JUSTICE SIMON DELIVERED THE OPINION OF THE COURT:
The petitioner, who was licensed to practice law in Illinois in 1940, was disbarred on consent in May 1980 as a result of his April 1980 conviction in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois on two counts of mail fraud involving the payment of bribes to public officials. The petitioner was sentenced to 14 months in prison, fined $2,000, and placed on probation for five years. After he served four months in prison, his prison sentence was reduced to time served, and in September 1983, the period of probation was terminated. In December 1983, the petitioner filed a petition for reinstatement on the roll of attorneys licensed to practice law in this State. In January 1985, the Hearing Board filed a report recommending that the petition be denied. The petitioner filed exceptions before the Review Board, and in April 1985 the Review Board affirmed the Hearing Board's recommendation that the petition be denied. The matter comes before this court on the petitioner's exceptions to the report and recommendation of the Review Board pursuant to our Rule 767 (87 Ill.2d R. 767).
The petitioner's misconduct arose through his connection as attorney, member, officer and employee of the Community Currency Exchange Association between 1965 and 1976. In 1971, in the capacity of lobbyist and general counsel for the association, the petitioner met with two State Representatives who sat on the House Banking Committee. One of them demanded $30,000 in return for keeping an eye on currency-exchange legislation. The petitioner obtained the money from the association and paid them the bribe. In 1972, the petitioner paid them $20,000. In 1974, he paid them another $10,000. In 1976, he was asked by a State official for a $10,000 contribution from the association in the form of checks made payable to a political campaign fund. The petitioner delivered the checks to the official, who had the authority to approve licenses, transfers and sales of currency exchanges.
A petitioner seeking reinstatement to the practice of law has the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that he should be readmitted. (In re Schechet (1985), 105 Ill.2d 516, 521.) Rule 767(f) sets out some of the factors that are appropriate to consider in determining whether reinstatement is indicated:
"(a) the nature of the misconduct for which the petitioner was disciplined;
(b) the maturity and experience of the petitioner at the time discipline was imposed;
(c) whether the petitioner recognizes the nature and seriousness of the misconduct;
(d) when applicable, whether petitioner has made restitution;
(e) the petitioner's conduct since discipline was imposed; and
(f) the petitioner's candor and forthrightness in presenting evidence in support of the petition." 87 Ill.2d R. 767.
The offense for which the petitioner was convicted and which led to his disbarrment on consent was the payment of $70,000 in bribes to public officials. Rather than reporting the solicitation of bribes by those officials, the petitioner acted as the middleman, conveying information from the officials to the association and delivering the payments. As an experienced attorney and businessman at the time of his misconduct, the petitioner must have been aware that the bribery of elected officials is a serious offense that undermines the integrity of our system of government. For a lawyer to participate in such an offense is particularly reprehensible, especially when the bribe is solicited and collected from the lawyer's clients, since a lawyer has a duty to protect not only his clients but also the integrity of our legal system.
In paragraph 17 of his verified petition for reinstatement on the roll of attorneys, however, the petitioner states:
"C. Petitioner's conduct leading to his disbarrment on consent did not involve any breach of fiduciary obligation to a client. In fact, if anything, Petitioner's unlawful acts resulted from misguidedly being overprotective of a client."
As an attorney for the association, the petitioner had a duty to protect his clients from extortion, to dissuade them from engaging in the bribery of a public official, and to warn them of the illegality of such conduct and of its consequences. He also had a duty to our legal system to refuse to participate in such conduct in any way. That the petitioner characterizes the breach of these duties as misguided ...