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06/23/88 Carlo Raimondo, v. Ann Kiley

June 23, 1988

CARLO RAIMONDO, PETITIONER-APPELLANT

v.

ANN KILEY, DIRECTOR, THE DEPARTMENT OF MENTAL HEALTH AND DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES, ET AL., RESPONDENTS-APPELLEES (RICHARD M. DALEY, STATE'S ATTORNEY OF COOK COUNTY, INTERVENOR-APPELLEE)



APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS, FIRST DISTRICT, FOURTH DIVISION

526 N.E.2d 457, 172 Ill. App. 3d 217, 122 Ill. Dec. 198 1988.IL.989

Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County; the Hon. Richard J. Fitzgerald and James J. Bailey, Judges, presiding.

APPELLATE Judges:

JUSTICE LINN delivered the opinion of the court. JIGANTI, P.J., and McMORROW, J., concur.

DECISION OF THE COURT DELIVERED BY THE HONORABLE JUDGE LINN

Petitioner, Carlo Raimondo, sought a writ of habeas corpus from the circuit court of Cook County. The writ would have ordered his release from the custody of the Illinois Department of Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities (the Department of Mental Health). Petitioner has been in the custody of the Department of Mental Health since 1975, pursuant to a court order that committed him following a finding that he was not guilty by reason of insanity. The trial court denied the petition.

Petitioner appeals, contending: (1) this court, in a previous appeal, erred in failing to apply retrospectively to him all of the provisions of the post-acquittal confinement statute; (2) his waiver of his ex post facto rights removes the constitutional barriers identified in our previous decision; (3) the failure to apply to him all of the provisions of the post-acquittal confinement statute deprives him of equal protection of law and constitutes special legislation prohibited by the Illinois Constitution; and (4) the trial court erred in denying the petition for writ of habeas corpus.

We affirm the order of the trial court and remand with directions.

Background

This cause is before us a second time. (Raimondo v. Pavkovic (1982), 107 Ill. App. 3d 226, 437 N.E.2d 712 (Raimondo I).) The pertinent background and statutory history are found in Raimondo I, Lee v. Pavkovic (1983), 119 Ill. App. 3d 439, 456 N.E.2d 621, and elsewhere. We will repeat only those facts that are necessary to dispose of this appeal.

A

The trial court found petitioner not guilty of his crimes by reason of insanity. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 38, pars. 6-2, 1005-2-4.) Accordingly, on January 9, 1975, the trial court committed petitioner to the Department of Mental Health. Under the then-effective version of the Unified Code of Corrections (Corrections Code),a trial court would order the "criminal" commitment of a defendant for no longer than 12 months. At the end of this period, the defendant's "civil" commitment began. This civil commitment was governed by the then-effective Mental Health Code of 1967 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 91 1/2, par. 1-1 et seq.; the trial court was no longer directly involved. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 38, par. 1005-2-4; ch. 91 1/2, par. 1-1 et seq.) The defendant's civil commitment was indefinite, lasting for as long as he needed hospitalization for medical treatment. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 91 1/2, par. 10-1.) Thus, petitioner was in custody indefinitely under a civil commitment as of January 9, 1976.

During petitioner's civil commitment, our legislature amended both the Code of Corrections and the Mental Health Code. The amended section 5-2-4 of the Corrections Code did away with the initial, maximum 12-month commitment period and subsequent indefinite civil commitment. The amended statute directs the trial court to calculate the maximum length of time that a defendant could have served had he been convicted of the most serious crime charged, less credit for good time behavior and before becoming eligible for parole. The trial court then enters an initial commitment order, which may not exceed this amount of time. The initial commitment order acts as an automatic release date. After such time expires, the defendant must be civilly committed or released. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 1005-2-4.

Section 5-2-4 additionally requires that notice of a proposed discharge be provided to both the court and the State's Attorney, either of whom could object. In case of an objection, the superintendent of the facility may not discharge a defendant until after a hearing. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 1005-2-4(d).) Further, the decision to discharge is then no longer that of the superintendent, ...


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