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04/24/87 Daniel B. Nelson, Jr., v. Gary Estes Et Al.

April 24, 1987

DANIEL B. NELSON, JR., PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE

v.

GARY ESTES ET AL., DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS



APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS, SECOND DISTRICT

507 N.E.2d 530, 154 Ill. App. 3d 937, 107 Ill. Dec. 617 1987.IL.541

Appeal from the Circuit Court of Kane County; the Hon. Michael F. O'Brien, Judge, presiding.

APPELLATE Judges:

JUSTICE WOODWARD delivered the opinion of the court. LINDBERG, P.J., and HOPF, J., concur.

DECISION OF THE COURT DELIVERED BY THE HONORABLE JUDGE WOODWARD, Defendants, Gary Estes and Rita Estes, appeal from the entry of summary judgment against them in a forcible entry and detainer suit.

Plaintiff, Daniel B. Nelson, Jr., filed a complaint in forcible entry and detainer against the defendants on January 31, 1985, alleging that he was entitled to possession of certain legally described real estate commonly known as 33 West 256 Shagbark Lane, Wayne, Illinois. Defendants filed a jury demand and an answer denying that plaintiff was entitled to possession of said real estate. Thereafter, plaintiff took discovery depositions of both defendants, and on February 7, 1986, he filed a motion for summary judgment which alleged that the only issue raised by the pleadings was whether plaintiff was entitled to possession of said real estate by virtue of the provisions of an option contract entered into with the defendants on July 6, 1977. The motion for summary judgment by the plaintiff further alleged that he gave the defendants an option to purchase said real estate for $84,500 by July 31, 1978. Plaintiff further alleged that the defendants failed to pay him the $84,500 due between July 1977 and July 1978; that over the last nine-year period, the defendants only paid plaintiff $25,000; that no written modification or alteration of the option contract was entered into; and that defendants had received a demand for possession. The respective depositions of the defendants were attached to the motion for summary judgment.

Defendants' response to the motion for summary judgment alleged that during the term of the option contract defendants paid plaintiff in excess of $25,000; that plaintiff and defendants reached a verbal agreement under which defendants would pay plaintiff cash over a longer period as plaintiff would request; that defendants tendered to plaintiff the cash balance of $59,500; and that plaintiff breached the verbal agreement by refusing the tender of cash.

In the deposition of the defendant, Gary Estes, he stated that he paid $25,000 to the plaintiff prior to the expiration of the option; that he and the plaintiff verbally made an alternative agreement whereby he would pay $84,500 in cash over a longer period of time, as it would be requested by the plaintiff; he was not sure but he believed that the new agreement was made prior to July 31,1978; he stated, however, that plaintiff did not accept any cash that he had tendered pursuant to that offer; and that in 1983 he last offered to pay the plaintiff the sum of $59,500 in cash that allegedly became due under the contract as modified. He identified an exhibit No. 2 dated December 4, 1978, which was an agreement signed by the defendants but not by the plaintiff; the defendant stated that this document was prepared by plaintiff or someone on his staff; however, it stated that the defendants were to accept $60,000 free rent for 60 months and then vacate the premises.

The defendant, Rita Estes, stated in her deposition that to the best of her knowledge, the other agreements with the plaintiff were made after July 31, 1978.

A certified report of proceedings was filed in lieu of a verbatim transcript pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 323(c) (87 Ill. 2d R. 323(c)); however, the only court proceedings consisted of the argument of the attorneys on the motion for summary judgment.

Although the parties have not stated the following facts in their briefs, the deposition of the defendant, Gary Estes, that was attached to the motion for summary judgment contained various exhibits and also other facts which indicated that Gary Estes acted as a general contractor and constructed a residence on said real estate; that Gary Estes' claimed payment to the plaintiff of $25,000 consisted of payment for materials or services in connection with the construction of the residence, and, further, it was stated that plaintiff furnished certain portions of the cost of the residence amounting to $84,500, and that he selected the items that he would pay in order that he could write them off as a business expense. The real estate and home constructed thereon were referred to in the deposition as a $250,000 home, and there was a written request by the plaintiff dated October 25, 1984, to defendants for access to the premises to have an appraisal made, and also attached thereto were other exhibits consisting of correspondence from the defendants addressed to Mr. Goode, concerning an offer to buy the premises.

Furthermore, attached to the deposition of the defendant, Gary Estes, was a copy of the option agreement identified as plaintiff's exhibit No. 1, which was signed by all of the parties. This document was apparently the initial transaction between the parties; it provided that the optionee could exercise the option by: (a) written notice delivered to the optionor on or before July 31, 1978, (b) by payment of the price or portion thereof specified, and (c) by delivery of any note and mortgage or trust deed above provided for. In addition the option described gave a legal description of the real estate and provided for a price of $84,500 payable as follows:

"IN FULL upon completion of single family residence errected [ sic ] on said lot, evidence of completion being issuance of occupancy permit, funds to be paid from Mortgage acquired by Optionee only."

On August 13, 1986, the court granted plaintiff's motion for summary judgment. Defendants appeal from that order, contending that the option contract had been modified as to time for payment by a verbal agreement reached prior to the expiration of the time set forth in the written agreement, ...


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