Appeal from the Circuit Court of Kane County; the Hon. Paul W.
Schnake and the Hon. John A. Krause, Judges, presiding.
PRESIDING JUSTICE NASH DELIVERED THE OPINION OF THE COURT:
This consolidated action is the result of litigation arising from the proposed development of a mobile-home park in the village of Gilberts (village), by the Holiday Park Corporation (Holiday Park). The village contends (1) an order enjoining the village from interfering with Holiday Park's development of the site is void, and (2) the circuit court erred in dismissing its complaint seeking to enjoin further development by Holiday Park. Holiday Park contends the trial court erred in finding the term "interfere" in the injunction order to be overbroad and in failing to hold the village in contempt for violating the terms of the injunction.
On February 17, 1978, Holiday Park filed an action seeking a declaratory judgment that the development site had been properly rezoned as an R-1 single-family residential district, with conditional use as a mobile-home park. On April 15, 1980, the court found the subject property was zoned as an R-1 district and ordered the village to issue all necessary permits to Holiday Park upon proper application by the corporation, including compliance with applicable subdivision ordinances.
On May 5, 1981, upon a request by Holiday Park for construction of various village ordinances, Judge John Krause held that Holiday Park's preliminary plan of development fulfilled the requirements of all applicable ordinances and statutes, except that Holiday Park had not yet obtained Illinois Environmental Protection Agency (IEPA) permits for water and sewage treatment. The court also considered a village ordinance relating to the size of mobile-home lots and held that a subdivision ordinance was inapplicable to Holiday Park's development. On August 4, 1981, the court reaffirmed its findings, again ordered the village to issue all necessary permits to Holiday Park, and enjoined the village from "preventing or in any way interfering" with construction of the site in accordance with the approved plan of development. The village presently appeals from the August 4, 1981, order.
On May 24, 1984, the village filed a complaint seeking to enjoin Holiday Park from further construction, alleging that a building permit was required, the plan of development failed to meet sanitation requirements, and Holiday Park's planned construction of a retention lake, a water storage tower, and a sewage-treatment plant were not permitted uses in an R-1 district. On August 29, 1984, Judge Paul Schnake dismissed the village's complaint on grounds of res judicata. The village appeals from the dismissal of its complaint.
On July 23, 1984, Holiday Park filed a petition requesting the court hold the village in contempt for failure to obey the August 4, 1981, order. On January 7, 1985, Judge John Krause ruled the term "interfering" was overbroad and rendered the August 4, 1981, order unenforceable. Holiday Park appeals from that decision.
• 1 The village contends the August 4, 1981, order is void because (1) of lack of jurisdiction, (2) of vagueness, (3) the court's determination that a subdivision ordinance was inapplicable to Holiday Park's construction was not made in the decretal portion of its order, and (4) the court improperly awarded injunctive relief rather than a writ of mandamus. We first note that, although the village failed to appeal from the August 4, 1981, order within 30 days, or within 2 years, under section 2-1401(c) of the Code of Civil Procedure (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 110, par. 2-1401(c)), a petition attacking a judgment as void may be brought at any time. (In re Crouch (1985), 131 Ill. App.3d 694, 697, 476 N.E.2d 69, appeal denied (1985), 106 Ill.2d 554; Village of Franklin Park v. Ogilvie (1982), 106 Ill. App.3d 301, 303, 435 N.E.2d 1177; Augsburg v. Frank's Car Wash, Inc. (1982), 103 Ill. App.3d 329, 332-33, 431 N.E.2d 58.) Accordingly, we will consider the village's appeal from the August 4, 1981, order.
• 2 The village first argues the court lacked jurisdiction to enter the August 4, 1981, order because more than 30 days had elapsed from its final order of April 15, 1980. Generally, a court loses jurisdiction to alter or set aside a final judgment after 30 days from its entry. (Bundy v. Church League of America (1984), 125 Ill. App.3d 800, 806, 466 N.E.2d 681; In re Marriage of Emerson (1983), 115 Ill. App.3d 712, 717, 450 N.E.2d 987, appeal denied (1983), 96 Ill.2d 539; Kelly v. Kelly (1982), 105 Ill. App.3d 136, 140, 434 N.E.2d 55, appeal denied (1982), 91 Ill.2d 570.) However, a court retains inherent power to enforce its orders and decrees. Adam Martin Construction Co. v. Brandon Partnership (1985), 135 Ill. App.3d 324, 326, 481 N.E.2d 962; Cities Service Oil Co. v. Village of Oak Brook (1980), 84 Ill. App.3d 381, 384, 405 N.E.2d 379, appeal denied (1980), 81 Ill.2d 590.
• 3 Here it is apparent that the August 4, 1981, order merely enforced the court's prior judgment of April 15, 1980, and therefore the court had jurisdiction to enter the latter order. In its first order the court directed the village to issue all necessary permits to Holiday Park upon proper application by the corporation, including compliance with applicable subdivision ordinances. In its subsequent August 4, 1981, order, the court approved Holiday Park's plan of development, ruled that a subdivision ordinance was inapplicable, construed an ordinance relating to lot size, and enjoined the village from interfering with development of the mobile-home site. The latter order did not alter or set aside the April 15, 1980, judgment; it merely enforced it by determining which ordinances were applicable to Holiday Park's development. Accordingly, we find the court had jurisdiction to enter the August 4, 1981, order.
