Furthermore, several Illinois cases have interpreted the
statutory phrase "arising from" to require "only that the
plaintiff's claim be one which lies in the wake of the commercial
activities by which the defendant submitted to the jurisdiction
of the Illinois courts." Koplin v. Thomas, Haab & Botts,
73 Ill. App.2d 242, 253, 219 N.E.2d 646, 651 (1st Dist. 1966); see
also In Re Oil Spill by Amoco Cadiz, 699 F.2d 909 (7th Cir.
1983). Even if the alleged wrongful acts were discovered
subsequent to the sale of the Cregors' Wilmette home, this
dispute over coverage might lie in the wake of the activity
involved in the ownership and sale of the home.
The defendants are correct in stating that the court cannot
exercise jurisdiction over them with regard to the latter two
homeowner policies. These two policies insure a risk located
within the State of Hawaii, the Cregors' home there. In addition,
at the time these latter two contracts were executed, the Cregors
resided in Hawaii. The expectation of the parties is that an
action concerning the Cregors' Hawaiian home will arise in
Hawaii. The benefit and protection of Hawaiian law will likely
apply to any of the contractual duties regarding the Hawaiian
home. Therefore, the McNally lawsuit and this declaratory
judgment action are unrelated to the policies which insure the
Cregors' Hawaiian residence.
2. Due Process
Due process requires that personal jurisdiction be exerted only
when it would not offend "traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice." International Shoe v. Washington,
326 U.S. 310, 316, 66 S.Ct. 154, 158, 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945). Under Shaffer v.
Heitner, this fairness requires an assessment of the
"relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the
litigation." Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 204, 97 S.Ct.
2569, 2579, 53 L.Ed.2d 683 (1977). See also Madison Consulting
Group v. State of S.C., 752 F.2d 1193 (7th Cir. 1985). The facts
of the instant case demonstrate that a substantial relationship
exists between the defendants and the forum state to satisfy due
First, the facts that the Cregors were residents of Illinois at
the time of the first policy's execution and that they initiated
the negotiations leading to the first homeowners' policy are
strong factors in favor of personal jurisdiction. See O'Hare
International Bank v. Hampton, 437 F.2d 1173, 1176-77 (7th Cir.
1971) (the fact that the defendant did initiate the negotiations
leading to the contract by phoning the plaintiff is support for a
finding of personal jurisdiction). Second, the likely performance
of the first policy in Illinois, as contemplated by both parties,
is a factor constituting another meaningful contact between
defendants and Illinois. Madison Consulting Group, supra, 752
F.2d at 1204. In light of these factors, the Court concludes that
there exist sufficient minimum contacts between the Cregors and
Illinois for the exercise of personal jurisdiction.
Defendants raise the issue that the Northern District of
Illinois does not have proper venue over this cause of action.
Venue in this case is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a) which
A civil action wherein jurisdiction is founded only
on diversity of citizenship may, except as otherwise
provided by law, be brought only in the judicial
district where all plaintiffs or all defendants
reside, or in which the claim arose.
Although the McNallys, co-defendants in this declaratory judgment
action, reside in Illinois, the Cregors are now Hawaiian
residents. Therefore, venue is to be determined by where the
claim arose and not by where all defendants reside.