APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS, FIFTH DISTRICT
519 N.E.2d 482, 165 Ill. App. 3d 585, 116 Ill. Dec. 590 1988.IL.145
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Saline County; the Hon. C. David Nelson, Judge, presiding.
JUSTICE LEWIS delivered the opinion of the court. HARRISON, P.J., and KARNS, J., concur.
DECISION OF THE COURT DELIVERED BY THE HONORABLE JUDGE LEWIS
Defendant, Thomas Frame, was charged in the circuit court of Saline County with driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor , illegal transportation of alcoholic liquor (illegal transportation), and possession of less than 2.5 grams of cannabis. On the date set for trial, defendant filed a petition for discharge, claiming his speedy trial rights had been violated. The circuit court granted the petition and dismissed all three charges. The State appeals.
The record reveals that on November 24, 1984, Trooper C. R. Fulkerson charged defendant with DUI, illegal transportation, and possession of cannabis. Each offense was charged on a separate Illinois citation and complaint form which bore the word "complaint" in bold red letters. The tickets, or complaints, designated December 17, 1984, as the date upon which defendant was to appear in court if he intended to plead guilty to the charges. The complaints indicate that defendant was unable to post bond and was transported to the Saline County jail for confinement.
The complaints were filed with the Saline County circuit clerk on November 26, 1984. They were placed in small, manila jackets such as are commonly used for traffic citations. Each jacket indicates that defendant entered a plea of not guilty on November 26, 1984. Bond was set at $1,500 for the DUI, $500 for illegal transportation, and $1,000 for possession of cannabis. Each case was assigned a docket number indicating that it was a traffic offense.
On November 27, 1984, Louis Johnson entered his appearance on behalf of defendant by filing an "Appearance and Demand" pertaining to the three charges at issue here (circuit court Nos. 84 -- TR -- 3179, 3180, 3181) and an apparently unrelated felony charge (No. 84 -- CF -- 46). The document purported to initiate "a continuing demand for a speedy trial . . . to continue should the accused . . . become, 'on bail'." In addition, the "Appearance and Demand" requested an order or ruling on defendant's "Motion for Discovery and Procedure" (apparently defendant's demand to produce) in the event the State failed to answer within a reasonable time. It also requested an evidentiary hearing for "bail relief."
Simultaneously, defendant filed a motion to suppress arrest, a motion to suppress confession, a motion to suppress evidence, and a "demand to produce." The three motions to suppress bore docket number 84 -- TR -- 3179 . The demand to produce bore the docket numbers of all three cases.
The demand to produce sought the following from the prosecution: (1) a copy of any written statement, admission or confession the defendant may have made, together with a list of all witnesses thereto; (2) a written description of the substance of any material oral statements, admissions or confessions made by the defendant, together with an exact list of witnesses identifying persons present when the statement was made and a "particularization" of the time and place of the statement; (3) a list, and an offer for inspection, of all physical evidence in the State's possession and control; and (4) a list of occurrence or material witnesses known to the State.
The next entry in the record is a notation that defendant posted $300 cash bail on March 21, 1985, the 118th day of his incarceration.
The record is again silent until July 31, 1985, when the State filed an answer to defendant's "motion for discovery" (defendant's demand to produce). The State listed two witnesses, attached a four-page police report, and noted that physical evidence would be available for inspection at the State's Attorney's office. Also on July 31, defendant filed a petition for discharge, claiming that his speedy trial rights had been violated. Defendant argued that he had not been brought to trial within 160 days of his speedy trial demand as required by section 103-5(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 103-5(b)).
On August 14, 1985, defendant submitted a memorandum of law in support of his position. In particular, defendant contended that the motions to suppress which he had filed in the DUI case did not in fact delay the trial and did not, therefore, interrupt the running of the speedy trial term. Relying in part on the rationale of People v. Perkins (1980), 90 Ill. App. 3d 975, 414 N.E.2d 110, ...