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05/16/88 the Industrial Commission v. the Industrial Commission

May 16, 1988

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS, THIRD DISTRICT, INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION DIVISION INTERNATIONAL HARVESTER COMPANY, APPELLANT

v.

THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION ET AL. (DAN HILDRETH, APPELLEE)



523 N.E.2d 1303, 169 Ill. App. 3d 809, 120 Ill. Dec. 392 1988.IL.756

Appeal from the Circuit Court of Rock Island County; the Hon. L. E. Ellison, Judge, presiding.

APPELLATE Judges:

JUSTICE CALVO delivered the opinion of the court. BARRY, P.J., and McCULLOUGH, McNAMARA, and WOODWARD, JJ., concur.

DECISION OF THE COURT DELIVERED BY THE HONORABLE JUDGE CALVO

Pursuant to the Workers' Compensation Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 48, par. 138.1 et seq.), arbitrator William M. Kelley found that claimant, Dan Hildreth, sustained injuries to his lower back arising out of and during the course of his employment with International Harvester Company. As a result, the arbitrator found that claimant sustained permanent disability to the extent of 31% of a body as a whole. Claimant subsequently filed a petition before the Industrial Commission (the Commission) seeking additional compensation on the basis that claimant's disability had materially increased. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 48, par. 138.19(h); Motor Wheel Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n (1979), 75 Ill. 2d 230, 236, 388 N.E.2d 380, 382.) After reviewing additional evidence presented by both parties, the Commission found that claimant's permanent disability had increased to the extent of 60% of a body as a whole. The trial court confirmed the Commission's findings, and the employer appeals to this court. The sole issue is whether the Commission's decision increasing claimant's permanent disability to 60% of a body as a whole was against the manifest weight of the evidence.

Claimant injured his back while working on an assembly line for the employer on October 16, 1981. Claimant subsequently underwent a laminectomy, performed by Doctor William D. Reinwein, an orthopedic surgeon. Reinwein stated in his January 4, 1983, report: "[Claimant] was returned to light duty on May 10, 1982, and gradually to full work, although I have stressed to him the weight lifting should be permanently restricted at 40 [pounds]." Reinwein also stated that claimant's back problems and resulting surgery were causally related to the work accident. Doctor F. Dale Wilson examined claimant on November 11, 1982, and also found a causal connection between claimant's work accident and subsequent disability. Wilson advised claimant to restrict his bending and twisting and to stay under a 50-pound weight-lifting limit. Claimant returned to work in June of 1982, and he was working at the time of the arbitration hearing on March 8, 1983. Claimant's job involved working on a Swayze machine, which required bending and heavy lifting. Claimant testified that, contrary to Reinwein's recommendation, he was working without any restrictions because he did not want to lose his job.

On March 9, 1983, Reinwein examined and took X rays of claimant. Reinwein testified that he observed a considerable amount of change in claimant's back where the surgery was performed. Reinwein recommended that claimant not lift over 25 pounds, but that he could occasionally lift 50 pounds. Reinwein also advised claimant to wear a back brace. Claimant continued to work until March 18, 1983, when the plant was shut down. Claimant testified that on June 14, 1983, he reinjured himself while working at home. He was treated by Reinwein at the Moline Public Hospital from June 14, 1983, until June 20, 1983, for acute lumbo-sacral sprain. Reinwein testified that the sprain was a result of a flare-up of claimant's condition brought on by the work-related injury and was not a result of claimant's activity at home. Wilson concurred with Reinwein's opinion. On June 24, 1983, Reinwein released claimant to return to work on June 30, 1983, and restricted claimant's weight lifting to 50 pounds. Also on June 24, 1983, the employer's physician, Dr. H. T. Kutsunis, examined claimant. Kutsunis released claimant for work on that day with a weight-lifting restriction of 40 pounds and a recommendation that claimant avoid excessive bending and stooping. Claimant did not return to work, however, because the plant was still shut down. The plant reopened on August 1, 1983, but the testimony revealed that claimant did not return to work because he was still undergoing treatment for the June 1983 sprain. Claimant entered the hospital from August 31, 1983, until September 5, 1983, for treatment of another acute lumbosacral sprain.

