The opinion of the court was delivered by: Mills, District Judge:
The parties offer cross motions for summary judgment.
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56. The Court finds that liability rests with the
Defendants who have denied the Plaintiffs their rights to
procedural due process in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Jurisdiction is appropriately premised on 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
Summary judgment "shall be rendered forthwith if the
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and
admissions on file together with the affidavits, if any, show
that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and
that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). In considering a motion for summary
judgment, the Court must view the facts in the light most
favorable to the party against whom summary judgment is
entered and give that party the benefit of all reasonable
inferences to be drawn from the underlying facts. Adickes v.
S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 1608, 26
L.Ed.2d 142 (1970). Cross motions for summary judgment require
no less careful scrutiny of the factual allegations. LaCourte
Oreilles Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians v. Voigt,
700 F.2d 341, 349 (7th Cir. 1983). The Court's inquiry "unavoidably
asks whether reasonable jurors could find by a preponderance of
the evidence that the Plaintiff is entitled to a verdict —
`whether there is [evidence] upon which a jury can properly
proceed to find a verdict for the party producing it, upon whom
the onis of proof is imposed.'" Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,
Inc., ___ U.S. ___, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2511, 91 L.Ed.2d 202
(1986), (quoting Improvement Co. v. Munson, 14 Wall. 442, 448,
81 U.S. 442, 448, 81 U.S. 442, 20 L.Ed. 867 (1872) (emphasis in
The posture of this particular litigation facilitates
adherence to these guidelines. The parties have hammered out
an understanding of the facts by dent of hard labor.
The Plaintiffs are employees of the State of Illinois,
specifically the Department of Public Aid. The employees of
the Department of Public Aid are divided into at least two
bargaining units for the purpose of administering a collective
bargaining agreement entered into between the State of
Illinois and Defendant American Federation of State, County,
and Municipal Employees (AFSCME). Although none of the
Plaintiffs are members of Defendant AFSCME, they have been
assigned to one of two bargaining units: RC-62 or RC-63. As of
August 30, 1985, there were 12,289 state employees assigned to
these two bargaining units and approximately half of these
employees were not members of Defendant AFSCME.
"Fair share" assessments are fees deducted from the
paychecks of non-union employees and paid to the union as a
pro rata assessment of the costs of conducting collective
bargaining activities from which the non-union employees
necessarily benefit. The parties do not contest the
constitutionality of "fair share" assessments, rather the
Plaintiffs object to the procedure whereby the fees were
After entering into the "fair share" agreement, CMS notified
various state department managers by letter of the impending
"fair share" assessments in late April and again in early July
1984. By August 30, 1985, a majority of the employees in
bargaining units RC-62 and RC-63 became members of Defendant
AFSCME. Thereupon Defendant AFSCME notified CMS of its
intention to seek "fair share" deductions from all employees
who were not members of the union. Pursuant to the agreement
entered into between AFSCME and CMS, AFSCME certified the
"fair share" contribution to be 90% of regular union dues.
On September 6, 1985, CMS informed the various state
agencies that deductions for "fair share" contributions would
begin with the September 16 through 30 pay period. Between
September 10 and September 30, 1985, members of Defendant
AFSCME placed notices of the impending "fair share"
assessments on bulletin boards throughout the state offices.
(Exhibits affixed to Defendant AFSCME's reply to Plaintiffs'
motion for a preliminary injunction.) The notices indicated
that the "fair share" assessment would be "90% of local union
dues paid by AFSCME members." They gave a brief explanation of
the manner in which the percentage was determined. And they
stated that the deductions would begin with the September 30,
1985, pay period. Both notices provided the following
information regarding objections to and appeals from the "fair
Non-members have the right to object to the
amount of the "fair share" fee and may do so (1)
through AFSCME's internal procedure; or (2) by
filing an unfair labor practice charge with the
Illinois Public Employee Labor Relations Board,
320 West Washington St., Suite 500, Springfield,
write: AFSCME Council 31, Attention Jackie
Kinnamen, 201 North Wells St., # 1850, Chicago,
This suit was filed on September 27, 1986. The first pay
period during which "fair share" assessments were deducted
ended on September 30, 1986. Two days later, CMS sent a letter
to all affected employees signed by Bureau of Personnel
Manager Robert H. Tapscott which in substance tracked the
notices posted by Defendant AFSCME. (Plaintiff's Exhibit 6).
With respect to the opportunity to object and appeal the CMS