APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS, THIRD DISTRICT
517 N.E.2d 707, 164 Ill. App. 3d 37, 115 Ill. Dec. 296 1987.IL.1908
Appeal from the Circuit Court of La Salle County; the Hon. Louis J. Perona, Judge, presiding.
PRESIDING JUSTICE BARRY delivered the opinion of the court. STOUDER and SCOTT, JJ., concur.
DECISION OF THE COURT DELIVERED BY THE HONORABLE JUDGE BARRY
The trial court granted the motion to dismiss filed by the defendant, Michael Ritko. The plaintiff, Clara Bashton, appeals.
The plaintiff filed her first complaint against the defendant on December 12, 1983. This complaint and two subsequent amended complaints were dismissed by the trial court. The plaintiff then filed a third amended complaint (the complaint) alleging breach of an implied warranty of habitability and intentional misrepresentation.
The complaint set forth that the defendant and his wife had sold a house to the plaintiff on or about May 26, 1975. Count I alleged that the defendant was the builder-vendor of the house, that he and his wife had not connected the sewer system of the house to the city's sewer system, and that failure to connect the sewer systems constituted a breach of the implied warranty of habitability. Count II of the complaint alleged that the defendant and his wife's knowing failure to inform the plaintiff that the sewer was not connected constituted intentional misrepresentation.
The defendant and his wife filed a motion to dismiss the third amended complaint, alleging that the complainant had not properly pleaded that the defendant was a builder-vendor nor had she alleged a cause of action against the defendant's wife. The trial court found that count I of the third amended complaint properly alleged that the defendant was a builder-vendor, but failed to state a cause of action against the defendant's wife. The court therefore dismissed count I as to the wife, leaving the remainder of the complaint intact. We note for clarification that from this time on, without explanation, all motions and the instant appeal were brought in the defendant's name only. Nonetheless, the trial court properly continued to refer to the "defendants."
After the court dismissed count I as to the wife, the defendant filed another motion to dismiss, arguing that an implied warranty of habitability did not extend to the plaintiff; that the applicable statute of limitations barred the plaintiff's suit; and that the doctrine of laches barred the suit.
Following a hearing on the matter, the trial court granted the defendant's motion and dismissed the cause of action with prejudice. The court did not offer any reasoning for its order. On appeal, the plaintiff argues that the trial court erred in finding as a matter of law that the plaintiff's cause of action is barred by the statute of limitations.
The plaintiff assumes that the trial court's order was based on the statute of limitations, though there is nothing in the record to support this contention. We note that an order sustaining a motion to dismiss, without specifying the ground on which it is based, places before the appellate court every issue raised by the motion and if any ground relied on by the trial court was proper, the reviewing court must affirm. (Lanno v. Naser (1979), 79 Ill. App. 3d 1, 398 N.E.2d 174.) Accordingly, we must review every argument raised in the defendant's motion to dismiss.
The defendant's contention that an implied warranty of habitability did not exist between him and the plaintiff was based on his allegation that he had originally built the plaintiff's home for his own use, rather than for an investment or for commercial property. In other words, the defendant is contending that he was not a builder-vendor.
When considering a defendant's motion to dismiss based on the pleadings, all of the plaintiff's well-pleaded facts are presumed true and all reasonable inferences are drawn in the plaintiff's favor to ascertain whether any set of facts could warrant recovery. Katz v. ...