• 4 In any event, the village participated without objection in the proceedings that it presently argues were inconsistent with the April 15, 1980, order and thereby revested the court with jurisdiction. People v. Kaeding (1983), 98 Ill.2d 237, 241, 456 N.E.2d 11; Sears v. Sears (1981), 85 Ill.2d 253, 260, 422 N.E.2d 610; In re Marriage of Savas (1985), 139 Ill. App.3d 68, 73, 486 N.E.2d 1318.
• 5 The village next argues that the August 4, 1981, order, which enjoined the village from "in any way interfering with the development of the subject property in accordance with the preliminary site plan," was void for vagueness. An injunction should be as definite and precise in its terms as possible to avoid any excuse or reason for misunderstanding or disobeying its terms. In re Marriage of Grauer (1985), 133 Ill. App.3d 1019, 1026, 479 N.E.2d 982; Streif v. Bovinette (1980), 88 Ill. App.3d 1079, 1084, 411 N.E.2d 341.
• 6 In cases considering the question, the Illinois courts have disapproved injunctions which inadequately define the specific rights to be protected or merely allude to general principles of conduct to be followed. In Streif v. Bovinette (1980), 88 Ill. App.3d 1079, 1084-85, 411 N.E.2d 341, the court held that an injunctive phrase forbidding defendant from "annoying or harassing the plaintiff in any manner" lacked particularity and language enjoining a party from "interfering in any way with plaintiff's use and enjoyment of his property rights and his business operations" did not adequately define the rights to be preserved. Similarly, in Illinois School Bus Co. v. South Suburban Safeway Lines, Inc. (1971), 132 Ill. App.2d 833, 839-41, 270 N.E.2d 200, appeal denied (1971), 47 Ill.2d 590, an injunction restraining the defendant from transporting school children unless it complied with statutes was held to be vague. However, the courts have upheld an injunction prohibiting individuals from "interfering with * * * plaintiff's employees in the performance of their duties." (Illinois Power Co. v. Latham (1973), 15 Ill. App.3d 156, 164-65, 303 N.E.2d 448.) And in a case presenting injunctive language similar to that questioned here, the court approved an injunction restraining individuals "from interfering with plaintiff from proceeding with the construction of the improvement" in accordance with approved plans. (Dvorson v. City of Chicago (1970), 119 Ill. App.3d 357, 365-66, 256 N.E.2d 59.) Here, the court enjoined the village from interfering with Holiday Park's development of the land in accordance with an approved plan of development. In light of the cases upholding similar language, we cannot say the August 4, 1981, order inadequately defined the prohibited conduct or was so unclear or imprecise as to render it void for vagueness.
• 7, 8 Next, the village argues the court failed to include its finding that a subdivision ordinance was inapplicable in the decretal portion of its August 4, 1981, order and, therefore, the judgment is void as to that issue. We disagree. Although only the decretal portion of an order may operate effectively as a judgment (Buchanan v. Lenz (1983), 115 Ill. App.3d 722, 726, 450 N.E.2d 1298, cert. denied (1984), 466 U.S. 905, 80 L.Ed.2d 155, 104 S.Ct. 1680; Stewart v. Stewart (1975), 35 Ill. App.3d 236, 239, 341 N.E.2d 136; Green v. Green (1974), 21 Ill. App.3d 396, 402-03, 315 N.E.2d 324), a decree must be construed in its entirety and should include consideration of the entire record, prior pleadings, and former decrees concerning the same cause (Baldi v. Chicago Title & Trust Co. (1983), 113 Ill. App.3d 29, 33, 446 N.E.2d 1205; Comet Casualty Co. v. Schneider (1981), 98 Ill. App.3d 786, 789, 424 N.E.2d 911, appeal denied (1981), 85 Ill.2d 577; Osina v. City of Chicago (1975), 28 Ill. App.3d 955, 958, 329 N.E.2d 498, appeal denied (1975), 60 Ill.2d 597). In its judgment of August 4, 1981, the court specifically reaffirmed its order entered May 5, 1981, in which it held that the subdivision ordinance was inapplicable to Holiday Park's plan of development. This effectively incorporated the prior decree in the August 4, 1981, order, and it therefore is not void as to that issue.
• 9 In its final challenge to the August 4, 1981, order, the village argues a writ of mandamus is the only proper method to compel the issuance of building permits and the court therefore erred in ordering the issuance by means of an injunction. This issue was not raised in the trial court and may not be raised for the first time on appeal. (Western Casualty & Surety Co. v. Brochu (1985), 105 Ill.2d 486, 500, 475 N.E.2d 872; Anderson v. Sutter (1983), 119 Ill. App.3d 1070, 1073, 458 N.E.2d 39; Dolce v. Dolce (1982), 108 Ill. App.3d 817, 820, 439 N.E.2d 1028.) In any event, a writ of mandamus will properly issue only where the plaintiff possesses a clear right to the relief sought. (In re Claudia K. (1982), 91 Ill.2d 469, 476, 440 N.E.2d 78; Schallau v. City of Northlake (1979), 82 Ill. App.3d 456, 467, 403 N.E.2d 266; Long v. Elk Grove Village (1978), 64 Ill. App.3d 1006, 1008, 382 N.E.2d 79.) At the time Holiday Park filed its request for injunctive relief, it had not yet complied with all applicable ordinances nor had its plan of site ...