cir. 1974);
United States v. Cotten, 471 F.2d 744 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
411 U.S. 936, 93 S.Ct. 1913, 36 L.Ed.2d 396 (1973); Hobson v.
Crouse, 332 F.2d 561 (10th Cir. 1964); United States v.
Rosenthal, 793 F.2d 1214 (11th Cir. 1986), cert. denied,
480 U.S. 919, 107 S.Ct. 1377, 94 L.Ed.2d 692 (1987). And no court applying
Toscanino has dismissed an indictment. In Marzano, 537 F.2d at
272, the Seventh Circuit found: "No facts have been alleged or
proved which could be termed shocking to the conscience.
Toscanino is therefore inapposite. We need not decide whether we
would follow Toscanino if similar facts were presented."
In Toscanino, the Second Circuit, determined that the
Ker-Frisbie doctrine was
weakened by the Supreme Court's ruling in Rochin v. California,
342 U.S. 165, 72 S.Ct. 205, 96 L.Ed. 183 (1952) (where the court
set aside a conviction based on evidence that had been obtained
by pumping the defendant's stomach, against his will). The
Toscanino court stated:
Faced with a conflict between the two concepts of due
process, the one being the restricted version found
in Ker-Frisbie and the other the expanded and
enlightened interpretation expressed in more recent
decisions of the Supreme Court, we are persuaded that
to the extent that the two are in conflict, the
Ker-Frisbie version must yield. Accordingly we view
due process as now requiring a court to divest itself
of jurisdiction over the person of a defendant where
it has been acquired as the result of the
government's deliberate, unnecessary and unreasonable
invasion of the accused's constitutional rights.
500 F.2d at 275. The allegations were as follows: Toscanino was a
citizen of Italy who was lured from his home in Uruguay by a
telephone call from a co-conspirator. Toscanino was knocked
unconscious with a gun, thrown into the rear seat of a car, bound
and blindfolded and driven to the Uruguayan-Brazilian border. He
was denied food, water and sleep and was "incessantly tortured
and interrogated" for seventeen days. He was forced to walk a
hallway for seven or eight hours, and was kicked and beaten. His
fingers were pinched with metal pliers, alcohol was flushed in
his eyes, and other fluids were forced into his body cavities. He
received electric shocks to his ears, toes and genitals. He
alleged that agents of the United States Department of Justice,
Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs were present at some of
the torture and participated in portions of the interrogation.
Id. at 269-70.
The Second Circuit remanded the case to the District Court
which denied the motion to dismiss, ruling that there was no
claim of participation by United States agents in Toscanino's
abduction and torture. 398 F. Supp. 916, 917 (E.D.N.Y. 1975).
Therefore, the Toscanino exception requires that both conditions
be met for the court to be divested of jurisdiction. The first is
that there must be government participation, and the second is
that the government agents' conduct must rise to a level that
shocks the conscience of the Court.
The Second Circuit, shortly after Toscanino, narrowed its
holding, and recognized the vitality of the Ker-Frisbie doctrine.
In Lujan v. Gengler, 510 F.2d 62, the Second Circuit stated:
Yet in recognizing that Ker and Frisbie no longer
provided a carte blanche to government agents
bringing defendants from abroad to the United States
by the use of torture, brutality and similar
outrageous conduct, we did not intend to suggest that
any irregularity in the circumstances of the
defendant's arrival in the jurisdiction would vitiate
the proceedings of the criminal court.
Id. at 65 (emphasis supplied). Further:
We scarcely intend to convey approval of illegal
government conduct. But we are forced to recognize
that, absent a set of incidents like that in
Toscanino, not every violation by prosecution or
police is so egregious that Rochin and its progeny
requires nullification of the indictment.
Id. at 66. Therefore, even the circuit that developed the
Toscanino exception has refused to apply it generally, absent
activity that "shocks the conscience."
Even if the Toscanino exception were to be applied in the
Seventh Circuit, the Court finds that, as a matter of law, the
allegations of petitioner do not rise to the threshold standard
of Toscanino. The allegations of torture do not meet the required
level of outrageousness, nor do they shock the conscience to the
extent that they would require the Court to afford Matta the
relief he seeks, thereby divesting each court under which he is
indicted of its jurisdiction over him. Rosenthal, 793 F.2d at
The Court again stresses that Matta is an alleged escapee,
under indictment for escaping federal custody. The indictment
charging Matta with escape was returned
in the Northern District of Florida on December 10, 1986. The
Court is unaware of any case applying Toscanino to dismiss an
indictment or grant habeas relief where an alleged escapee has
been returned to the jurisdiction of the court. Furthermore, the
Second Circuit, in United States v. Reed, 639 F.2d 896 (2d Cir.
