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Shoopman v. Allen

OPINION FILED JUNE 30, 1986.

MAC SHOOPMAN, D/B/A PRICE REALTY, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT,

v.

TROY ALLEN, DEFENDANT-APPELLEE.



Appeal from the Circuit Court of Brown County; the Hon. Robert W. Cook, Judge, presiding.

JUSTICE WEBBER DELIVERED THE OPINION OF THE COURT:

Plaintiff filed suit in the circuit court of Brown County seeking recovery on a judgment note executed by defendant and payable to the order of plaintiff. Following a trial at bench on the merits, the trial court found in favor of defendant and this appeal ensued.

Since our decision rests on grounds other than the merits of the controversy, no detailed explanation of the facts is necessary. A broad outline of those facts follows.

Defendant's daughter, after a dissolution of her marriage, was seeking to purchase a home for which defendant was to furnish the financing. The daughter, Janet Schenk, consulted with a salesperson, Susan Heaton, who was connected with plaintiff's real estate agency. A house owned by Larry Franklin and located in Mount Sterling was shown to Schenk by Heaton. The house appealed to Schenk and a form of offer-to-purchase was filled in showing Franklin as the seller and defendant as the purchaser at a price of $55,000. This form, together with the note under litigation, was mailed to defendant at Abingdon, his place of residence. The note was in the amount of $5,500 and according to the purchase offer represented an earnest-money payment.

Defendant altered the purchase price to $50,000 on the document, signed it, and mailed it back to Heaton. He did not alter the face amount of the note which was also returned. After sundry conversations between and among Schenk, Heaton, Franklin, and defendant, Franklin signed the purchase offer and Heaton returned it to defendant. It is clear from the record that there was never any direct communication between Franklin and defendant. Franklin operated through Heaton and defendant through his daughter Schenk.

The trial court found, based upon the prolix evidence presented, that the defendant had revoked his offer prior to its acceptance by Franklin. It then entered judgment in favor of defendant and ordered the note returned to him.

On the day of trial defendant filed a motion to withdraw his answer and to file a motion to dismiss. The gist of the motion was that plaintiff, as an escrow agent, had no power to sue on the note and that Franklin was a necessary party. Franklin had never been joined in the suit as either plaintiff or defendant. Plaintiff objected and resisted the motion. The court then denied the motion and proceeded to trial.

In this court, after the notice of appeal had been filed and briefing had been completed, plaintiff filed a motion to amend his pleadings and to add Franklin as a necessary party plaintiff. Attached to the motion was Franklin's affidavit stating that if the motion were allowed, he would ratify and adopt all of plaintiff's proceedings taken to date. Defendant objected to the motion.

• 1 This court denied the motion. It is noteworthy that both parties switched positions from those taken in the trial court. Below defendant sought to add Franklin and plaintiff objected. Just the reverse occurred here. The language of the supreme court in Auton v. Logan Landfill, Inc. (1984), 105 Ill.2d 537, 543, 475 N.E.2d 817, 818, is pertinent:

"It is fundamental to our adversarial process that a party waives his right to complain of an error where to do so is inconsistent with the position taken by the party in an earlier court proceeding."

Plaintiff's motion in this court is inconsistent with the position he took in the court below, and defendant's argument in his brief that Franklin was a necessary party and that the note was without consideration is inconsistent with his objection to plaintiff's motion in this court. Nonetheless, we are of the opinion that the non-joinder is the dispositive issue and that the trial court was in error in denying defendant's motion to dismiss. However, the error was harmless since the trial court arrived at the proper conclusion.

• 2 The language found in Board of Education v. Schmidt (1978), 64 Ill. App.3d 513, 517, 381 N.E.2d 400, 403, is apropos:

"We are aware of the fact that we are arriving at the same decision as the trial court but the decision of this court is predicated on a different reason. That a reviewing court can affirm the judgment of a trial court for reasons other than those relied upon by the trial court is well established. See 2 Ill. L. & Prac. Appeal & Error sec. 633, at 566 (1953); McDermott v. Burke (1912), 256 Ill. 401, 100 N.E. 168; Kelley v. Village of Willowbrook (1962), 38 Ill. App.2d 112, 186 N.E.2d 369; Meyer v. Povilat (1959), 20 Ill. App.2d 279, 156 N.E.2d 4."

As we have indicated, the note in question was payable to plaintiff. The pertinent provisions of the purchase offer state that a sum (originally $5,500 and altered to $5,000) "is deposited as earnest money with Price Realty, Escrow Agent." At the bottom of the instrument receipt of $5,500 in the form of a note as earnest money is acknowledged. In the body of the instrument appears in pertinent part: "should the said purchaser fail to perform this contract, then the above earnest money shall be forfeited by the Purchaser as liquidated damages, and this contract shall be and become null ...


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