APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS, FIFTH DISTRICT
Construction Company, et al., Third-Party, Defendants; H.W. Kroeger Erection
Construction Company, Fourth-Party, Plaintiff; Davey McKee et
503 N.E.2d 1106, 151 Ill. App. 3d 1092, 105 Ill. Dec. 100 1987.IL.84
Appeal from the Circuit Court of St. Clair County; the Hon. Patrick J. Fleming, Judge, presiding.
JUSTICE JONES delivered the opinion of the court. HARRISON and KASSERMAN, JJ., concur.
DECISION OF THE COURT DELIVERED BY THE HONORABLE JUDGE JONES
The plaintiffs, Harold Dasenbrock and Terri Lynn Dasenbrock, brought suit, occasioned by personal injury suffered by Harold Dasenbrock, against the defendants, Serstel Company (Serstel) and Koppers Company, Inc. (Koppers). Harold Dasenbrock, an employee of the Granite City Steel Company (Granite City) was injured in a fall of about 25 feet on March 10, 1980, at the site of construction of a battery of coke-producing ovens on his employer's premises. Both defendants were involved in the construction in question. In count I of his second amended complaint, Harold Dasenbrock sought damages from Serstel for an alleged violation of the Structural Work Act (the Act) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 48, par. 60 et seq.); in count III he sought damages from Koppers for an alleged violation of the Act. In counts II and IV he sought damages from Serstel and Koppers, respectively, for alleged negligence. In the remaining counts Terri Lynn Dasenbrock sought damages for loss of consortium. In this appeal we are concerned with only those counts of the second amended complaint and aspects of the litigation having to do with the Structural Work Act. None of the third-party defendants or fourth-party litigants are involved in this appeal.
In response to the motions of both Serstel and Koppers for summary judgment as to counts I and III, the trial court denied the motions and, pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 308(a) (87 Ill. 2d R. 308(a)), found that the order involved a question of law as to which there is a substantial ground for difference of opinion and that an immediate appeal from the order might materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation. The trial court stated the question of law as follows:
"Whether the plaintiff, a pipefitter employed in Granite City Steel's maintenance department, who was not employed as a construction worker nor engaged in any phase of the construction project taking place on the Granite City Steel premises and was in the construction area contrary to Granite City Steel's policy, is a protected person under the ...