Before ROBINSON, Chief Judge, and MIKVA and GINSBURG, Circuit Judges.
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
UNPUBLISHED CASE RESOLUTION- NOT TO BE CITED AS PRECEDENT. SEE LOCAL RULE 8D.C. CIRCUIT.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA; Civil Action No. 84-01215.
This cause came on to be heard on the record on appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, and was briefed and argued by counsel.
On consideration of the foregoing, it is ORDERED and ADJUDGED by this Court that, for the reasons set forth in the attached memorandum, the judgment of the District Court appealed from in this cause be and hereby is affirmed. It is
FURTHER ORDERED by the Court, sua sponte , that the Clerk shall withhold issuance of the mandate herein until seven days after disposition of any timely petition for rehearing. See Local Rule 14, as amended on November 30, 1981, and June 15, 1982.
In 1983, appellant, Veronica Awkard, filed a complaint with her employer, the Securities and Exchange Commission, charging "sex harassment." She has not, however, filed any other administrative complaint. In an action brought in the District Court in 1984, she asserted claims of employment discrimination because of her sex, race, and handicap, as well as claims against named and unnamed individuals for assault, battery, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The District Court dismissed the action, "it appearing to the court that [appellant] has failed to exhaust her administrative remedies" for the discrimination claims, and that the exercise of pendent jurisdiction over the common law claims would not be appropriate.*fn1
The District Court ruled correctly. Persons who would complain in court of unlawful discrimination in federal employment must first accord the employing agency notice through the filing of an administrative charge, and must afford the agency a fair opportunity to investigate and, if in order, to provide redress.*fn2 Moreover, the agency process made available for an administrative disposition must be fully utilized before resort to the courts. The exhaustion doctrine "does not require merely the initiation of administrative procedures," rather, "[i]t is one of exhausting them . . . to their appropriate conclusion." *fn3
Appellant filed no administrative complaint of discrimination on the basis of race or handicap, and her sex discrimination plea in the District Court advances contentions she did not place before the agency. As counsel for the agency advised at oral argument, she may be able to reinstate her sexual harassment complaint for further proceedings before the agency. Nevertheless, because she did not give the agency the requisite notice and opportunity to respond at the administrative level, the District Court properly declined to entertain her discrimination ...