SUPREME COURT OF ILLINOIS
515 N.E.2d 45, 118 Ill. 2d 263, 113 Ill. Dec. 236 1987.IL.1386
No. 63082. -- Appeal from the Circuit Court of Marion County, the Hon. E. C. Eberspacher, Judge, presiding. Nos. 63539, 63540, 63541 cons. -- Appeals from the Circuit Court of Fayette County, the Hon. Richard G. Hodson, Judge, presiding.
JUSTICE WARD delivered the opinion of the court. MILLER and CUNNINGHAM, JJ., took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
DECISION OF THE COURT DELIVERED BY THE HONORABLE JUDGE WARD
The defendants in these consolidated appeals were individually charged with the offenses of criminal sexual assault and aggravated criminal sexual assault in violation of sections 12-13 and 12-14 of the Illinois Criminal Code of 1961 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, pars. 12-13, 12-14). In each case the circuit court dismissed the charges, holding that the statutes upon which the defendants were charged were unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. The State appealed each dismissal directly to this court under our Rule 603 (107 Ill. 2d R. 603), and we have consolidated the appeals.
Defendant John Haywood was charged in Marion County in an information of two counts with aggravated criminal sexual assault (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 12-14). Count I was brought under section 12-14(a)(1) of the Criminal Code and alleged that the defendant, using a dangerous weapon, to wit, a knife, "by the use of force . . . placed his penis into the vagina of [the complainant]." Count II charged the defendant under section 12-14(a)(2), alleging that the defendant caused bodily harm to the victim in committing the offense of criminal sexual assault.
Defendants Rhodes, Russell and Garland were individually charged by indictment in Fayette County with one count of aggravated criminal sexual assault under section 12 -- 14(a)(2) and in a second count with the lesser included offense of criminal sexual assault under section 12 -- 13(a)(1). Garland was also charged in a third count with a second offense of criminal sexual assault, which arose out of an incident separate from that alleged in counts I and II. Each count of the indictments alleged that the defendant "by the use of force . . . placed his penis in the vagina of [the complainant]."
Prior to trial each defendant filed a motion to dismiss the charges, claiming that the statutory definitions of criminal sexual assault and aggravated criminal sexual assault are so vague and overbroad that they violate the constitutional guarantees of due process (U.S. Const., amend. XIV; Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, sec. 2). The circuit court of Marion County granted defendant Haywood's motion, holding the entire Criminal Sexual Assault Act, sections 12-12 through 12-18 of the Criminal Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, pars. 12-12 through 12-18), unconstitutional. Following a motion by the State to reconsider, the court modified its judgment, limiting its holding of unconstitutionality to sections 12-13(a)(1) and 12-14(a)(2). The circuit court of Fayette County dismissed the indictments against Russell, Garland and Rhodes on the same grounds that the circuit court of Marion County relied on, vagueness and overbreadth.
Criminal sexual assault is defined in section 12 -- 13(a)(1) of the Criminal Code, which inter alia provides:
"The accused commits criminal sexual assault if he or she:
"ny contact, however slight, between the sex organ of one person and the sex organ, mouth or anus of another person, or any intrusion, however slight, of any part of the body of one person or of any animal or object into the sex organ or anus of another person, including but not limited to cunnilingus, fellatio or anal penetration . . .." Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 12-12(f).
"Force or threat of force" is defined in section 12 -- 12(d) as:
"The use of force or violence, or the threat of force or violence, including but not limited to ...