1981), drew a distinction between the re-capture of a fugitive
from justice and the initial capture of a defendant.
It should also be noted that the agents' conduct
would have been legal had it occurred anywhere in the
United States or in any country where the United
States exercises extraterritorial jurisdiction; see
18 U.S.C. § 3041-3042, for Reed, unlike the defendant
in Toscanino, was a fugitive from justice who had
jumped bail, who was the subject of a bench warrant,
and who had been sought for some weeks. . . . We do
believe, however, that this case is different from
one in which jurisdiction is initially obtained by
Id. at 904 n. 2 (emphasis added). The Toscanino exception is
limited, and does not apply to fugitives brought back to the
United States to face the charges against them. Therefore, not
only do the allegations of torture fail to rise to the level of
Toscanino, but petitioner is an alleged escapee who is not
entitled to review under the Toscanino exception. Id.
Although, for purposes of review, the Court has construed the
petition in the light most favorable to the petitioner, certain
allegations are less than credible. Under Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e),
affidavits must be "made on personal knowledge, shall set forth
such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show
affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the
matters stated therein."
The Court first notes that parts of Matta's affidavit are less
than credible due to his admission that he had a black hood
placed over his head throughout the apprehension and drive to the
air base. For example, Matta's affidavit states that "one of the
agents was seen to carry a briefcase into the house and he knew
that they opened it, removed a plastic bag containing a white
powder and threw it on the floor," a statement which is not made
on his own knowledge. Matta, by his own admission, had a black
hood over his head at the time this incident occurred. Similarly,
his affidavit states that he was given electric shocks by United
States agents, again these incidents occurred while his head was
covered. He does not aver that he could see through the hood, nor
that the hood was, at anytime, removed from his head prior to his
arrival in the United States.
Even if the Court were to accept all of Matta's allegations as
true and disregard the affidavits and reports of the government,
the treatment he received, even if solely at the hands of United
States agents, clearly does not rise to the level of the "set of
incidents" alleged in Toscanino. Moreover, the medical report of
April 6, 1988 fails to support Matta's allegations of torture.
Although the Court acknowledges that there is some medical
evidence to support Matta's claim that he received shocks from a
stun gun, his abrasions were medically classified as "compatible
with a ruptured blister." By his own affidavit, Matta's return to
the United States took little more than 24 hours. Clearly, his
treatment did not rise to the level of torture described in
Therefore, the Court, under Toscanino would not be required to
order Matta returned to Honduras as there has not been an
"unreasonable invasion of [Matta's] constitutional rights."
Toscanino, 500 F.2d at 275. The Court notes that a similar
decision was reached by the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Florida in a related case. United States v.
Matta-Ballesteros, 700 F. Supp. 528 (N.D.Fla. 1988). The Court
denied Matta's Motion to Dismiss the Indictment, which was also
based on the Toscanino exception. The court ruled:
I conclude that the Toscanino rationale should not
apply under the facts of this case. First, . . . the
Supreme Court has implicitly rejected Toscanino in
decisions subsequent to 1974 which have reaffirmed
the Ker-Frisbie doctrine.
[E]ven if Toscanino represented the law, the facts
alleged in this case by the defendant do not
establish the kind of cruel, barbaric, and outrageous
conduct by United States officials needed for the
application of the substantive due process prong of
Id. at p. 531.
Under the law, therefore, the Court finds that petitioner's
claim fails to raise any issues that would entitle him to an
evidentiary hearing. The allegations of the petition, the
affidavits and reports, considered in the light most favorable to
Matta, conclusively establish that Matta is not entitled to
habeas corpus relief. The factual allegations, as a whole, do not
allege circumstances of a kind that would require this Court to
authorize further discovery or order an evidentiary hearing. Cf.
Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. 487, 494-95, 82 S.Ct. 510,
513-14, 7 L.Ed.2d 473 (1962).
While Matta is entitled to all of the substantive and
procedural protections of the Constitution that are afforded to
all criminals facing trial in the United States, the Court finds
that the record shows that no grounds exist which would entitle
petitioner to a writ of habeas corpus from this Court.
Accordingly, the Court DENIES Matta's petition for a writ of
habeas corpus, and finds that as a matter of law no hearing is
required. This cause of action is hereby DISMISSED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
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