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People v. Kashney

OPINION FILED FEBRUARY 21, 1986.

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, APPELLEE,

v.

ROLAND J. KASHNEY, APPELLANT. — THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, APPELLANT,

v.

DAVID LEE, APPELLEE.



No. 61310. — Appeal from the Appellate Court for the First District; heard in that court on appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County, the Hon. Thomas J. Maloney, Judge, presiding.

No. 61342. — Appeal from the Appellate Court for the First District; heard in that court on appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County, the Hon. Edward M. Fiala, Judge, presiding.

JUSTICE MORAN DELIVERED THE OPINION OF THE COURT:

Rehearing denied April 1, 1986.

Neil F. Hartigan, Attorney General, of Springfield, and Richard M. Daley, State's Attorney, of Chicago (Mark L. Rotert, Assistant Attorney General, of Chicago, and Joan S. Cherry, Michael E. Shabat, Thomas V. Gainer, Jr., and Richard A. Stevens, Assistant State's Attorneys, of counsel), for the People.

Steven Clark and Patricia Unsinn, of the Office of the State Appellate Defender, of Chicago, for appellee.

In cause No. 61310, defendant, Roland Kashney, was found guilty of the murder of Benjamin Peck by a jury in the circuit court of Cook County and was sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not less than 30 nor more than 60 years. Defendant appealed his conviction to the appellate court raising numerous errors at trial. Chief among these errors was a claim that the prosecution improperly used statements made by the defendant to court-appointed psychiatrists who examined him to determine his fitness for trial. The defendant argued that his statements were inadmissible because he had not presented the affirmative defense of insanity. The court found no error and noted that the defendant "[had] not present[ed] a classic insanity defense in the sense of admitting the commission of the acts charged but contending that he was insane when he committed them. But he did present evidence suggesting to the jury that he was insane when he confessed to the crimes." (People v. Kashney (1984), 129 Ill. App.3d 218, 224.) The court, in affirming the judgment of the trial court, held that the State could use defendant's statements made during his fitness examinations for purposes of impeachment. 129 Ill. App.3d 218, 226.

In cause No. 61342, defendant, David Lee, was found guilty of rape by a jury in the circuit court of Cook County and was sentenced to a six-year term of imprisonment. Defendant appealed his conviction. As he had not raised the affirmative defense of insanity, defendant argued that the State should not have been permitted to introduce statements made during a court-ordered fitness examination for purposes of impeachment. The court agreed, reversing defendant's conviction and remanding the cause for a new trial. People v. Lee (1984), 128 Ill. App.3d 774, 780.

Both appeals raise a common question arising under section 104-14(a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 38, par. 104-14(a)) and, therefore, have been consolidated by this court. We are asked to decide whether or not the State, consistent with section 104-14(a), may introduce statements made by a defendant during a court-ordered psychiatric examination for purposes of impeachment. Section 104-14(a) provides in relevant part:

"Statements made by the defendant and information gathered in the course of any examination or treatment ordered under Section 104-13, 104-17 or 104-20 shall not be admissible against the defendant unless he raises the defense of insanity or the defense of drugged or intoxicated condition, in which case they shall be admissible only on the issue of whether he was insane, drugged, or intoxicated. * * *" Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 38, par. 104-14(a).

The defendant in cause No. 61342 raises a second issue. He asks that we find involuntary and, therefore, inadmissible certain incriminating statements he made after being told, deliberately but falsely, that his fingerprints had been found in the alleged victim's apartment.

The facts are set out at length in the respective appellate court opinions. Therefore, the facts related herein are limited to those necessary to decide the issues raised in these appeals.

In cause No. 61310 defendant Kashney was arrested, on the basis of an informant's tip, for the murder and armed robbery of Margaret Riggins and the murder and armed robbery of Benjamin Peck. Shortly after his arrest and after being advised of his Miranda rights, defendant signed a written statement confessing to both murders.

Prior to trial defendant moved to suppress his confession as given involuntarily, claiming that he had been hit on the head by an officer during questioning and that he was "afraid for his life." The trial court held a hearing on defendant's motion. The court expressed concern about defendant's allegation of being hit but found no corroboration of the incident. Further, the court cited unrefuted testimony by the assistant State's Attorney that he had spoken privately with the defendant prior to taking his written statement. The assistant State's Attorney directly asked the defendant whether or not he had been threatened or abused in any way. The ...


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