APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS, FIRST DISTRICT, FIFTH DIVISION
510 N.E.2d 1087, 157 Ill. App. 3d 955, 110 Ill. Dec. 56 1987.IL.895
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County; the Hon. Fred G. Suria, Judge, presiding.
JUSTICE PINCHAM delivered the opinion of the court. SULLIVAN, P.J., concurs. JUSTICE LORENZ, specially Concurring.
DECISION OF THE COURT DELIVERED BY THE HONORABLE JUDGE PINCHAM
Following a trial by the court, the defendant, Willie McBride, was found guilty of voluntary manslaughter (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 9-2) of Diane Neil on July 20, 1983, in Chicago and he was sentenced to 10 years' imprisonment. On this appeal he contends for reversal that, because he was arrested "for investigation" and without probable cause, the trial court erred in overruling his motion to quash his arrest and suppress his statements.
The defendant urges that his arrest by Chicago police detectives Peterson and Harrington violated his constitutional right to be secure in his person against unreasonable seizure, guaranteed by the fourth and fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution and section 6 of article I of the Illinois Constitution.
The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution, in pertinent part, provides:
"The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, . . .." U.S. Const., amend. IV.
Section 6 of article I of the Illinois Constitution provides, in pertinent part:
"The people shall have the right to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and other possessions against unreasonable searches, seizures, invasions of privacy or interceptions of communications by eavesdropping devices or other means. . . .." Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, sec. 6.
The defendant, Willie McBride, and Chicago police detective Stephen Peterson were the only witnesses on the hearing of the defendant's motion to quash the defendant's arrest and suppress his statements. Their testimony established that Chicago police detectives Stephen Peterson and Harrington went to the production office where the defendant was employed, Printing Arts, 500 South Clinton Street in Chicago, on July 21, 1983, at approximately 3 p.m. The detectives directed the defendant's supervisor, Dennis Durkennis, to have the defendant leave his work area and come to the production office. Durkennis did so. When the defendant arrived in the office, the detectives showed the defendant their police badges and asked the defendant his name. The defendant told the detectives his name, whereupon the detectives directed the defendant to turn around and put his hands behind his back. When the defendant asked, "For what?" the detectives responded, "So you don't run." The defendant complied with the detectives' command and they cuffed the defendant's hands behind his back. The detectives told the defendant that they were taking him to the police station "for investigation" of the Diane Neil homicide. The detectives took the defendant to the police station, chained him to a wall and questioned him. The defendant made several exculpatory statements. *fn1
In overruling the defendant's motion to quash his arrest and suppress his statements, the trial court commented, inter alia :
"If the officer were to ask me my opinion as to what he should do under these circumstances I would of course suggest that he go to the place of employment, request Mr. McBride to accompany him to the station for the statement and not place him in handcuffs and not place him under arrest. The officer did not seek my opinion."
The defendant contends before this court that his arrest by the detectives "for investigation" violated his constitutional right to be secure in his person against unreasonable search and seizure. On oral argument before this court, the court inquired of the State if the detectives' testimony that they took the defendant into the police station "for investigation" could be discounted. The question was not answered.
An arrest "for investigation" or "for questioning" was condemned and held to violate the fourth amendment's constitutional right of security of person against unreasonable seizure in Brown v. Illinois (1975), 422 U.S. 590, 45 L. Ed. 2d 416, 95 S. Ct. 2254. In Brown two Chicago detectives were investigating the murder of Roger Corpus, which occurred on May 6, 1968. On May 13, as Brown climbed the stairs leading to the rear entrance of his Chicago apartment, the detectives pointed their revolvers at him and told him, "Don't move, you are under arrest." The detectives ordered Brown to stand against the wall and they searched him. When he denied that he was Brown, the detectives showed Brown his picture, informed him that he was under arrest for the murder of Roger Corpus, handcuffed him, took him to the squad car and to the police station, where Brown confessed to his participation in the Corpus murder.
In the hearing of Brown's motion to quash his arrest and suppress his confessions, the detectives testified that "they made the arrest for the purpose of questioning Brown as part of their investigation of the murder of a man named Roger Corpus." The trial court denied Brown's motion to quash his arrest and suppress his confessions and the confessions were admitted as evidence against him at his trial for the murder of Corpus. Brown was convicted. The supreme court affirmed. People v. Brown (1974), 56 Ill. 2d 312, 307 N.E.2d 356.
In reversing the supreme court and holding that Brown's arrest was unconstitutional and illegal, the following language of the Supreme Court is applicable to the defendant's arrest in the case at bar:
"The illegality here, moreover, had a quality of purposefulness. The impropriety of the arrest was obvious; awareness of that fact was virtually conceded by the two detectives when they repeatedly acknowledged, in their testimony, that the purpose of their action was 'for investigation' or for 'questioning.' [Citation.] The arrest, both in design and execution, was investigatory. The detectives embarked upon this expedition in the hope that something might turn up." Brown v. Illinois (1975), 422 U.S. 590, 605, 45 L. Ed. 2d 416, 428, 95 S. Ct. 2254, 2262-63.
In the case at bar, "the arrest, both in design and execution, was investigatory" and in the case at bar, as in Brown, it too is quite apparent that "the detectives embarked upon this expedition in the hope that something might turn up."
In Dunaway v. New York (1979), 442 U.S. 200, 60 L. Ed. 2d 824, 99 S. Ct. 2248, the Supreme Court again held that an arrest without probable cause for investigation or interrogation is constitutionally invalid. In Dunaway, a pizza parlor proprietor was killed during an attempted robbery. Six months later, the detectives received information from an informant, who was in jail awaiting trial for burglary, that Dunaway was involved in the murder-robbery. Even though the informant did not furnish enough information to obtain an arrest warrant for Dunaway, the detectives nevertheless arrested him, took him to a police station where he was questioned, made statements and ...