SUPREME COURT OF ILLINOIS
519 N.E.2d 879, 119 Ill. 2d 441, 116 Ill. Dec. 664 1988.IL.213
No. 63846. -- Appeal from the Appellate Court for the Third District; heard in that court on appeal from the Circuit Court of Will County, the Hon. Michael A. Orenic, Judge, presiding. No. 63954. -- Appeal from the Appellate Court for the Fourth District; heard in that court on appeal from the Circuit Court of Livingston County, the Hon. William T. Caisley, Judge, presiding.
JUSTICE MILLER delivered the opinion of the court.
DECISION OF THE COURT DELIVERED BY THE HONORABLE JUDGE MILLER
Section 110-14 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 38, par. 110-14) provides a $5 credit, to be applied against a subsequently imposed fine, for each day spent in custody by an accused awaiting trial on a bailable offense. These appeals present the question whether a defendant is entitled to the monetary credit provided by section 110-14 if he has also received credit against a sentence of imprisonment for time spent in custody awaiting trial. An additional question raised in one of the appeals is whether the monetary-credit provision of section 110-14 applies to fines imposed under the Violent Crime Victims Assistance Act (Ill. Rev. Stat., 1984 Supp., ch. 70, pars. 501 through 511).
Fred Hare, the defendant in cause No. 63846, was convicted of armed robbery on July 2, 1985, following a bench trial in the circuit court of Will County. On July 25, 1985, the trial Judge sentenced Hare to 6 years' imprisonment, with credit for 23 days Hare spent in custody on the charge before posting bond. The trial Judge also imposed a $20 fine, as he was required to do under section 10(b) of the Violent Crime Victims Assistance Act (Ill. Rev. Stat., 1984 Supp., ch. 70, par. 510(b)), and ordered that the amount be deducted from Hare's bail deposit. Hare appealed, arguing that his $20 fine should have been deemed satisfied by operation of the $5-per-day credit provision of section 110-14. The appellate court agreed with Hare. (144 Ill. App. 3d 279.) Noting the division among the appellate districts on the question-the Fifth District had allowed credits against both fines and prison terms in People v. James (1985), 133 Ill. App. 3d 623, and People v. Young (1981), 96 Ill. App. 3d 634, but the Second District had disallowed the double credit in People v. Love (1986), 140 Ill. App. 3d 651-the Third District in Hare's case held that there was no reason apparent in the statutory language or the case law to exclude from those given credit under section 110-14 that group of defendants who have also received credit against their terms of incarceration. In view of the length of time Hare spent in jail awaiting trial, the appellate court granted him a credit for the entire amount of his fine. We allowed the State's petition for leave to appeal. 107 Ill. 2d R. 315(a).
James Holzhauer, the defendant in cause No. 63954, pleaded guilty in the circuit court of Livingston County on November 3, 1980, to a charge of aggravated battery. The trial Judge sentenced Holzhauer to 30 months' probation, ordered him to pay restitution of $1,692.50, and imposed a fine of $535, plus court costs (see Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 38, par. 1005-9-1). The trial Judge also sentenced Holzhauer to serve 109 days in the county jail, with credit for 109 days he had served while awaiting trial. Petitions to revoke Holzhauer's probation were filed on May 2, 1983, and May 13, 1985, alleging that he had failed to pay restitution. At the hearing on the first petition, it was established that Holzhauer had paid his fine and court costs but had not paid the required restitution. After each petition, Holzhauer's probation was revoked and he was resentenced to probation and directed to pay restitution. A third petition to revoke probation was filed on September 30, 1985. At the hearing on the petition, the trial Judge found that Holzhauer had violated a condition of his probation by refusing to submit to a breath test, which would reveal alcohol consumption. The Judge revoked Holzhauer's probation and sentenced him to a prison term of 3 years and 218 days, with credit for 126 days he had served in the county jail.
On appeal, Holzhauer argued that under section 110 -- 14 he was also entitled to have credited against his fine $5 for each day he spent in custody awaiting trial. The Fourth District disagreed. (144 Ill. App. 3d 153.) Noting that the Second District disallowed the double credit in People v. Love (1986), 140 Ill. App. 3d 651, and the Fifth District allowed it in People v. Young (1981), 96 Ill. App. 3d 634, the court believed that allowing credit against both a term of imprisonment and a fine would be unfair to defendants posting bail, who would be required to serve their full prison terms and pay their entire fines. We allowed Holzhauer's petition for leave to appeal (107 Ill. 2d R. 315), and ordered his case consolidated with Hare's for our review.
Section 110 -- 14 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 provides:
"Credit for incarceration on bailable offense. Any person incarcerated on a bailable offense who does not supply bail and against whom a fine is levied on conviction of such offense shall be allowed a credit of $5 for each day so incarcerated upon application of the defendant. The clerk of the court shall notify the defendant in writing of this provision of the Act at the time he is convicted. However, in no case shall the amount so allowed or credited exceed the amount of the fine." Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 38, par. 110-14.
The State argues that the legislature could not have intended for a defendant to receive a "double credit" against both a fine and a term of incarceration for time spent in jail awaiting trial. The State also suggests that equal protection problems would arise if the double credit were allowed to defendants who did not post bail. Finally, the State argues that applying the monetary-credit provision of section 110-14 against fines that are imposed under the Violent Crime Victims Assistance Act (Ill. Rev. Stat., 1984 Supp., ch. 70, par. 510), like defendant Hare's, would frustrate the purposes of the Victims Act.
"The primary rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the legislature, and that inquiry appropriately begins with the language of the statute. (Franzese v. Trinko (1977), 66 Ill. 2d 136, 139-40.)" (Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Washburn (1986), 112 Ill. 2d 486, 492.) Section 110 -- 14 is not ambiguous. By its plain terms, it grants to an accused who is incarcerated while awaiting trial on a bailable offense a monetary credit against any fine imposed upon conviction of the offense. The terms of the statute do not limit its application to persons who receive only a fine upon conviction, nor does the statute exclude from its scope persons who have also received credit for time spent in custody awaiting trial against a later sentence of imprisonment. (See People v. Young (1981), 96 Ill. App. 3d 634, 636.) We can see no reason for reading such exceptions into the statute here. "There is no rule of [statutory] construction which authorizes a court to declare that the legislature did not mean what the plain language of the statute imports" (Western National Bank v. Village of Kildeer (1960), 19 Ill. 2d 342, 350), and it is not a court's function to "'read into a statute exceptions, limitations, or conditions which depart from its plain meaning'" (In re Estate of Swiecicki (1985), 106 Ill. 2d 111, 120, quoting Belfield v. Coop (1956), 8 Ill. 2d 293, 307). The nature, character, and extent of criminal penalties are essentially legislative matters (People v. Taylor (1984), 102 Ill. 2d 201, 205; People v. Munziato (1962), 24 Ill. 2d 432, 437), and therefore it is within the province of the legislature to determine the effect of pretrial custody on the sentences ultimately imposed upon a convicted defendant. There is nothing that prohibits the legislature from granting a defendant, for each day spent in custody awaiting trial, credits against both a term of imprisonment and a fine.
The State suggests that allowing credit against both a prison term and a fine for those who do not post bail unfairly discriminates against persons who do post bail. We do not agree. Those who have the financial ability to post bail may, of course, choose not to do so and elect instead to remain in custody so that they may be eligible for the two credits. It would appear that the State's reasoning would imperil the provisions ...