APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS, SECOND DISTRICT
514 N.E.2d 579, 161 Ill. App. 3d 432, 112 Ill. Dec. 916
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Lake County; the Hon. Henry C. Tonigan, Judge, presiding. 1987.IL.1514
JUSTICE DUNN delivered the opinion of the court. WOODWARD and UNVERZAGT, JJ., concur.
DECISION OF THE COURT DELIVERED BY THE HONORABLE JUDGE DUNN
The defendant, John R. Lueloff, appeals from an order of the circuit court denying his motion for discharge from misdemeanor probation. On appeal, the defendant contends that according to sections 5-7-8(a) and 5-8-4(d) of the Unified Code of Corrections (Code) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, pars. 1005-7-8(a), 1005-8-4(d)), his completion of a three-year term of imprisonment satisfied his misdemeanor probation of periodic imprisonment, even though he was incarcerated only for approximately one week due to credit for time previously served.
On July 31, 1985, the defendant pleaded guilty to the offenses of driving under the influence of alcohol (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 95 1/2, par. 11-501(a)(1)) and driving while license revoked (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 95 1/2, par. 6-303). The defendant was placed on one year's probation, which sentence required him, inter alia, to serve 30 days in the county jail and six months of periodic imprisonment. The defendant was ordered to commence serving his 30-day jail sentence immediately.
Prior to the imposition of defendant's misdemeanor sentence, he was placed on probation for an unrelated felony conviction for burglary. On October 21, 1985, the defendant's felony probation was revoked, and he was resentenced to a three-year term of imprisonment in the Department of Corrections with credit for time served in the county jail and for time served on probation in the amount of 547 days. Apparently, the defendant's 547-day credit for time served under his felony probation resulted in his release from the Department of Corrections approximately seven days after entering that facility.
On November 18, 1985, the defendant filed a motion for discharge from his misdemeanor probation. The defendant's motion asserted that under sections 5-7-8(a) and 5-8-4(d) of the Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, pars. 1005-7-8(a), 1005-8-4(d)), his felony and misdemeanor sentences merged, which resulted in the termination of his misdemeanor probation upon the successful service of his felony sentence. After a hearing on the defendant's motion, the circuit court found the general legislative intent underlying sections 5-7-8(a) and 5-8-4(d) indicated that the defendant's felony and misdemeanor sentences should be merged to run concurrently; however, neither sentence extinguished the other. Consequently, the circuit court denied the defendant's motion to discharge his misdemeanor probation. On June 17, 1986, we granted the defendant's motion for leave to file a late notice of appeal.
The sole issue raised in this appeal is whether, under the plain language of section 5-7-8(a) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 1005-7-8(a)), the defendant's incarceration for approximately one week in the Department of Corrections satisfied his misdemeanor sentence of periodic imprisonment. We note initially that neither party has directed us to a case on point, and our independent research has not discovered any. Apparently, the issue raised on review presents this court with a case of first impression in Illinois. In order to resolve this case, we must interpret the statutory language of section 5-7-8(a).
In the relevant part, section 5 -- 7 -- 8(a) states:
"The service of a sentence of imprisonment shall satisfy any sentence of periodic imprisonment which was imposed on an offender for an offense committed prior to the imposition of the sentence. An offender who is serving a sentence of periodic imprisonment at the time a sentence of imprisonment is imposed shall be delivered to the custody of the Department of Corrections to commence service of the sentence immediately." Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 1005-7-8(a).
The defendant correctly points out that the language of section 5 -- 7 -- 8(a) is clear on its face. When the language of a statute is unambiguous, its meaning should be given effect without resorting to supplementary principles of statutory construction. (County of Du Page v. Graham, Anderson, Probst & White, Inc. (1985), 109 Ill. 2d 143, 151, 485 N.E.2d 1076; People v. Singleton (1984), 103 Ill. 2d 339, 341, 469 N.E.2d 200.) In order to resolve the issue raised in this case, we must discern the meaning of the phrase "service of a sentence of imprisonment" as used in section 5 -- 7 -- 8(a).
The defendant contends that the phrase "service of a sentence of imprisonment" does not mean that the defendant must actually be incarcerated for the entire term of the sentence imposed upon him. Instead, the defendant asserts that the imposition of a sentence of imprisonment is "service of a sentence of imprisonment" regardless of whether he was granted early release from the Department of Corrections. In other words, under the defendant's interpretation of the plain language of section 5 -- 7 -- 8(a), the mere imposition of a sentence of ...