APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS, THIRD DISTRICT
L. MUNSON, Defendant-Appellant
525 N.E.2d 250, 171 Ill. App. 3d 274, 121 Ill. Dec. 444 1988.IL.952
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Fulton County; the Hon. Kenneth L. Bath and the Hon. Charles H. Wilhelm, Judges, presiding.
JUSTICE WOMBACHER delivered the opinion of the court. BARRY and HEIPLE, JJ., concur.
DECISION OF THE COURT DELIVERED BY THE HONORABLE JUDGE WOMBACHER
In the two consolidated causes, the defendant Rickie L. Munson appeals from denial of post-conviction relief and from a resentencing order. We affirm.
The defendant was originally found guilty of unlawful use of weapons, resisting a peace officer, and two counts each of armed violence and intimidation. On direct appeal we reversed the unlawful use of weapons conviction, affirmed the remaining convictions, and remanded for resentencing. Prior to the resentencing hearing, the defendant filed a petition for relief under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 122-1 et seq.).
On April 27, 1987, the trial court both denied the defendant's request for post-conviction relief and resentenced the defendant to concurrent terms of imprisonment: 7 1/2-year terms on each armed violence count and 364 days for resisting a peace officer. The defendant brought the instant appeals, arguing that his armed violence convictions are the result of improper double enhancement and that the court reversibly erred in resentencing without a new presentence report.
The following facts underlie the defendant's convictions. Two police officers went to the defendant's residence to investigate a possible offense. When the officers approached, the defendant pointed a .22 caliber rifle and threatened to kill them both. The police first backed away and then arrested the defendant after he began to leave.
The defendant acknowledges the instant conduct and effectively concedes that he knowingly resisted or obstructed official, authorized acts of known peace officers, a possible Class A misdemeanor violation of section 31-1 of the Criminal Code of 1961 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 31-1). The defendant goes on to argue that his armed violence conviction was a result of impermissible double enhancement of that conduct. He suggests that his single act of possession of the rifle was the basis to first elevate his conduct to a Class 3 felony violation of intimidation (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 12-6(a)(1)), and then to enhance the offense of intimidation to a Class X offense of armed violence (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 33A-2). We choose to address the argument although the defendant did not raise it either in the trial court or on the direct appeal. See People v. Brown (1972), 52 Ill. 2d 227, 287 N.E.2d 663.
In his argument, the defendant relies upon People v. Haron (1981), 85 Ill. 2d 261, 422 N.E.2d 627. In Haron, the supreme court concluded that the legislature did not intend the presence of a weapon to first enhance a misdemeanor battery to the felony offense of aggravated battery (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 12-4(b)(1)), and then to further enhance the conduct by serving as the basis for a charge of armed violence. The court held generally that the offense of armed violence, which is defined as commission of any Illinois felony while armed with a dangerous weapon (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 33A-2), contemplated the commission of a predicate offense which was a felony without enhancement by the presence of a weapon.
We agree with the State that Haron is not inconsistent with the defendant's conviction of armed violence. In Haron the court considered a conviction of armed violence which was based upon the predicate offense of aggravated battery. That predicate offense constituted a felony solely because it was accompanied by a deadly weapon. In contrast, the instant case presents a conviction for armed violence based upon conduct constituting a felony even without the presence of a weapon.
Unlike the form of aggravated battery considered in Haron, the instant form of intimidation requires no presence of a weapon. It merely requires a threat to unlawfully inflict harm, communicated with intent to cause action or inaction. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 12-6(a)(1).) Here the defendant committed the predicate intimidation when he threatened the police officers; his possession of a weapon was not an essential element supporting that offense. As his predicate ...