APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS, FIRST DISTRICT, FOURTH DIVISION
513 N.E.2d 97, 160 Ill. App. 3d 6, 111 Ill. Dec. 851 1987.IL.1206
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County; the Hon. Irwin Cohen, Judge, presiding.
PRESIDING JUSTICE McMORROW delivered the opinion of the court. LINN and JOHNSON, JJ., concur.
DECISION OF THE COURT DELIVERED BY THE HONORABLE JUDGE MCMORROW
Plaintiff Broadway Bank (bank) instituted citation proceedings against defendant Dena E. Kakos (Dena) to satisfy a foreign judgment it had obtained against her in the amount of $231,654.87. The bank requested that the trial court apply to Dena's judgment debt certain monthly payments she received from her former husband, Steve Kakos (Steve), which were being paid by Steve pursuant to a judgment dissolving his marriage to Dena. The trial court found that the payments were alimony or income to Dena, exempt from application to the judgment to the extent necessary for Dena's "support" or "reasonable requirements." (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 110, pars. 2-1402(b)(2), 12-1001(g)(4).) The bank appeals. We affirm the trial court's finding that the payments are alimony, rather than payments pursuant to a division of property rights.
The bank, a judgment creditor, registered a foreign judgment in the amount of $231,654.87 against Dena in April 1984. Subsequently, the bank filed a citation to discover assets. It petitioned the trial court to order Dena to deliver to the bank, among other things, the $1,500 monthly payments she would receive from Steve each month from December 1984 until June 1991 pursuant to the marriage settlement agreement incorporated into the judgment dissolving the marriage.
In the marriage settlement agreement and judgment, Steve agreed to pay Dena $158,000 "in lieu of periodic maintenance or support." The $158,000 was to be paid as follows: $10,000 within 30 days of the execution of the agreement, $500 per month from July 1981 until February 1984, and $1,500 per month from March 1984 until June 1991. The agreement provided that payments were to terminate upon the death of either spouse. In the property settlement agreement, Dena received specifically described real estate, certain stocks and bonds, an automobile, a loan receivable, and miscellaneous personal property.
Based on the testimony presented on the bank's petition to discover assets, the trial court found Steve's payments to constitute alimony, support, or income to Dena, exempt from garnishment or application to a judgment debt to the extent necessary for Dena's "support" or "reasonable requirements." (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 110, pars. 2-1402(b)(2), 12-1001(g)(4).) The trial court determined that Dena's "reasonable requirements" and the amount "necessary for her support" was $1,275 each month. It ordered Dena to pay the bank $225 from the $1,500 she received monthly from Steve. The bank appeals.
The bank contends that the trial court erred in finding Steve's payments to be alimony, support, or income exempt from garnishment. The bank asserts that the payments by Steve are maintenance in gross. It further argues that because maintenance in gross has been described as being "in the nature of a property settlement," Steve's payments to Dena are not alimony; thus, the bank argues, the entire amount of each payment should be applied to the judgment. Ihle v. Ihle (1981), 92 Ill. App. 3d 893, 896, 416 N.E.2d 366, 369, citing Pacione v. Pacione (1980), 81 Ill. App. 3d 600, 605, 402 N.E.2d 316, appeal denied (1980), 81 Ill. 2d 594.
A court may compel a judgment debtor to apply any assets in the debtor's possession to a judgment debt. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 110, par. 2-1402(b)(1).) A judgment creditor may execute or levy on money owed to the judgment debtor. (Deschauer v. Hilt (1982), 105 Ill. App. 3d 657, 434 N.E.2d 552; National Bank v. First Wisconsin National Bank (1977), 48 Ill. App. 3d 915, 363 N.E.2d 619.) "[Alimony], support or separate maintenance," however, are exempt from application on a judgment to the extent necessary for the support of the judgment debtor. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 110, par. 12-1001(g)(4).
Generally, "alimony" falls into two categories: (1) ordinary or periodic alimony, and (2) alimony in gross, sometimes referred to as lump sum alimony or as maintenance in gross. (Roberts v. Roberts (1967), 90 Ill. App. 2d 184, 189, 234 N.E.2d 372; see also In re Marriage of Mass (1981), 102 Ill. App. 3d 984, 994-96, 431 N.E.2d 1, appeal denied (1982), 91 Ill. 2d 560.) Maintenance in gross has the same meaning that alimony in gross has traditionally had in Illinois. In re Marriage of Freeman (1985), 106 Ill. 2d 290, 298, 478 N.E.2d 326.
Maintenance in gross is a non-modifiable sum certain to be paid either in a lump sum or in installments over a fixed period regardless of changes in circumstances. (See generally In re Marriage of Freeman (1985), 106 Ill. 2d 290, 478 N.E.2d 326; In re Marriage of Mass (1981), 102 Ill. App. 3d 984, 431 N.E.2d 1.) Upon a review of the parties' marital settlement agreement, we conclude that the award in the instant case is maintenance in gross, a form of alimony.
The description of maintenance in gross as "in the nature of a property settlement" for certain purposes does not alter its legal status as alimony here. Notwithstanding the various characterizations given to maintenance in gross, the fundamental purpose of a maintenance in gross allowance is the support and maintenance of the recipient spouse. (See In re Marriage of Mass (1981), 102 Ill. App. 3d 984, 994-96, 431 N.E.2d 1; Palacio v. Palacio (1975), 33 Ill. App. 3d 1074, 1078-79, 339 N.E.2d 427.) Maintenance in gross falls within the legal definition of alimony. ...