The opinion of the court was delivered by: Mills, District Judge:
A question of IRS summonses.
They are valid and must stand.
Dennis brings this action under the Internal Revenue Code,
26 U.S.C. § 7609(b)(2)(A), to quash six Internal Revenue Service
("IRS" or "Service") summonses issued during an investigation of his
federal income tax liabilities for the calendar years 1981, 1982, and
After the Government moved to dismiss, Dennis demanded discovery by way
of interrogatories and requests to produce. Following his motion to
compel responses, the Government sought a protective order. Dennis
— who appears pro se — then filed a memorandum setting forth
his positions both on discovery and the merits. Argument ensued before
U.S. Magistrate Charles H. Evans, who ruled in favor of the Government on
the discovery matters.
The Magistrate also recommended that the district court allow the
motion to dismiss. His able recommendations are hereby adopted and the
Government's motion to dismiss is consequently allowed. Before launching
into our analysis, a short review of the facts is in order.
Bernard Coleman is a duly commissioned special agent of the Service's
Criminal Investigation Division, with a post of duty in Springfield,
Illinois. In his capacity as a special agent, Coleman investigated
Dennis' federal tax liabilities for the taxable years 1981, 1982, and
Pursuant to the investigation, and in accordance with
26 U.S.C. § 7602, between the dates of April 9 and July 30, 1985,
inclusive, the IRS issued a summons to Millikin National Bank, Decatur,
Illinois; First Federal Savings and Loan Association, Tuscola, Illinois;
Credit Bureau of Decatur, Inc.; Monroe Savings Bank of Rochester, New
York; Illinois Bell Telephone Company, Chicago, Illinois; and
Teleconnect, Cedar Rapids, Iowa. Each summons directed the named to
appear before him (or another designated officer of the Service) on a
specified date to testify and produce for examination the books, papers,
records and other data set forth in the document. Dennis timely filed an
amended petition seeking to quash the summonses.
The Government moves to dismiss the action for failure to state a claim
upon which the Court may grant relief. Fed.R. Civ.P. 12(b)(6).
Additionally, the Government maintains the district court is without
jursidiction to quash three out-of-district summonses since the United
States has not waived its sovereign immunity with respect to an action
seeking to quash summonses issued to out-of-district entities.*fn1
Agent Coleman derives his power from § 7601(a) of Title 26. That
provision directs the Secretary of the Treasury (or his delegate) to make
inquiries into the tax liability of every person who may be liable to pay
any Internal Revenue tax. To aid in an investigation, § 7602(a) and
(b) authorize the examination of records, issuance of summonses, and
taking of testimony for the purposes of: (1) "ascertaining the
correctness of any return," (2) "making a return where none has been
made," (3) "determining the liability of any person for any internal
revenue tax," and/or (4) "inquiring into any offense connected with the
administration or enforcement of the internal revenue laws." United
States v. Euge, 444 U.S. 707, 710-11, 100 S.Ct. 874, 877-78, 63 L.Ed.2d
141 (1979); United States v. LaSalle Nat'l Bank, 437 U.S. 298, 308, 98
S.Ct. 2357, 2363, 57 L.Ed.2d 221 (1978); United States v. Particle Data,
lnc., 634 F. Supp. 272, 276-77 (N.D.Ill. 1986).
In seeking to quash the summonses in question, Dennis attempts to take
advantage of § 7609(b)(2)(A), a provision which expressly waives the
sovereign immunity of the United States. It permits the taxpayer (or
other person entitled under § 7609(a)(1) to notice of a summons),
upon complying with the conditions of the ...