APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS, FIRST DISTRICT, FOURTH DIVISION
522 N.E.2d 744, 168 Ill. App. 3d 341, 119 Ill. Dec. 82 1988.IL.417
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County; the Hon. Robert L. Sklodowski, Judge, presiding.
PRESIDING JUSTICE JIGANTI delivered the opinion of the court. LINN and McMORROW, JJ., concur.
DECISION OF THE COURT DELIVERED BY THE HONORABLE JUDGE JIGANTI
The plaintiff, Griffith Laboratories U.S.A., brought this appeal from an order of the trial court denying its request pursuant to the Illinois Freedom of Information Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 116, par. 201 et seq.) for disclosure of certain sampling data and calculations compiled by the defendant, Metropolitan Sanitary District of Greater Chicago . The question before us is whether the information sought by Griffith is exempt from disclosure under section 7(c)(i) of the FOIA. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 116, par. 207(c)(i).) Section 7(c)(i) exempts from disclosure "[investigatory] records compiled for State or local administrative law enforcement purposes," to the extent that disclosure would "interfere with pending or actually and reasonably contemplated enforcement proceedings." Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 116, par. 207(c)(i).
The MSD is a public agency charged with the responsibility of collection, treatment and disposal of sewage in the Chicago metropolitan area, as well as enforcement of State and Federal water pollution laws. Section 46 of the Illinois Environmental Protection Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 111 1/2, pars. 1046(b), (c)) empowers the MSD to enact ordinances providing for proportionate cost sharing by users of the MSD's waste-treatment services. Pursuant to this statutory authority, the MSD enacted its User Charge Ordinance, which provides for proportionate cost sharing and sets up a system which enables the MSD to secure compliance with those provisions. The system is essentially a self-reporting one, requiring users to sample the wastes which they discharge into the sewer system and report the results to the MSD. The ordinance calls for sampling to be done on an annual basis, but requires that any additional sampling performed by the user be reported to the MSD. Section 5 of the User Charge Ordinance enables the MSD to monitor the self-reporting system by conducting its own inspections and sampling analyses. In determining the amount of the user's bill, the MSD may rely upon the self-reported data, MSD data, or a combination of the two. Section 9 contains an appeals process which allows the user to challenge the bill by submitting a "detailed written request" specifying the reasons for the challenge. Section 10 provides for enforcement of the ordinance, stating that the MSD "may sue to recover any and all amounts due and owing as provided herein and take such other and further action as may be necessary to recover all such sums due it hereunder, restrain any unlawful discharge and otherwise compel compliance with the provisions of this Ordinance." (Emphasis added.)
Griffith is classified as a large commercial-industrial user under the ordinance and operates plants in Chicago and Alsip, Illinois. In 1985, Griffith received a bill from the MSD which was significantly higher than bills for previous years. Griffith sought to challenge the bill through the User Charge Ordinance's appeals process and asked the MSD for its sampling data and calculations in order to prepare the "detailed written request" required by the ordinance. The MSD replied that pursuant to its standard operating procedure, MSD sampling data would be released to Griffith only after Griffith turned over to the MSD all of Griffith's sampling data for the period in question. The MSD did, however, provide Griffith with a "summary table" of the data and calculations used in arriving at Griffith's bill.
Griffith then filed a two-count complaint for injunctive relief, seeking a court order to compel disclosure of the MSD sampling data and calculations pursuant to the Illinois Freedom of Information Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 116, par. 201 et seq.). The complaint was subsequently amended to add counts III and IV, which requested the sampling data and calculations used by the MSD in determining Griffith's estimated monthly user charge for 1987. The MSD filed a motion to dismiss under section 2-619 of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 110, par. 2-619) alleging that the requested information was exempt from disclosure under section 7(c)(i) of the FOIA. This section exempts from disclosure investigatory records compiled for law enforcement purposes to the extent that disclosure would interfere with pending or actually and reasonably contemplated enforcement proceedings. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 116, par. 207(c)(i).) Attached to the motion to dismiss were a copy of the User Charge Ordinance and the affidavit of Cecil Lue-Hing, the MSD director of research and development, which stated that an enforcement proceeding was contemplated if Griffith did not pay the bill and that disclosure of the requested records would interfere with the enforcement proceeding.
Attached to Griffith's second-amended complaint, which requested the sampling data and calculations used by the MSD in computing the estimated monthly user charge for 1987, were copies of correspondence which revealed that the MSD again relied upon exemption 7(c)(i) to deny Griffith's FOIA request. In a letter dated February 20, 1987, MSD's general superintendent Frank E. Dalton stated that the requested records were compiled by the MSD and used to verify the user-established sampling data in order to administer that the User Charge Ordinance. Dalton restated the MSD's standard operating procedure which requires the user to certify that it had given the MSD all of its sampling data before the MSD would furnish the user with MSD verification sampling data.
At a hearing on a motion to dismiss, counsel for the MSD amplified the reasons for the MSD's position that release of its data prior to receiving assurance that it had been given all of Griffith's data would interfere with the MSD's enforcement of the User Charge Ordinance. Counsel stated that if the MSD were required to give the user MSD verification sampling data before obtaining all user-established data for the same period, there would be a danger that in a subsequent dispute over the amount of a bill, the user would eliminate any of its own sampling data which showed higher concentrations of waste than the data compiled by the MSD. Counsel for Griffith responded that its sampling was done by an independent laboratory and that for MSD's fears to be realized, fraud and conspiracy to commit fraud would have to be presumed.
At the Conclusion of the hearing, the trial court denied MSD's motion to dismiss as to counts I and II, which involved the 1985 data and calculations, but granted the motion as to counts III and IV, which pertained to the data and calculations used to formulate the 1987 bill. This appeal concerned only the propriety of the trial court's order dismissing counts III and IV.
On appeal, Griffith contends that the dismissal of counts III and IV constituted error because the MSD's motion to dismiss contained only conclusory statements which were insufficient to support its claim that the requested records are exempt from disclosure under section 7(c)(i) of the FOIA. Essentially, Griffith advances two arguments regarding the sampling data and calculations which it seeks to obtain from the MSD. First, it maintains that the requested information constitutes "routine accounting materials" used to calculate a bill rather than investigatory records compiled for administrative law enforcement purposes. Second, it claims that even if the data were to be considered investigatory records, the MSD failed to establish that disclosure would interfere with a pending or actually and reasonably contemplated enforcement proceeding.
The purpose of the Illinois FOIA is to ensure that the public be given full and complete information regarding the affairs of government. (Hoffman v. Department of Corrections (1987), 158 Ill. App. 3d 473, 511 N.E.2d 759.) To that end, the statute provides that the stated exemptions "should be seen as limited exceptions to the general rule" of disclosure. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 116, par. 201.) Courts interpreting the exemptions have held that they must be narrowly construed. (City of Monmouth v. Galesburg Printing & Publishing Co. (1986), 144 Ill. App. 3d 224, 494 N.E.2d 896.) However, as pointed out by the MSD, the FOIA also states that "[this] Act is not intended to be used . . . for the purpose of furthering a commercial enterprise, or to disrupt ...