APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS, FIFTH DISTRICT
516 N.E.2d 607, 162 Ill. App. 3d 748, 114 Ill. Dec. 452 1987.IL.1641
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Fayette County; the Hon. William R. Todd, Judge, presiding.
JUSTICE WELCH delivered the opinion of the court. KARNS, P.J., and HARRISON, J., concur.
DECISION OF THE COURT DELIVERED BY THE HONORABLE JUDGE WELCH
The State appeals from a dismissal of its indictment by the circuit court of Fayette County charging defendant Darold Yarbrough with the offense of communicating with a juror. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 32-4(a).) The State raises the issue of whether a charge alleging the offense of communicating with a juror is sufficient if it is couched in the language of the statute. This court affirms.
On January 24, 1986, the State filed an information charging defendant with the offense of communicating with jurors in that
"the said defendant without legal justification and with the intent to influence Doug Sitter, a juror, communicated indirectly with Doug Sitter regarding a case in which Doug Sitter was summoned as a juror."
On February 18, 1986, the State filed an indictment charging defendant with the same offense using the same language.
On April 1, 1986, the State filed a motion for discovery. Defendant filed his motion for discovery on September 2, 1986. The State filed its answer to defendant's discovery motion listing 12 witnesses and referring to various reports. On October 7, 1986, defendant filed his answer to the State's discovery motion.
On October 7, 1986, defendant filed a motion in limine, a motion for bill of particulars and a motion to dismiss. In defendant's motion to dismiss, he alleged that the indictment was insufficient because it was couched only in the language of the statute. After a hearing on the motions, the trial court granted defendant's motion to dismiss and, in doing so, stated in part:
"I think because of the generality of the statutory language in this case itself that more is required than the state [ sic ] has alleged to state an offense."
From this order, the State appeals.
The State argues that a charge alleging the offense of communicating with a juror is sufficient if couched in the language of the statute. Defendant argues that the indictment failed to ...