On September 15, 1983, Reinwein took a CT scan of claimant which revealed a "considerable amount of changes in the canal, stenotic changes, mainly manifested as spurring due to instability at some levels." In Reinwein's opinion, this change was a normal reaction to the loss of the discs in claimant's back. Reinwein released claimant to return to work on October 31, 1983, and advised claimant not to lift over 25 pounds and to avoid continuous bending or stooping. On October 24, 1983, Kutsunis concurred with Reinwein's restriction. On November 2, 1983, claimant presented Kutsunis with a note from Reinwein recommending a change in the weight-lifting restrictions from 25 pounds to 50 pounds. Because claimant still complained of pain, and because claimant's physical examination did not reveal any changes since October 24, 1983, Kutsunis recommended no change in the restrictions. On January 25, 1984, Reinwein advised claimant that he could occasionally lift up to 50 pounds and that he should wear a back brace.

Although claimant was released for work in October of 1983, the employer did not call claimant back to work, because of his restrictions and seniority, until April 9, 1984. At that time, claimant's duties involved driving a sweeper. On June 1, 1984, claimant was bumped from that job and assigned an assembly line job making feeder gears which required lifting the 33-pound gears. The employer later took claimant off that job because the work was too heavy. The employer then assigned claimant to drive a forklift until his layoff, due to seniority, on August 31, 1984. Claimant testified that he has since applied for other jobs in Illinois and California, and has disclosed his weight restrictions to the prospective employers, but has not received a job offer.

Claimant testified that his physical condition remained unchanged after the arbitration hearing. The employer initially argues that this was a judicial admission. Therefore, the Commission's finding that claimant's condition worsened after the hearing was improper. Claimant acknowledges that he testified that his physical condition had not changed. The parties disagree, however, on the interpretation of the law regarding judicial admissions as it applies to the case at bar.

Judicial admissions are binding upon the party making them and may not be contradicted. (Trapkus v. Edstrom's, Inc. (1986), 140 Ill. App. 3d 720, 722, 489 N.E.2d 340, 343.) They thus differ from ordinary evidentiary admissions which may be controverted or explained. (Trapkus, 140 Ill. App. 3d at 722, 489 N.E.2d at 343.) Testimony of a party may be binding on him or her as a judicial admission, if the matter testified to is within the party's personal knowledge, without reasonable chance of mistake, and if the admission is clear and unequivocal. (Trapkus, 140 Ill. App. 3d at 723, 489 N.E.2d at 343.) Furthermore, "[such] an admission must be given meaning consistent with its context and considered in relation to the testimony of other witnesses and their opportunity to observe the facts testified to. [Citation.] Otherwise, the result is to penalize honest mistake and confusion." Trapkus, 140 Ill. App. 3d at 723, 489 N.E.2d at 343.

The employer argues that claimant's condition of well-being is within his personal knowledge. Although a claimant is in the best position to know how he or she feels, doctors or medical experts are in a better position to know the actual physical condition of a claimant. Thus, claimant's testimony as to the change in his physical condition is not within his personal knowledge. The employer argues that claimant's testimony is consistent with the medical testimony and it is consistent with the evidence that claimant's restrictions changed very little, if at all, after arbitration. Claimant testified before the Commission, however, that he had not worked for approximately one year, so he did not have an adequate opportunity to test his physical well-being. Moreover, the record discloses that the doctors placed claimant on greater weight-lifting restrictions after arbitration. Also, Wilson stated that claimant's condition deteriorated after arbitration. Considering claimant's testimony in relation to these latter circumstances, in addition to the fact that claimant testified to a matter not within his personal knowledge, claimant's testimony was not a judicial admission. The employer is correct, however, that claimant's testimony, as an evidentiary admission, may be considered and weighed in the context of the other evidence presented at the hearing.

The employer's second contention is that the medical evidence proved that claimant's condition had not changed. The employer points out, and claimant acknowledges, that Reinwein testified that claimant's condition "remained essentially the same" since March 9, 1983. Claimant notes, however, that Reinwein testified that X rays and a CT scan taken after arbitration revealed a considerable amount of change in the discs where the previous surgery was done. Reinwein also stated that claimant's lumbo-sacral sprains after arbitration were related to the work accident.

Wilson examined claimant in 1982 and 1984. In Wilson's opinion, claimant's condition "gradually worsened" between the two examinations. Wilson testified that claimant lost some range of motion in flexion, and that claimant's lateral motion and rotation also decreased. Wilson testified further that claimant's X rays and the CT scan revealed increasing degenerative changes. Wilson noted further that claimant had lost sensation over the right foot since the 1982 examination. Wilson indicated that claimant suffered from a permanent, continuing, degenerating condition related to ...


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